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FOREWORD
As part of the continuing program of unmanned exploration of space,
and to increase the effectiveness of the manned space program for exploring
the moon, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of
Technology issued six-month study contracts to investigate the feasibility
of a small, unmanned, lightweight, remotely controlled roving vehicle to
be incorporated in the surveyor spacecraft to extend its data-gathering
capabilities on the lunar surface. Specifically, the study program was to
determine the feasibility of a 100-1b Surveyor Lunar Roving Vehicle (SLRV)
system in gathering sufficient scientific information by surveying the lunar
surface near the Surveyor spacecraft landing point to certify the area, in
terms of specific hazards, as a potential Apollo LEM landing site.
This Final Technical Report, submitted in five volumes, presents the
results and conclusions of the study program conducted by The Bendix
Corporation under JPL Contract No. 950656. The volumes are organized
to correspond to the specific objectives of the program: to conduct an analysis,
to generate a preliminary design, and to fabricate and demonstrate an engi-
neering test model in support of the over-all program objectives.
The results of Bendix's study show that the SLRV concept is not only
feasible, but can make substantial contributions to the unmanned exploration
of the moon in support of the manned Apollo program. The SLRV char-
acteristics, the problems, and the initial trade-offs have been determined
in sufficient detail to permit the definition of specific objectives and criteria
for a follow-on development program. Program conclusions and recom-
mendations are included in Volume V.
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
This volume of the Final Technical Report presents the results of
the Phase I SLRV study program in accordance with the portion of Article
1, Section (a)(1)(iv) of the Statement of Work of JPL Contract No, 950656,
Modification No. 1, which pertains to the preparation of failure mode and
reliability data. This volume includes the SLRV reliability design effort
conducted since the Second Bimonthly Technical Progress Report and
summarizes the reliability efforts and results reported in the First and
Second Bimonthly Technical Progress Reports (BSR 844 and BSR 879).
This effort included updating and/or completion of system and subsystem
reliability in the following areas:
1. Goals
2. Pr edictions
3. Block diagrams
4. Mathematical models
5. Analysis of mode of failure
6. Criticality rankings of failure modes
In addition, the effect of degraded modes of operation on system
reliability are discussed.
IV 1 - 1
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SECTION Z
SLRV RELIABILITY
2. 1 SYSTEM STUDIES
2. i. 1 Parametric Studies
Bendix's approach enabled design decisions to be based on both
performance and reliability criteria. It differs from conventional re-
liability techniques in that the subsystem design concepts are selected on
a basis of reliability considerations before design freeze or the initiation
of detailed preliminary design. Moreover, mission requirements and
operating profiles did not have to be established until the reliability
parametric data were weighed to determine their effect on the total sys-
tem.
Z. I. Z Reliability Block Diagram
The reliability block diagram for the SLRV system is shown in
Figure Z. 1-1. In establishing this diagram, it has been assumed that the
reliability of all static components such as supports, flanges, screws,
etc., are near unity. As a consequence of this assumption, the system
reliability is given by:
10
Rs(t, c) = i%l R i(t, c)
where R. is the specific subsystem reliability with t in hours and c in
cycles. IThe specific reliability equations for each of the subsystems are
delineated in detail in the applicable subsystem sections of this report.
2. I. 3 Reliability Predictions
The primary SLRV system requirement is to survey 19 landing
points. Based upon eight different lunar soil models that have been
postulated and programmed into the computer, it has been determined
that the average mission length will be 4. 5 months.
IV 2- 1
BSR 9O3
Z
o
)
i I
_I _
v i
I
I
[_ I
I
_ 6
l:1 I
i
i
2:
Z
o_,_
_."
II
,-1
0
I
2-2 IV
BSR 903
The probability of successfully surveying 19 landing points is 29.3%.
The mission profile data used in calculating the reliability for the
SLRV system is shown in TablesZ. l-land2.2-2. Ithasbeenassumedthat
only the 210-ft antenna is available with DSIF control 12 hours per day,
12 days per 28-day lunar periods.
The transmitter is energized during DSIF vehicle control time,
except that in the first earth month the transmitter will also be energized
during the lunar night DSIF control hours.
Table 2-.i-3 and Figure-2. 1-2 show that the reliabilitypercentages of
the SLRV system for 1, 2, 3, and 4. 5 months of mission time is respectively
76.3, 58.9, 44. 9, and 29.3.
The three subsystems contributing the most to system failure as
shown in Table 2. 1-3are ranl_ed as follows:
I. TV
2. Mobility
3. Data transmitter.
Failure mode analysis shows that the track in mobility, vidicon tube in
TV,_ and coax switch in the data transmitter are the most critical items in
the system.
Z. 1.4 Reliability Goals
It was shown in the first bimonthly report that the reliability goal
for SLRV (PsR) was a function of mission effectiveness (E), the probability
of site acceptance (PsA), and the probability of site identification (Psi) .
PSR
PSA" PSI
where
E = 0.40 (see Vol. V, Section 2 for development.)
IV 2-3
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TABLE 2. I-I
MISSION PROFILE DATA
No. of 28 Day
Lunar Periods 1 Z 3 4. 5
Total Earth Hours 67Z 1344 Z016 3024
DSIF Control Hours 144 432 648
Travel - (kin)
TV-Pictures (k)
Probe Cycles
Transmitter (Hours)
5.4
5.5
Z30
Z80
Z88
, ,J
10.8
II.0
460
16. Z
16.5
Z4. 3
Z4.8
103569O
4Z4 568 784
TABLE 2-2
TRAVERSE AND LANDING POINT PROFILE DATA
ITEM
TV Pictures
Time (Heurs)
ONE TRAVERSE
ZOO
ii
ONE LANDING POINT
IZ00
Z7
TOTAL
1.400
38
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P = 1
SA
P =0.8.
SI
,Then
0.4
P - = . 5, SLRV
SR O. 8 reliability goal.
The preliminary subsystem goals are established based upon the SLRV sys-
tem goal of 0. 50. These subsystem goals will be revised during Phase II
to reflect a cost effectiveness relationship, i.e., the cost to achieve a AR
in each of the subsystems.
The technique used to establish the preliminary subsystem reliability
goals is as follows:
I. Establish the k t for the system
Then,
To obtain the subsystem goal, multiply the subsystem
prediction k t by the ratio of the system k t goal to
the system k t prediction
(k t(SG))
k t(SSG ) = X t(ssP ) x k t(sp) "
- k tSSG.
R q_q_. = e
Figure 2, 1-3 presents the SLRV Goal Tree for _ m{ss_on t{me of 4, 5
months. This mission period is the time required to survey 19 landing
point s.
2. I. 5 Failure Mode Analysis
Failure mode analysis was conducted in accordance with the tech-
niques described in the Bendix Systems Division SLRV System Assurance
Program Document SLRV-SA-I.
The purpose of this analysis is, to be able to rank the potential failure
modes so that they can be investigated in the order of their level of critical-
ness. The order is determined by the quantitative product of the probability
that a failure mode will occur and the degree of degradation resulting from
the failure.
IV Z-7
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A component failure mode is defined as the manner in which a given
component can fail. A component can fail, depending on the number of parts
it contains and the stresses (electrical, mechanical, and/or environmental)
experienced by the parts while operating in the expected environment. Each
part within the component constitutes a potential failure. The manner in
which the part fails under the given stresses may represent a possible fail-
ure mode of the component. Therefore, a failure mode analysis of a com-
ponent is an analysis of its constituent parts to determine which of the fail-
ure modes will result in catastrophic failure or performance degradation
of the component.
Once all conceivable failure modes of a component have been ascer-
tained, a determination of the likelihood or probability of their occurrence
under the particular operating condition is required to define the major
failure modes. The likelihood of occurrence of a failure in a particular
mode is given by
-k t
P = l-e
where
P = likelihood of occurrence
k = rate of occurrence of the particular failure mode
t = operating time
e = base of the natural logarithms.
The rate of occurrence of a failure mode of a part is related to its
failure rate through the following relationship:
k
k T-- _ k.1 for time (or cycle) sensitive devices
i--1
whe r e
k
T =
I
K ___
total failure rate of the time (or cycle) sensitive parts
part failure rate due to the i TM failure mode
number of failure modes.
IV 2-9
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The failure modes having the highest probability may be defined as the
major failure modes.
The purpose of a failure effects analysis is to ascertain the degree
of degradation resulting from the occurrence of one or more of the failure
modes determined in the failure mode analysis. Since the component may
fail either catastrophically or through performance degradation, the critical-
ness of a failure mode will be determined by the combination of the probability
of failure and the degree of resultant degradation. Therefore, a major fail-
ure effect is defined as one having a severe or catastrophic effect on the
performance of a subsystem and the over-all system in its mission.
Listed below are five categories of degradation into which the de-
grading effects on performance resulting from the occurrence of a failure
mode may fall. The severity of each mode will be determined by the level
to which it applies to the functional failure of the system, subsystem, com-
ponent, and part in that order.
_/oof Reliability Degradation
A = 0.75 degraded to catastrophic (l. 0)
e
(likely abort)
B = 0. 50 to < 0.75 degraded
e
(continued operation in degraded mode)
C
e
0. 25 < 0. 50 degraded
(continued operation in degraded mode)
D = 0 to < 0. 25 degraded
e
(continued operation in degraded mode)
E = no effect
e
Subsequent to the failure mode and effects analyses, the potential
failures representing serious deterrents to reliable performance of the
component must be identified prior to implementing a reliability improve-
ment effort. Such failures may be termed critical and can be defined as
potential failures having a severe effect on component performance as well
as high probability. The degree of criticalness of a potential failure is
measured by the product of its quantitative probability of failure and the
amount of degradation resulting from its occurrence.
2- I0 IV
BSR 903
The levels of criticalness will be presented in the order of decreasing
importance. In implementing a reliability improvement effort, it will be
determined which deficiencies represent the major deterrents to reliable
performance, and effort will be concentrated on these. For example, the
highest numerical product will be assigned a criticality number of 1, the
next higher 2, etc. Since these criticality numbers are initially deter-
mined at the subsystem level, they will be re-examined by Bendix to es-
tablish a final criticality ranking based upon their influence on system re-
liability. Therefore, it is conceivable that a criticality ranking of "1" at
the subsystem level could be modified to a ranking of "10" at the system
level, depending upon the degree of change in system probability of suc-
cess.
The most critical items in the SLRV system are shown inTablh 2. 1-4
and are ranked in order of decending criticality.
It is recognized that failures of parts may either cause mission
abort or extend the mission time to complete the survey of 19 landing
points.
The computer evaluation program was used to assess the effect on
reliability of those failures that extended the mission length, but still per-
mitted the mission to be completed.
The following failures (see Tabl_ 2. 1-5), classified as partial because
they did not abort the mission, were programmed into the computer at
time t = 0 and t = 500 hours.
One hundred mission runs were programmed for each of the failures.
Catastrophic failures could occur during each run. Analytically, their rela-
tive critical ranking, based upon probability of failure and estimated affect
on mission, is shown in Table 2 I-5.
The results of the computer run are shown in Table 2. 1_6 Withfail-
ures programmed at time t = 0 and t = 500 hours, we find that our analytical
critical ranking of the data transmitter coax switch agrees with the com-
puter run; i.e., the reliability decrease is greater for the coax switch
failure than for the other subsystems. However, the computer results
enable us to rerank the other items in descending order as follows:
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Subsystem
Degraded Mode
Analytical Ranking
Degraded Mode
Revised Ranking
Data Transmitter 1 1
Command - TV Pan Z 4
TV 3 5
Mobility 4 6
Command - 50 ° fov 5 3
Navigation 6 g
The failures described above are typical of the many failures that
would be programmed to permit reranking of part criticality. It is planned
to continue this task during Phase II, so that a cost effectiveness factor
can be established for each item.
Z. 1.6 Heavier Than 100-1b Vehicle
The foregoing discussion, including supporting studies in the sub-
system sections of this report, has been devoted to a vehicle weighing no
more than 100 lb. It is recognized that reliability improvement can be
achieved at the expense of weight and power penalties.
Figure Z. 1-4 delineates the cumulative increase in reliability with
cumulative increased weight. Curve 1 is the reliability of the basic 100-1b
_T I:}_r _..^*___ _1_1_ " " _'^11^..._.
i. No. 2: Basic with TV control circuitry redundant. The
specific circuitry, consisting of 81 microcircuits,
is shown in the Section 1 portion of the TV reliability
block diagram. Reliability increases 6.3% for a
0. 25-1b increase in weight.
Z. No. 3: Curve number 2 with redundant command circuitry --
specifically, redundant communications and penetrometer
decoder, TV decoder, and mobility decoder. This
results in a 1Z. 6% cumulative increase in reliability
over curve number 1 with a weight penalty of 0. 5 lb.
The command redundancy additional weight is only
0. 25 lb.
IV Z- 15
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Figure 2. I-4 Reliability vs Mission Months With Increased Redundancy
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3. No. 4: Curve number 3 with a redundant coax switch in the
data transmitter. Cumulative reliability increase
is 20. 5% with a cumulative weight penalty of 1 lb.
4. No. 5: Curve number 4 with a 30% increase in track thickness.
Cumulative reliability increase is 24. 6% with a cumula-
tive weight penalty of Z lb.
5. No. 6: Curve number 5 with a TWT redundant in the transmitter.
Cumulative reliability increase is 26. i% with a cumula-
tive weight penalty of 4. 0 lb.
6. No. 7: Curve number 6 with a redundant vidicon tube in the TV.
Cumulative reliability increase is 29.4% with a
cumulative weight penalty of 7. 5 lb.
As a result of this analysis, it can be clearly seen that an increase
of 30% in SLRV reliability can be achieved for a weight increase of less
than 10 lb through the use of selective redundancy. Further increases can
be obtained by the complete use of high reliability parts. Raytheon's pre-
diction (see Section 2.2. 2) was predicated on the use of non-high-reliability
parts. Their prediction of 63.3% (using standard parts) for a 4. 5-month
mission has a considerable effect on the system reliability of 29%.
Z. 1.7 Conclusions
The reliability analysis of the SLRV system during Phase I has
resulted in the following conclusions:
l. The reliability goal of 0. 50 for a mission period required
to survey 19 landing points can be achieved with selective
redundancy at a weight penalty of 1 lb. This goal can be
surpassed with additional redundancy through more extensive
use of high reliability parts with an additional weight penalty
of 3 lb.
The subsystems contributing most to system failure are TV,
data transmitter, and mobility. Reliability efforts will be
concentrated in these areas during Phase II.
IV 2-17
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3. The three most critical items in the system are:
.
a. Track in mobility subsystem
b. Vidicon tube in TV
c. Coax switch in data transmitter.
The computer evaluation program has provided a tool for
reranking the criticality of parts whose failure does not
cause mission abort but permits the mission to be com-
pleted in a degraded mode of operation. The effect on
system reliability as a result of increased mission time
is the factor employed in reranking the criticality of parts.
This task will be continued during Phase II.
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2. 2 INFORMATION
2. Z. 1 Data Transmitter Parametric Studies
2. 2. 1. 1 First Bimonthly Report
In the first bimonthly report, the SLRV concepts were evaluated
for the TWT-type direct transmitter and associated antennas for a direct
mode of transmitter operation, SLRV to ground station. The variables
which were investigated for reliability were as follows:
1. Transmitter complexity
Z. TWT redundancy
3. Operating time
4. Temperature effects
5. Vehicle speedst
6. Vehicle range.
The two basic concepts examined were a transmitter with a fixed
omniantenna and a transmitter with a steerable parabolic dish antenna.
It was shown that the transmitter using the fixed omniantenna had
complexity of the steerable antenna configuration. In summary, it was con-
cluded that:
I. The fixed antenna configuration had a higher inherent reliability.
2. There was a significant increase in reliability for transmitter
operation at 85°C as compared to operation at IZ5°C.
3. There was a significant gain in reliability in the use of a
standby TWT in the transmitter.
4. A reduction in vehicle travel speed produced a decrease in
reliability due to increased mission time.
IV. Z- 19
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5. A significant gain in reliability could be achieved in continuous
day-night operation missions.
2. Z. i. Z Second Bimonthly Report
In the second bimonthly report, parametric reliability studies were
performed for transmitter subsystem configurations of directional vs dual
mode and for solid state vs TWT or Amplitron type circuits.
The parametric reliability study for a directional type transmitter
(with fixed omni- and steerable antennas) vs dual mode type transmitter
(with fixed omniantenna, indirect transmitter and surveyor link) was made
for an ambient operating temperature of 55°C. The directional transmitter
was shown to have a higher reliability and shorter mission time than the dual
mode configuration. This was due to the greater complexity and lower TV
data transmission rate for the dual mode transmitter.
In the parametric reliability study of the solid state transmitter
circuit vs a TWT or Amplitron type, it was shown that the solid state _ir-
cult had a 2% higher reliability, considering a typical mission not exceeding
1000 hours. The difference becomes more a function of constant rate for
extended missions.
The slightly higher reliability of the solid state transmitter design,
however, was shown to be offset by the SLRV system weight and power con-
straints. For a 0. 5-watt transmitter design it was shown that the solid
state circuit was less efficient, resulting in twice the weight of a TWT cir-
cuit, i.e. , 12 lb vs 6 lb. At the Z-watt output level selected for the SLRV
system design, the solid state components are not available for a practicable
design.
Subsequent to the above parametric studies, a TWT type transmitter
configuration using switchable antennas, fixed omni- and steerable, was
decided upon for the SLRV.
Z. Z. i. 3 Reliability of Transmitter Subsystem
Since the last (Znd) bimonthly report, the transmitter subsystem
has been updated from the version used in the previous reliability study.
Therefore, this section will include the new reliability block diagram and
mathematical model.
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, The reliability block diagram for the transmitter subsystem is
shown in Figure 2. 2-1. This diagram assumes a total mission success
with both antenna systems operating. Therefore, they are shown in series
with the other units of the transmitter. A partial success or degraded mode
of operation could be achieved with either one of the antenna systems opera-
ting.
The resulting reliability diagrams are shown in Figures 2. 2-2
and 2. 2-3. It should be pointed out, however, that the probability of mis-
sion success for either degraded mode is now equal to the product of the
reliability of the transmitter subsystem (Figure 2. 2-1) up to the time of
the degraded mode operation and the reliability of the transmitter subsys-
tem operating in the degraded mode (Figures: 2.2-2 or 2.2.-3') for the time
required or CompIete the mission.
This section will only include the reliability mathematical model
for achieving the primary mission.
As shown in Figure Z. Z-1, the reliability of the transmitter sub-
system is given by the expression
L = L Ix L 2 x L 3 x L 4x L 5 x L 6 x L 7 x L 8 x L 9 x LI0 x L II x L12
x L13 x L14x LI5 x L16 x L17 x LI8 x L19 x L20 x L zl
(z.z-,)
where
L 1 through LZ1 are the individual reliabilities of the subunits.
The values for L 1 through L are obtained by using the equationZ1
-kt
R = e (2.2-2)
whe r e
R = reliability
k = total fhilure rate of subunit parts
t = operating time of subunit during mission.
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Using Equation {2.2--2),the reliabilities of the subunits are given
by the following:
-k it =k
L 1 = e 1 LI2 = e 12t3
-kzt -k
L 2 = e 1 L I3 = e 13t4
-k = -k
L 3 = e 3tl L14 e 14t4
-k4t 1 -k
L 4 = e L 15 = e 15t4
-k = lk
L 5 = e 5tl L16 e 16t4
-k = -k
L 6 = e 6tl L17 e 17t5
-k = -k
L 7 = e 7tl L18 e 18t5
-k8t 1 -k
L 8 = e L 19 = e 19t5
-k9t I -kL 9 = e L20 = e 20t5
-k = -k
L I0 = e lOt2 L2 1 e 2It6
-k
L = e 1It3
ii
Substitution of the above into Equation (2.. 2- 1) andcombining terms yields
the following equ£tion;
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L-- e
i=9
i=l
kit 1
-k lOtg -(k 11 + k 1z)t3
x e X e
i= 16
i=13
X e
k it4
(z.z-3)
i=20
-_ kit 5
-k
i=17 Zlt6
X e Xe
Using the failure rate data derived for the transmitter subsystem
shown on the Reliability Prediction Worksheets and assuming a 4. 5-month
mission, the following values are then obtained for failure rates and times:
kl = 0. 1106 x 10 -5 ki2 = 0.0400 x 10-5
k 2 = 0. iZ06 x 10-5 k13 = 1. 1000 x i0
-5
k 3 = O. 2116 x 10-5 k14 = 0.4300 x 10-5
k 4 = 0.0626 x 10-5 k
-5
k = O. 2552 x i0 k
5
k = O. 0766 x 10-5 k
6
k = O. 2526 x 10 -5 k
7
k = 0. 0036x 10-5 k
8
-5
k = 3. 6150 x I0 k
9
k = 2 x 10-5/cycle k
I0
15
-5
= 0. 1720 x i0
= 0. 0760 x i0
16
-5
17
-5
= I. I000 x i0
= 0.4300 x I0
18
-5
19
-5
--0. 1720 x i0
20
-5
= 0. 0760 x i0
= 0. 3520 x 10
21
-5
k = 0.0010 x i0
II
-5
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t 1 = 784 hrs
t 2 = 10,400 cycles
t3 = 627 hrs
t 4 = 3. 9 hrs
t 5 = 3. 9 hrs
t 6 = 157 hrs
Substituting the above values into Equation (2.2-3) gives the follow-
ing expression for the total transmitter reliability
-0. 03673 -0. 20800 -0. 00026 -0. 00007
L=e X e Xe ×e
-0. 00007 -0. 00055
x e x e
(2.2-4)
-0. 2457
.. L = e = 0.7821. (2. 2-5)
The low reliability value for the transmitter is due mainly to the
large failure rate of the RF switch used to select the transmitting antenna.
It is felt, however, that the failure rate could be reduced through selection
of a more reliable switch or through redesign of the present switch.
The reliability of the transmitter subsystem in terms of mission
months is shown in Table 2. 2-1.
2. 2. 1.4 Failure Mode Analysis for Transmitter Subsystem
This section contains the failure mode analysis for the SLRV Trans-
mitter Subsystem for the determination of the failure mode(s) and failure
rates for each part, the failure mode probability, the degradation effect of
part failure mode on subsystem mission, and the level of criticalness for
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TABLE 2.2-I
DATA TRANSMITTER RELIABILITY
U nit
Isolation Amp.
X5 Multiplier
X3 Multiplier
Mod. Driver
Modulator
RF Amplifier
X2 Multiplier
X4 Multiplie r
TWT RF Amp.
RF Switch
Hybrid
Omni Antenna
Motor, Az•
Gear Box, Az.
Bearing, Az.
Position Sensor;
Az•
Motor, Elv•
Desig.
L 1
L Z
L 3
L 4
L 5
L 6
L 7
L 8
L 9
LIO
LII
L1 z
LI3
L14
L
15
L16
L17
Gear Box, Ely.
Bearing, Elv•
Position Sensor,
Ely•
Steer• Ant. Dish
Data Transmitter
Subsystem
L18
L 19
L20
L21
L
•9997
•9997
.9994
•9998
.9993
•9998
•9993
.9999
.9899
•9548
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9413
Reliability Per
Mission Months
.9996
.9995
•9991
.9997
.9989
.9997
.9989
.9999
.9848
.9117
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9998
•8926
.9994
.9994
.9988
.9996
.9986
.9996
.9986
.9999
•9797
•8705
•9999
•9998
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9996
.8471
4.5
.9992
.9991
.9983
.9995
.9980
.9994
.9980
.9999
.9721
.8122
.9999
.9997
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
.9999
•9999
.9994
.7821
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each part (the product of probability of failure and the degradation effect).
The analysis was made for the transmitter subsystem configuration, which
includes the steerable antenna and fixed omniantenna, as shown in the
block diagram of Figure Z. 2-4.
The data derived from the analysis is contained in Tables Z. 2-Z
and Z. 2-3. The following paragraphs will discuss the derivation of
together with possible methods for decreasing the high criticalness of some
of the parts.
Table Z.2-2 delineates for each part of the transmitter subsystem
the part failure rate, the failure mode ratio, and part failure rate for the
failure mode. The sources for the part failure rates are noted at the end
of Table 2. Z-I. The failure mode ratio values represent the ratio of failures
in each mode to the total expected failures of the part. Thus, the product
of LI,= faiiure mode ratio and the to_ai failure rate of tne part Wlil glve _ne
part failure rate for that particular failure mode. The values used for the
failure mode ratio were in most cases taken from TRA-873-74, section 6,
dated 1 September 1961. However, where information was not available
for failure mode(s) or failure mode ratio for parts, an assumed failure
mode ratio was used. The data derived in Table g. Z-2 is used for deriva-
tion of the data in Table Z. Z-3.
Table Z. Z-3 delineates, for each part of the transmitter subsystem,
the failure mode, the failure mode failure rate, the operating time or cycles
during an SLRV mission, the probability of failure, the percent degradation
of subsystem as related to part failure, the level of criticalness, and the
criticality index number. The part failure mode and failure mode failure
rates are taken from Table Z. Z-Z.
The operating time values were obtained from an analysis of the
schedule of operations for the SLRV for point survey and traverse to each
point. The assumed schedule of operations is shown in Table 2. Z-4. It
was assumed that the transmitter will be operating for the total time of
857 hours. In addition, it was assumed that for the first month of operation
the transmitter will be operated also during the first lunar night and two
additional days (days not suitable for TV transmission) for telemetry pur-
poses. This additional time brings the total time to about I000 hours,
assuming operation with the DSIF 210-ft antenna at II hours per day.
To arrive at the operating time distribution between the omni- and
steerable antenna modes of transmitter operation, it was assumed that
IV Z -43
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TABLE 2. Z-Z
TRANSMITTER SUBSYSTEM PARTS FAILURE KATE
FOR MODE OF FAILURE
Part
Ref. Part
Desig. Name
C 1 Capacitor,
F.M.
C2 "
C3 "
C4 "
C5 "
C6 "
LI RF Coil
L2 "
L3 "
54
L6 "
Q 1 Transistor
C7 Capacitor,
F.M.
C8 "
C9
CIO "
CII "
C12 "
L5 RF Coil
L7 "
58 "
L9 "
Stage Part
Us ed Derating
Iso. Amp. 50
" 50
" 50
" 50
" 50
" 50
I!
tl
I!
II
I!
" 50
X5 Multi. 50
" 50
" 50
" 50
" 50
" 50
!$
11
T!
l!
*Part Failure Mode Part Failure Rate in
Failure Ratio Failure Mode
Rate (XI0 -5)
%/1000
hrs a55°C Open Short Drift Open Short Drift
• 0060 .70 .30 .0042 .0018
.0060
0060
OO6O
0060
0060
0100
0100
0100
0100
0100
0146
0060
•70 .30
70 .30
70 .30
70 .30
70 .30
I0
I0
I0
I0
I0
Z0 . 10
70 .30
•0042
0042
0042
0042
0042
90 0010
90 0010
90 0010
90 0010
90 0010
70 0029
0042
•0018
.0018
• 0018
.0018
.0018
.0015
.0018
0O9O
OO9O
009O
009O
0O90
0102
OO6O
OO6O
OO60
0060
0060
0100
0100
0100
0100
70 .30
70 . 30
70 . 30
70 . 30
70 . 30
I0
I0
I0
I0
.90
• 90
.90
.90
0042
0042
0042
0042
0042
0010
0010
0010
0010
• 0018
.0018
.0018
.0018
.0018
.0090
.0090
.0090
.0090
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TABLE 2. Z-Z (CONT.)
Part Stage Part
Ref. Used Deratimg
Desig. Part Name In %
LI0 RF Coil X5 Multi. --
LII " " --
Q2 Transistor X5 Multi. 50
C13 Capacitor, X3 Multi. 50
F.M.
C
C14 " " 50
C15 " " 50
C16 " " 50
C17 " " 50
C18 " " 50
C19 " " 50
CZO " " 50
LIZ RF Coil " --
LI3 " " --
LI4 " " --
LI5 " " --
LI6 " " --
LI7 " " --
LI8 " " --
LI9 " " --
R1 Resistor, " 50
F.C.
R2 " " 50
R3 " " 50
CR 1 Diode " 50
CZl Capacitor, Mod. Driver 50
F.M.
C22 " " 50
• Part Failure Mode Part Failure Rate in
Failure Ratio Failure Mode
Rate (Xl0 -5)
%/lOOO
hrs a 55°C Open Short Drift Open Short Drift
• 0100 .I0 .90 .0010 •0090
• 0100 .10 .90 .0010 •0090
.0146 .ZO .I0 .70 .0029 .0015 .0102
.0060 .70 .30 .0042 .0018
0060
0060
0060
0060
0060
0060
0060
0100
0100
0100
0100
0100
0100
0100
0100
0270
.0270
.0270
.0026
.O06O
70
70
70
70
70
70
70
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
.10
• 10
.10
.70
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
.3O
.30
9O
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
.90
.90
• 60
0042
0042
0042
0042
0042
0042
0042
0010
0010
0010
0010
0010
.0010
.0010
.0010
.0027
.0027
.0027
.0003
.0042
0018
0018
0018
0018
0018
0018
0018
.0008
.0018
0090
0090
0O90
0090
0090
0090
0090
0090
0243
• 0243
• 0243
.0016
.0060 .70 .30 .0042 .0018
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TABLE Z. Z-Z (CONT.)
Part
Ref.
Desig. Part Name
CZ3 Capacitor,
m. M.
L20 R F Coil
L21 "
LZ2 "
Q3 Transistor
C24 Capacitor,
F.M.
C25 "
C26 "
C27 "
CZ8 "
C29 "
C30 "
C31 "
C32 "
_33 "
L23 RF Coil
L24 "
L25 "
L26 "
L27 "
LZ8 "
LZ9 "
R4 Resistor,
F.C.
R5 "
Stage Part
Used Derating
*n %
Mod. Driver 50
t!
t!
I1
" 50
Modulator 50
" 50
" 50
" 50
" 50
" 50
" 50
" 50
" 50
" 50
l!
l!
IV
If
11
T!
I!
" 50
*Part
Failure
Rate
%/lOOO
hrs a 55°C
.oo6o
Failure Mode Part Failure Rate in
Ratio Failure Mode
(Xl0 -5)
Open Short Dri_ Open Short Dri_
.70 .30 .0042 .0018
.0100 .I0 .90 .0010 . 0090
.0100 .I0 .90 .0010 .0090
.0100 .I0 .90 .0010 .0090
.0146 .Z0 .10 .70 .0029 .0015 .0102
.0060 .70 .30 .0042 .0018
OO6O
OO6O
OO6O
O06O
OO6O
OO6O
0060
.OO60
.0060
.0100
.0100
.0!00
.0100
.0100
.0100
.0100
.0270
70
70
70
70
70
70
70
70
70
10
I0
!0
I0
I0
10
10
10
" 50 . 0270 .I0
.3O
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
0042
0042
0042
0042
0042
0042
0042
0042
0042
90 0010
9O 0010
90 o00!0
90 .0010
90 .0010
90 .0010
90 .0010
90 .0027
0018
0018
0018
0018
0018
0018
0018
0018
0018
0090
0090
0090
0090
0090
0090
0090
0243
.90 .0027 .0243
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TABLE Z. Z-2 (CONT.)
Part Stage Part
R el. Used Derating
Desig. Part Name In go
R6 Resistor, F. C Modulator 50
R7 " " 50
CR2 Diode " 50
Q4 Transistor " 50
C41 Capacitor, RF Amp. 50
F.M.
C43 " " 50
L33 RF Coil " 50
L34 " " --
L35 " " --
L36 " " --
L38 " " --
Q5 Transistor RF Amp 50
C34 Capacitor, XZ Multi. 50
F.M.
C35 " " 50
C36 " " 50
C39 " " 50
C38 " " 50
C39 " " 50
C40 " " 50
C4Z " " 50
L31 RF Coil " --
L31 " " --
L3Z " " --
L39 " " --
R8 Resistor, " 50
F.C.
*Part Failure Mode Part Failure Rate in
Failure Ratio Failure Mode
Rate (XlO -5)
%/100o
hrs a 55°C Open Short Drift Open Short Drift
• 0270 .I0 .90 •0027 .0243
• 0270 .10 .90 •0027 •0243
.00Z6 .I0 .30 .60 .0003 .0008 .0016
.0146 .Z0 .I0 .70 .00Z9 .0015 .010Z
.0060 .70 .30 .004Z .0018
0060
0100
0100
0100
0100
0100
0146
0060
70 .30
i0
I0
I0
i0
I0
Z0 . i0
70 .30
90
90
90
90
90
70
004Z .0018
0010
0010
0010
0010
0010
00Z9 •0015
004Z .0018
OO9O
0O9O
0090
0090
0090
OlOZ
OO6O
0060
0060
0060
OO6O
OO6O
0060
0100
0100
0100
0100
0Z70
70 . 30
70 30
70 30
70 30
70
70
70
i0
I0
I0
I0
I0
30
30
30
.9O
.90
.90
.90
.90
004Z
0042
004Z
0042
004Z
004Z
004Z
0010
0010
0010
0010
00Z7
.0018
0018
0018
0018
0018
0018
0018
• 0090
• 0090
• 0090
• 009O
• 0Z43
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TABLE 2. 2-2 (CONT•)
Part Stage Part
Ref. Used Derating
Desig. Part Name In %
R9 Resistor,
F.C.
RI0 "
RII "
RI2 "
RI3 "
CR4 Diode
SL- I Stripline
CR3 Diode
V-1 TWT
X2 Multi.
II
I!
II
IT
)[4 Multi.
II
RF Pwr. Amp
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
*Part Failure Mode Part Failure Rate in
Failure Ratio Failure Mode
Rate (X10 -5)
%/looo
hrs a 55°C Open Short Drift Open Short Drift
• 0270 . 10 • 90 .0027 .0243
.0270
.0270
.0270
.0270
.0026
.0010
.0026
5.6150
• I0 •90
I0 •90
I0 .90
I0 • 90
I0 .30 . 60
50 .50
I0 .30 . 60
1.0
0027 .0243
0027 .0243
0027 .0243
0027 .0243
0003 .0008 .0016
0005 .0005
0003 .0008 .0016
3. 615
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TABLE Z. 2-4
ASSUMED SCHEDULE OF OPERATIONS FOR SLRV
FUNCTION
T ravel
Penetrometer
R end ing s
TV Slewing
TV Transmission
Steerable Antenna
Slewing
Decision
TOTAL
OPERATING TIME
IN MINUTES
POINT SURVEY
173
96
124
118
I0
558
1079
TRAVERSE
(To next point)
155
Z8
Z4
9
333
549
Total Time = 19(1079 x 1.8" + 549 x 1.4.) = 51400 mira
(19 points) = 857 hours
*Correction factors taking into account irregular travel paths
and unsuitable points.
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transmissions through the omniantenna will be made during vehicle travel,
steerable antenna slewing, and during the ground decision time; and that
operation with the steerable antenna will be made for TV and penetrometer
data transmissions and TV slewing.
For the operating time or cycles of the transmitter RF switch,
it was assumed that the switch will be operated each time the SLRV starts
and stops for transmissions (through the omniantenna if the vehicle is
moving, and through the steerable antenna when the vehicle is stopped for
taking of pictures or penetrometer readings).
The probability of failure for each part was determined by sub-
stitution of the values for the part failure mode failure rate and operating
time into the expression
-k t
P = l-e
F
whe re
PF = probability of failure
k = failure mode failure rate
t = part operating time or cycles.
The values for the % Degradation column of Table Z. Z-3 were
arrived at by taking each part of the transmitter subsystem for each failure
mode of that part and determining what the degradation effect would be on
the transmitter performance with respect to power output and data trans-
mission rate.
The level of criticalness values are obtained from the product
of the failure mode probability and the degradation. The associated index
number indicates the relative level of the criticality of the part with respect
to the other parts of the subsystem, with the smaller numbers being the
highest part criticality and the larger numbers being the lowest part criticality.
The following discussion will be limited to the analysis of the six
most critical items. These are shown in the chart of Table 2.2-5.
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TABLE Z. Z-5
TRANSMITTER SUBSYSTEM FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS EXCERPT
Item
TWT(V1)
RF Switch
(Sl)
Malfunction
Drift
Solenoid Inoperative
in steerable antenna
position (I).
Solenoid inoperative
in omni antenna
position (Z).
High contact
resistance in
steerable antenna
position (1).
High contact
resistance in omni
antenna position (2).
Open on wiper
Short on wiper
Open in steerable
antenna position {1).
Open in omni
antenna position (Z).
Short in steerable
antenna position (1).
Short in omni
antenna position (Z).
Failure
P robabilit F
.03546
.05068
•05068
.0307Z
.03072
•01034
•01034
•00519
.00519
•00510
•00519
....... °.................
C riticality
Percent Level
Degradation Index No.
100 1
50 Z
50 Z
5O 3
50 3
100 4
100 4
5O 5
50 5
50 5
50 5
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TABLE Z. Z-5 (CONT.)
Item Malfunction
Resistor (R4) Drift
Resistor (R5) Drift
Resistor (R6) Drift
Resistor (R7) Drift
Ste e rable Ope n
Antenna (ANT-I) Short
Resistor (RZ)
Resistor (R3)
Resistor (R9)
Resistor (R 10)
Resistor (Rll)
Resistor (RI3)
Transistor (QI)
Transistor (Q2)
Transistor (Q3)
Transistor (Q4)
Transistor (Q5)
Drift
Drift
Drift
Drift
D rift
D rift
Drift
Drift
i
Drift
Drift
D rift
r i '7"'
Failure
Probability
.000Z4
.000Z4
.00024
.00024
.00035
.00035
.000Z4
.000Z4
i
.000Z4
.000Z4
.000Z4
.000Z4
•00010
•00010
•00010
.00010
.00010
Percent
Degradation
100
100
100
100
i
5O
5O
50,
5O
5O
5O
5O
5O
100
100
100
100
100
C riticality
Level
Index No.
6
6
6
6
ii
7
7
i
8
i
8
8
i
8
8
8
9
9
9
1
9
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In Table g. 2-5, the TWT is shown to have the highest criticality.
This is due to the high failure probability and percent degradation. How-
ever, it should be pointed out that the failure rate, used for the determina-
tion of the probability, is based on the Hughes "Life and Reliability Report
on Space Traveling - Wave Tubes" dated May 1963. This report indicated
that there were no failures in the tubes tested and that an MTBF of 27, 860
hours was predicated based on assumed random failures and Poisson dis-
tribution. Therefore, these tubes can very well have a life expectancy
exceeding the MTBF of ZT, 860 hours which would then decrease the value
of the failure probability and criticality level. The malfunction of the TWT
was assumed to be due to drift, i.e., change in the tube characteristics.
This was based on the fact that no representative failures had occurred
and that in a properly designed vacuum tube, the wearout life is determined
by the eventual reduction of electron emission from the cathode. The 100%
degradation was assigned to the TWT failure, because it is the out-put am-
plifier stage of the transmitter and the failure would be catastrophic for the
mission. A method to improve the TWT criticality would be to provide
selective switching redundancy. This would mean providing a standby TWT
with a switch for inserting it into the circuit. Whether this type of redundancy
could be used is limited by the constraints of physical size and weight of
the transmitter subsystem.
The RF Switch, in Table Z. 2-5, is shown to have a criticality,
for its various failure modes, covering a range from Z through 5. The high
criticality is due mostly to the high probability of failure. The probability
of failure for this switch was based on the manufacturer minimum life
expectancy rating of 50,000 cycles. This particular switch was chosen
1_ ....... 1" 'L 1 • 1 " I" ,
_,=_=_== u_ 1_ _a_cnmg zeacure, iow power requirements for switching and
low insertion loss. However, it is felt that a switch meeting the above
requirements could be found having a longer life expectancy of between
Z50,000 to 500,000 cycles or the manufacturer could redesign the present
switch for the required life expectancy. The degradation figures assigned
to the various failure modes for the RF switch are based on the following:
l. If the solenoid is inoperative when the switch is in the
steerable or omniantenna position, the degradation is
assumed to be 50% for either position. This is due to
increased mission time (using the steerable antenna only)
caused by the requirement for orientation of the steerable
antenna now for all transmissions and due to the reduction
in bit rate when using the omniantenna.
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o For an open or short on the wiper of the switch, the degrada-
tion is 100%0 because of no transmitter output; a catastrophic
condition.
o For high contact resistance or open or shorts in either
position of the switch, the reason specified in (i) above
is also applicable.
Resistors R4, R5, R6, and R7 have a criticality index number
of 6 as shown in Table 2. 2-5. This is a result of the high failure probability
of these fixed composition resistors for the drift condition, and the 100%
degradation due to the drift. These resistors are used in the modulator
stage of the transmitter as biasing resistors, and drifting of these resistors
will cause a change in the modulation characteristics and modulator output.
A possible improvement for this condition would be to use resistor types,
such as carbon film, having less tendency for the drift condition or by
derating of parts.
The steerable antenna dish (ANT-l) is shown in Table 2. 2-5 to
have a criticality index of 7. The failure modes for this antenna were
assumed, and the failure rate for the antenna was halved for each failure
mode. The percent degradation was taken as 50% for each failure mc_le,
since an open or short of the antenna will terminate RF transmission and
require switching to the omniantenna at the reduced bit rate. Improve-
ments for this type of failure will require an analysis of the physical
design of the antenna.
The next parts in order of criticality are fixed composition re-
sistors RZ, R3, R9, RI0, RII, and RI3. These resistors are used as
biasing resistors for the X3 and X2 multipliers. They have a high probability
of failure due to drift which would result in a reduction in output from the
multiplier stages and consequently a decrease in transmitter output. A
50% degradation o# 3-db decrease in power was assumed. However, a de-
tailed analysis after part values have been assigned may indicate a greater
loss. An improvement for the drift condition would be similar to that
stated above for resistors R4, R5, R6, and RT.
Transistors QI, QZ, Q3, Q4, and Q5 of the transmitter are next in
order of criticality for malfunction due to drift. A drift in this case is defined
as a change in the characteristics of the transistor resulting in reduced gain.
These transistors are used in series stages of the transmitter, and a reduction in
outputfrom any one of the stages will effect areduction in transmitter output. For
the present analysis, this reduction is assumed to be catastrophic or 100% de-
gradation. Possible ways of decreasing the criticality would bethroughselection
oftransistorshaving alow drift failure rate, derating, and redundancy.
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2.2.2 Television
The reliability aspects of the present TV subsystem design are an
integral part of the design and development processes.
Z. 2.2. 1 Parametric and Option Analysis
As part of the parametric and option analysis, parametric re-
liability tradeoff data were generated to provide criteria which could be
applied to various design options and approaches. The basic and most
important data generated for tradeoff use in option analyses included the
follow ing:
I, The sensitivity of electronics parts reliability to operating
temperature.
The relative complexities, adaptabilities, stabilities, and
tolerance limits of analog and digital circuits required to
perform a given function and their resultant reliabilities.
. A reliability comparison of the various construction techniques,
namely discrete parts, micromodules, and microcircuits
(monolithic and discrete-chip types).
. A comparison of the two basic classes of panning systems:
mirror drive and camera drive.
. A reliability analysis of the four basic functions relating to
picture taking: field of view, aperture, focus, and exposure.
In a number of options, the aspect of reliability was secondary be-
cause of the low reliability of sensitivity to the options when compared to
factors such as performance capabilities, weight, power consumption, and
optical limitations. In many instances, the difference in reliability be-
tween various configurations was obviously insignificant since essentially
the same parts and components were used in different options but were only
distributed in differing arrangement. A continual consideration and analysis
was made of parts contemplated for any option.
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Summary of Selected Tradeoff Studies
The basic and most important data subjects generated during the
parametric and option analysis phase are listed above. A brief summary
of selected tradeoff studies is presented here.
The effects of temperature on electronic reliability were investi-
gated to determine a suitable operating temperature range without imposing
difficult constraints on the thermal control system. The operating temi-
perature range selected was 10°C to 50°C with a non-operating temperature
minimum of-40°C.
The lower operating limit was set at 10°C because circuit per-
formance and efficiency begin to deteriorate below this temperature, and
because failure rate data are limited below this temperature. The upper
limit was set primarily by the vidicon which has a maximum temperature
limit of 70°C. In this region, and above, the failure rate of component
parts rapidly increases with temperature.
The majority of comparisons found in literature circuitry are
based upon discrete-part technology rather than integrated circuits. For
discrete, conventional parts, the expected reliability gain (digital over
analog) is about 10:l.
For micro-module technology (extremely small discrete parts)
one source of data indicates a reliability gain of about 4: l (failure rate of
0. 077%/1000 hrs for digital vs 0.37%/I000 hrs for analog; per transistor
active element group).
For microcircuit technology, documented and proven reliability
exists only for digital circuits. This type of monolithic construction pro-
vides the highest reliability gains which have been proved, and are avail-
able off-the-shelf.
In summary, the following general statements can be made relative
to digital and analog circuits:
1. More complexity is required to perform the same function
with digital than with analog techniques
2. Microcircuitry can be applied more readily to digital systems
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, Digital circuits will generally operate over wider temperature
ranges than analog circuits and with more stability
. Part tolerances must be kept within tighter tolerances with
analog circuitry
. Failure rates of digital circuits are conservatively 1/Z
to 1/3. those of analog circuits.
Application of the findings, failure rate ratios, and guidelines to preliminary
camera circuits, with certain functions which could be accomplished by either
digital or analog circuits, resulted in the following summations of failure
rates for the TV subsystem:
Digital failure rate: 26.4%/1000 hr
Analog failure rate: 17.8%/i000 hr
Two basic panning options were considered. The first consisted
of an azimuth-elevation mount in which the camera rotated in both elevation
and azimuth. In the second option, a reflecting mirror rotated in elevation,
and the camera and mirror assembly rotated together in azimuth.
On the basis of the parts and items contemplated for use, and the
assumed operational duty cycles, there was no significant difference in
reliability between the two options.
"3 2 _-._ 2 p_^l- : n-1-'--L-'; ................ _'I• • r_,--, u_,zLy ReportJ. _:;I.&£11 l.IA_, y
The preliminary reliability report of 13 February 1964 from Ray-
theon Company presented a reliability block diagram of the TV subsystem
design as it existed at that time, a reliability analysis relating to the block
diagram, and a preliminary parts control program. The specific reliability
of the complete system was shown based on the parts content and the analysis,
development, and definition of camera motion-control parameters.
The reliability effort previously defined was continuing as part of
the design effort. The work was increasingly oriented to the selection,
analysis, and judgment of parts and components which could satisfy the
developing needs of design and performance.
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Z. Z. Z. 3 Stereoptic System Analysis
Since the start of the program, considerable attention had always
been directed to vidicons -- their capabilities, limitations, and particularly
their reliability. The critical relation of the vidicon served to stress the
absence of an authoritative and documented failure rate for vidicons. Con-
sidering the unavailability of a failure rate and the concern over the degree
of confidence desired, a closer look at a stereoptic system was initiated.
The stereoptic system analyzed employs fixed lenses and eliminates
the rotating Galilean telescope turret. This eliminates two undesirable
failure modes. First, the turret control mechanism may fail while the
turret is between two FOV positions and prevent transmission of the scene.
A fixed lens ensures that the optical path is never obstructed. Second,
elimination of the turret removes inaccurate rotational positioning of the
turret due to wear and possible environmental factors. This failure mode
causes boresight errors in imaging the scene on the vidicon faceplate with
resultant errors in surveying and perhaps in photogrammetry.
The use of two vidicons in a stereo (basically redundant) arrange-
ment enhances mission reliability. Considering only the vidicon itself, the
reliability of two in parallel is given by the equation Rp = 1 -(I-R) Z, where
Rp is the reliability of two vidicons in parallel and R is the reliability of
one vidicon. Failures are taken as having an exponential distribution.
The stereo system does away with the lens turret gearhead motor
but requires a motor for the second vidicon iris. This, however, is not
a one-for-one exchange in reliability. The failure mode of an iris control
motor is less critical than the failure modes of a lens turret motor. Failure
of an iris motor results in degraded performance while failure of a lens
turret motor can result in either degradation or a catastrophic failure.
Concern over the vidicon may be lessened after conducting investi-
gations into data and vidicon reliability information generated by other con-
tractors in their respective vidicon improvement programs for various
space projects.
Z. 2. Z. 4 Interim TV Subsystem Design
The interim TV subsystem design (reported in Raytheon Report
BR-Z848-1, 28 February 1964) took advantage of the analyses and results
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of the work accomplished up to that date. The decisions and choices of
specific approaches, such as thermal control design range, were based
on the findings of the tradeoff study and subsequent analyses. While the
use of potentiometers for camera pan and tilt control readout instead of
brush type shaft encoders were largely predicted on reliability require-
ments, investigations were underway on the technical feasibility of changing
to the use of the latter. Encoders were considered to offer many advantages
over analog systems from the viewpoint of readout accuracy and PCM data
transmission systems.
2. 2. 2. 5 Interim TV Subsystem Reliability Report
The interim TV subsystem reliability report from Raytheon in-
cluded the following:
1. A reliability block diagram
A reliability analysis associated with the block diagram and
contents thereof
3. Failure mode analysis
4. A preferred parts list for space applications.
2. Z. Z. 6 Reliability Block Diagram and Mathematical Model
Figure Z. 2. =5 shows the reliability block diagram, the failure
rate for each block, and the mathematical model for the final TV subsystem
design.
The reliability of the TV subsystem,
reliability of the time-dependent items, R(t),
item, R(k c), as expressed by:
RTV, is the product of the
and the reliability of the cyclic
RTV = R(t)_ R(k c)
Investigations to date, of parts and items in the TV subsystem de-
sign, show no apparent area where wearout failure conditions are expected
in terms of the operating time and number of cycles of actuation expected
for the missions presently contemplated. Therefore, the failures will be
chance failures only and have an exponential distribution as defined by the
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equation R(t) -7e-kt for time-dependent parts and R(kc) = e -k/cycle x
number oi cycles for cyclic items. The cyclic formula is used for time-
dependent parts which operate briefly on a low duty-cycle basis 4n con-
junction with the taking of each picture such as the digital electronic cir-
cuits for converting picture information, as well as electromechanical items
such as a motor which operates for a few seconds when tilting the camera.
The reliability formula for both the truly cyclic items, such as the shutter
solenoid, and the low duty-cycle items, can be basically expressed as a
function of picture taking by the equation
-(k c/picture) x (number of pictures)R(k c) = e
The need and potential for redundancies have been directed mainly
at the vidicon in two areas: (I) the use of two vidicons in a stereoptic con-
figuration, and (Z) some considerations of redundancy in switching the vidi-
con heater. These are not shown in Figure Z. 2- 5 because: (1) the final de-
sign is a monoptic design, and (2) the addition of vidiconheater switching
parts and circuits need not have any discernible degrading effect on over-
all reliability.
Z. Z. Z.7 Reliability Analysis
Figure Z. Z-5 shows the reliability block diagram to be divided into
three sections corresponding to the three basic ways of expressing time, t,
in the reliability mathematicalmDdels. These variations arise from the
partial switching performed to limit power demands on the SLRV, and the
intermittent performance needed of certain parts and items in relation to
the taking of each picture.
Section 1 covers the items to which electrical power is continuously
applied during the entire mission, including lunar nighttime. As such, the
time, t, in the reliability equation is made equal to the operating time for
any selected portion of the SLRV mission.
The vidicon, although in Section i, can be switched off when photo-
graphic activity has ended for the lunar day as the lunar night approaches.
This is described in Section 2. Z.Z. 8. It will be seen that the switching cir-
cuit and relay do not contribute to the total failure rate of the TV subsystem
and need not be included in the reliability block diagram.
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= failure rate in Tq/lO00 hours
= reliability of time-dependent items
= base of natural logarithms
= reliability of cycled circuits, low duty-cycle and cyclic items
= number of site pictures
= number of traverse pictures
= average panning angular movement of camera per site picture,
degrees
average
picture,
aver age
degrees
aver age
picture,
aver age
panning angular movement of camera per traverse
degrees
tilting angular movement of camera per site picture,
= tilting angular movement of camera per traverse
degrees
= time required to change FOV, seconds
= average number of pictures taken with one FOV setting
before changing to another FOV
= average time required to change aperture, seconds
= average number of pictures taken with one aperture setting
before changing to another aperture
= failure rate of shutter control items per cycle of operation
= number of shutter control operations per picture
Figure 2.2-5 Reliability Block Diagram and Mathematical Model
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Section 2 covers the items which operate in a specific cycle. _The
power is controlled from the SLRV and is switched off when the functions
are not required in order to minimize electrical demands on the SLRV power
supply. The reliability equation in basic terms can be stated as follows:
.
t im e
-k (
R(kC) l = e cycle
) (number of cycles)
Roberts Generator - The Roberts Generator can be switched
in or out on command by the operator. The total failure rate
of Section 2 is given for both modes of operation.
e Determination of Time, t - The computation of the reliability
of Section 2 involves the time term, t, which is the time:
period beginning from the time power is turned on when the
shutter is closed after an exposure and extending up to the end
of the erase cycle, at which time the power is turned off. This
time, t, is variable since it is a function of_ (1) the number of
elements per picture, (2) the number of encoding levels, and
(3) the output data rate. Figure 2. 2-6 shows the time elements
and equations for determining time t for Section 2. The basic
equation for computing the time it takes to scan one frame is
as follows:
elements bits 1
x x
picture element clock rate
T-- ..I11_ a square picture xorma_.... wl_n equal horizontal and vertical
resolution, the number of elements per picture is also
numerically equal to the square of the number of scan lines.
The variables applicable to the computation of time and
reliability are:
Primary Mode Emergency Mode
Number of Lines:
Encoding Levels:
Output Data Rate:
512 256
4 2
122,800 bits/sec 960 bits/sec
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OUTPUT DATA RATE=
122,880 BITS/sec ,
OR 960 BITS /sec.
/ / /
t z =FAST ERASE CYCLE_
ERASE SWEEP RATE =
122,880 BITS /sec.
t= tl +t z
(NUMBER OF SCAN LINES)iX (ENCOOING LEVELS)t : OUTPUT DATA RATE X 3600
(NUMBER OF SCAN LINES) = X (NUMBER OF ERASURES)]
+ HOURSJERASE SWEEP RATE X 3600
(NUMBER OF SCAN LINES)Zx FENCOOING LEVELS
,= Lo_--_-_ _3600 + ( 2.4414 X I(_S)I HRS
Figure 2. 2-6 Section 2, Time Elements and Equations
Section 3 covers the low duty-cycle and cyclic items which are
activated in preparation for, or during, the taking of a picture. The re-
liability equations (excepting that of the shutter solenoid) in basic terms
can also be stated as follows:
-X.( --
R(k c) = e
X
time
cycle ) {number of cycles}
For the cyclic shutter solenoid, the equation in basic terms is:
- failure rate
R(k c)6 = e ( cycle ) (
number of cycles ) (number of pictures)
picture
The variables applicable to the computation of time and reliability
are:
NS: 0 to 16,625
NT: 0 to 6,688
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Although the other terms in the reliability equations have been
assigned specific values according to the present design and contemplated
mission data, the general terms have been retained to permit computations
for different design parameters, if desired, or when changes occur in mis-
sion profile data.
The parts and items contained in each block of the reliability block
diagram are itemized in the Reliability Prediction Worksheets immediately
following
The failure rates and explanatory data for the various items con-
tained within each block, along with the failure rate sources, are sum-
marized in Table 2. 2-6. These failure rates are not high reliability part
failure rates and do not include any factor for lunar environment.
The failure rates are based on a derating of 50% at a maximum
temperature of 70°C. In the future program, breadboard tests will be con-
ducted to check transient effects to ensure that parts are not overstressed.
Transient effects will be taken into account by suitably increasing failure
rates when necessary on the basis of transient duration, duty cycle, type
of part, packaging techniques and thermal design.
Reliability of TV Subsystem Sections
The reliability of the TV subsystem sections can be computed from
the equations given in Figure Z. 2- 5 by using the desired or appropriate values
for the variables. The reliability of the different sections are computed and
combined wherever practicable and meaningful. Table 2. Z-7 gives the re-
liability of the TV and its components for 1, Z, 3, and 4. 5 months of opera-
tion.
The reliability of the continuously-operating items in Section 1 is
shown in Figure Z. 2-7. , Reliability is plotted as a function of operating
time to accommodate the different mission profiles of the various Bendix
SLRV system concepts.
The reliability of the cyclic-operation items in Section 2 is shown
in Figure Z. 2-8 as a function of: (1) number of pictures, and (2) number of
"surveyed sites". The total failure rate used includes the Roberts Generator
although use of the Roberts Generator is optional. Reliability is plotted for
only the primary mode of operation.
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TABLE Z. Z-6
FAILURE RATES AND FAILURE RATE SOURCES
I)
;:_
Note :
Item
Source: TRA-873- 74
a) Resistor - Fixed metal film; I/4 and I/2
watt rating; I00 K to I meg values.
b) Resistor, Variable, composition, 50-500 K.
c) Capacitor - Fixed solid tantalum.
d) Capacitor- Paper.
e) Capacitor - General purpose ceramic.
f) Capacitor- (Metalized Film) Paper-Plastic.
g) DC Motor, Insulation "A", brush device,
rotational speed taken as I00 rpm due to low
duty cycle.
h) Coil - Inductor (Grade 5); encapsulated
construction; class "T" Insulation; hot spot
temperature 20@C above ambient.
i) Transformer (Pulse &Blocking Oscillator)
Grade 5.
j ) Diode-Silicon; general purpose.
k) Transistor-Silicon; medium power.
1) Cathode Ray Tube (for Vidicon)
Failure Rate
percent/1000 hours':-"
0. 045
0.075
0.0625
O. 024
0. 030
0.0025
0.160
0.05
0.08
0.053
0.073
2.00
Failure Rates determined on basis of operating parts at 50 percent
rating.
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TABLE 2.2-6 (CONT.)
m)
n)
2) Source: AVCO
Item
Connector, Electrical
Relay- Coil
- Individual Contact Set
- Redundant Contact Sets
(2 in parallel)
a) Gear Box
b) "0" Ring
c) Bearing
d) Solenoid Rotary
e) Cable
3) General Instruments
4)
"PC" type microcircuit.
microcircuit package.
Signetic s
0. 25" x 0.25" x O. 70"
5) Texas Instruments
Microcircuits, "SN" type.
Failure Rate
percent/1000 hours*
0.0OO2
(per contact)
0. 21/104
Operations
Determined
by Number of
Operations
0. 063
0. 002
o. o65
0.03 percent/lO 3
Cycle s
O. 0475
0.1
O. 1
0.1
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I'0 K R/t)= (_Xt
0.9"1 _ )'= 14.175%/1000 hr
0+7
0.6-
0 0.4 08 I 2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8
OPERATING TIME (HOURS x lO00)
'°°°N L,NES,____'X
I \ /ENCODING LEVELS - eJ_.l
o+999-_...........
PR,MARYMODEAND*,TH\
ROB_E_RTS GENERATOR X
_==16=_511% ! I000 HOURS \
NO OF SCAN LINES ,512 _>
ENCODING LEVELS = 4
OUTPUT DATA RATE = 122,880 BITS/sec
(N$ +N. r) = 25,000 PICTURES, TOTAL
0.998 -
oi,
o _ _ ,_ 2'0 A
TOTAL NUMBER OF PICTURES x I000
6 .... ,,G.... ib.... ,_' ' 'I_
NUMBER OF "SURVEYED SITES"
Figure 2. 2-7 Reliability System 1.
Continuously Operating Items
Figure 2. 2-R R_l;ml_;1;f,. ,-,4" q_^.'^_ -)
Cyclic -Ope ration Items
A total of 25,000 pictures is required for a complete mission --
20,000 for site survey and 5,000 for intersite traverse. These figures
include allowances for false starts.
A surveyed site is defined here as consisting of one intersite
traverse plus one site survey. A surveyed site provides for false starts
also, and the pictures due to false starts are arbitrarily averaged out over
the required 19 good sites. Thus the number of pictures in a surveyed
site is found by dividing 25,000 by 19, which gives 1315.
The reliability of the low duty-cycle and cyclic items (Section 3),
as expressed by the equations and data shown in Figure 2. 2-5 , is deter-
mined by selecting specific parametric values based on the final system
design and present mission concepts.
IV 2-9l
BSR 903
, Pan and Tilt Control Systems - The pan and tilt control sys-
tem equations for R(k c) Z and R(k c)3 are the same, and the
systems are discussed together since certain aspects are
common to each.
The average required pan and tilt angular movement of the
camera was based on a 40-degree field-of-view lens. With
such a lens, an average angular camera movement of 30 degrees
per site picture and Z0 degrees per traverse picture was given.
For this analysis, it is assumed that the total angular camera
movement is equally divided between panning and tilting.
The parametric values for determining R(kc) z and R(k c) 3
are as follows:
O S = 15 degrees
P
O T = i0 degrees
P
0 S = 15 degrees
t
0 T t = 10 degrees
The reliability of the pan and tilt control systems as a function
of the number of "surveyed sites" is shown in Table 2. Z-8 ,
and combined with other low duty-cycle and cyclic items of
Section 3 in Figure 2. 2- 9 The reliability is also shown as
a function of number of pictures. This is made possible by
making a minor approximation. For a site picture, the average
camera movement is 15 degrees while for a traverse picture,
the average movement is l0 degrees. With a fixed rate of
camera angular motion of 6 degrees per second, slightly more
time is required to complete the required camera movement
for a site picture than for a traverse picture. Although a
group of intersite traverse pictures is taken and then followed
by a group of site pictures, it may be taken that the site and
traverse pictures are interleaved by a ratio of I. 054/263,
(since 1,054 pictures are required for one site, and 263 are
required for one intersite traverse). From this, 4 site pic-
tures are taken for every 1 traverse picture and are inter-
leaved in that order. This concept of interleaving makes it
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TABLE 2.2-8
RELIABILITY OF SECTION 3, LOW DUTY-CYCLE AND CYCLIC ITEMS
Block Reliability
Pan Actuator Assembly
Tilt Actuator Assembly
F0V Actuator Assembly
Aperture Actuator Assembly
R(_tc) 2 0.999907
R(_tc) 3 O. 999919
R(kc) 4 O. 999974
R(_c) 5 O. 999985
Shutter Solenoid R(kc)6
6
Overall Reliability: R(_c)2_ 6 = r R(_c) =
2
0. 985110
0. 984898
Number of Traverse Pictures
Total number of pictures
_v, vVV
: 5,000
= 25,000
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,
convenient to plot reliability as a function of number of pic-
tures, yielding negligible errors in between the discrete,
integral numbers of "surveyed sites".
Field-of-View Control System - The parametric values
used for determining R(\c) 4 are as follows:
tFO V
N
FOV
= 1 5 seconds
= 20 (it is estimated that FOV will be changed every
20 pictures, or 1/20 operation per picture)
The reliability of the FOV control system is shown in
Table 2. Z-8 , and combined with other low duty-cycle and
cyclic items of Section 5 in Figure Z. 2-9.
I000 "_ •
R(_, c)
"_ 0990"
,?,
0.980.
O'_ ,
o _ ,b ,_ io z5
TOTAL NUMBER OF PICTURES x I000
6 .... _ .... ,b.... ,_'" ',_
NUMBER OF "SURVEYEO SITES"
Figure 2.2-9 Reliability of Section 5, Low Duty-Cyclic and Cyclic Items
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. Aperture Control System - The parametric values used
for determining R(k c) 5 are as follows:
tAp = 5 seconds
NA p =10 (it is estimated that the aperture will be changed
once every 10 pictures, or 1/10 operation per
picture}.
The reliability of the aperture control system is shown in
Table Z. 2-8 and combined with other low duty-cycle and
cyclic items of Section 3, in Figure 2. 2- 9 .,
. Shutter Solenoid - The parametric values used for deter-
mining R(k c) 6 are as follows:
-5
kSH = 0.03 x 10 failures/cycle (0.03 percent/1000 cycles}
N N = 2 operations per picture
The reliability of the shutter solenoid is shown in Table 2. 2-8
and combined with other low duty-cycle and cyclic items
of Section 3, in Figure Z. 2-9. •
Table 2.2-8 shows extremely high reliabilities for R(k c)2, R(k c) 3,
R(kc)4, and R(kc) 5 because the motors are operated for very short periods
and accumulate a relatively low number of operating hours over the span of
a mission. The normal determination of failure rates for motors includes
consideration of duty cycle to arrive at operating time. However, when a
motor is repeatedly started and run for very short periods, it is felt that
the straight, time-dependent failure rate becomes less and less realistic.
The failure rate should most probably be multiplied by some factor which
reflects the increasing effects of a failure mode attributable to motor starts.
An investigation will be made in the next program phase to determine if
such a factor can be established.
Reliability of TV Subsystem
By means of the reliability block diagram, mathematical model,
and failure rates given in Figure Z. 2- 5 , and the parametric values given
in the text, the reliability of the TV subsystem may be obtained for any
chosen operating time and any given number of site and traverse pictures
(or "surveyed sites" as defined herein}.
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The reliabilities of Section 2 (as shown in Figure 2. 2- 8) and
Section 3 (as shown in Figure 2. 2- 9) are combined for convenience in
Figure 2. 2-10. Thus, the reliability of the TV subsystem may also be
obtained by multiplying the reliabilities from Figures 2. 2-7 and 2. 2-l0
for any given operating time and number of pictures, or sites surveyed,
recognizing the conditions and definitions about which Figures 2. 2- 8 ,
2. 2- 9 , and Z. 2-10were generated.
1.000
i 0990
0.980
oT
o _ ib ,_ _o 15
TOTAL NUMBER OF PICTURES x I000
.... _ .... ,b .... ,'_' ' ',_
NUMBER OF "SURVEYED SITES"
Figure Z. 2-10 Combined Reliability of Section 2 and Section 3
(Figures 2. 2-8 and 2. 2-9)
2.2. 2.8 Reliability Aspects of Critical Parts and Items
Reliability aspects of critical parts and items, and design features,
are discussed to give additional background and a better understanding of
the TV subsystem and some of the design decisions which affected the final
de sign.
Vidicon
The vidicon is considered to be one of the most critical items in the
TV subsystem. Unfortunately, vidicons are low-population items and because
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of the lack of statistical data, there are no known vidicon failure rates in
the various available failure rate data sources. To date, a generic failure
rate of 2%/i000 hours for CRTs and kinescopes has been used since these
are the nearest comparable items to the vidicon.
To attain the high degree of confidence in the vidicon for this pro-
ject, future work must include carelul investigation, analysis of test data
that become available, a test program, and, probably, a product improve-
ment program if shown to be desirable and technically profitable in succeeding
program phases. The scope of this effort will become defined after an investi-
gation into the vidicon data and reliability findings generated by various con-
tractors in their vidicon improvement programs for previous and current
space programs.
Test data furnished by General Electrodynamics Corporation (GEC)
on their vidicons and heater/cathode assemblies are summarized as follows:
. Continuous Operation - Test data on 25 heater/cathode
assemblies operated continuously showed total hours run,
ranging from 588 hours to 2472 hours grouped as follows:
_o Juo-1O00 hours: 4assemblies
b. IO00-ZO00 hours: 12 assemblies
c. 2000-2472 hours: 9 assemblies
The assemblies tested represented succeeding new batches of
manufacture. No failures occurred. A few assemblies were
removed from test because of declining emissionbut mosttests
were terminated because the test facilities were limited and
assemblies were removed to make room for newer batches.
Cyclic Operation - Test data on 4 assemblies operated in a
cyclic mode consisting of 1 minute on and 4 minutes off, an
extremely rugged test, showed the following:
a. 2 failed at 1634 hours (heater failure)
b. i removed from test at 6625 hours and was still
operating satisfactorily
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Co 1 removed from test at 6731 hours and was still
operating satisfactorily.
o Cyclic Operation - Four vidicons were tested in a cyclic mode
consisting of 4 minutes on and 1 minute off with the following
results:
a. 1 survived 2000 hours
b. 2 survived 5000 hours
Co I was still operating satisfactorily at i0,000 hours when
the test was terminated.
GEC stated that the main failure mode of the vidicon is failure of
the heater.
A "standard" commercial TV vidicon has an expected life of 3000
hours, as a conservative figure, according to technical information from
Raytheon's Industrial Tube Division, but in space _pplicati0ns ernploy_,ng
slower read-out rates may experience shorter life because of the possibility
of deterioration in the photosensitive material.
GEC stated that while deterioration of photosensitive material
may take place in commercial vidicons, their test data and experience
have shown no such failure mode to be evident in the 1344 and similar type
vidicons.
The vidicon (Section l of Figure Z. Z- 5), which can be switched
off when photographic activity has ended for the lunar day and the lunar
night approaches), is considered to be the most critical item in the TV sub-
system due to the absence of an authoritative, documented failure rate for
vidicons. Cea:tain facts are known about the GEC vidicon:
i) The main failure mode is failure of the heater/cathode
element
In an "off-on" power switching cyclic test, the failure
mode is opening of the heater
, In a continuous power "on" run, the failure mode is exhaustion
of the cathode with emission falling off below an acceptable limit.
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GEC has expressed "good" confidence in the ability of the vidicon
to successfully complete a mission of 3400 hours duration. The test data
supplied by GEC heater/cathode assemblies for both continous and cycled
test runs indicate good life. However, it would have been preferable if
more of the tests were continued for longer periods and more tests to end-
of-life were run.
Even though the vidicon test data and failure mode analyses point
to satisfactory life capabilities, the present phi!osophy is to be conservative
and minimize accumulated vidicon operating time by switching power off
during the lunar night. This arrangement conserves heater/cathode life
for expenditure during the lunar day only when the TV subsystem is actively
engaged in picture taking. As more test data become available from the
vendor and, if deemed necessary, from special Raytheon tests, an extra
margin of confidence may be attained at which the conservative approach of
switching heater power off during lunar night time may be discarded along
with the parts and circuits required for this function.
The subject of switching vidicon heater power is related to one of
the thermal control design requirements. The temperature of the TV sub-
system can be maintained within the desired limits during the lunar night
by means ot power dlssipated by certain circuits which are continuously
powered, along with the one watt of power dissipated by the vidicon heater.
To conserve heater/cathode life, as previously discussed, a design based
on reliability considerations was then adopted to switch off the vidicon heater
and switch in resistors which would dissipate the required one watt of power.
Figure 2. 2-II shows two circuits for switching vidicon heater and
heater resistors. Circuit a, employing a single relay, is used in the present
design. Redundant contacts are used for increased reliability. The series-
parallelarrangement of resistors, properly sized, provides better reliability
than a single resistor, along with the advantage of dispersing the source of
heat. Examination of this circuit shows that the relay can be neglected in
the reliability analysis. The reliability of the relay is given by the equation:
-(k t b + k* N)R = e b
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where:
kbt b = expected number of coil failures
3
k b = coil failure rate = 0. 025%/10 hr
= time power is applied to coil
= expected number of failure for redundant relay contacts
= failure rate for redundant contacts (k for single contact4
set = 0. 21%/10 operations - from TRA-873-74)
N = number of relay operations in mission.
The term k.t. vrould ordinarily be somewhat significant since powerb
is to be applied during_unar nights. However, if the relay coil fails, the re-
suit is that power will be applied to the vidicon heater for the remainder of the
lunar night(s) and there is no effect on TV subsystem operation. In this case
the heater will be operating instead of turned off in accordance with the present
conservative approach. The term X_N can be neglected since the failure rate
for two contact sets in parallel, operated twice for each lunar night, is in-
significant.
I I
I HEATER RESISTORS
I
!
.L
RELAY
5VKli_ DE -ENERGIZED
o) SINGLE RELAY CIRCUIT
Figure 2. 2- 11
HEATER RESISTORS
I ,,L RELAYS
I_ _ DE-ENERG,ZED
KI K2
b) REDUNDANT RELAY CIRCUIT
Vidicon Heater Switching Circuits
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A remote possibility is that the relay armature would not spring
back for proper contact operation and reapply power to the vidicon heater
when SLRV operation is to resume. If this possibility were of concern, a
solution could be provided by a redundant relay circuit such as shown by
circuit b of Figure 2. 2-II. While this circuit ensures that the vidicon heater
will have power when desired, the switching of current to the heater resistors
requires operation of both relays.
Sealed Motion-Control Drives
The TV subsystem, as presently designed, requires the use of
motors and potentiometers. These types of parts are not normally capable
of operation in hard vacuum and it is planned to seal them, along with gear
trains, in a container having controlled leakage rates. The output shaft is
sealed by "O" rings and a suitable lubricant.
Construction of the sealed drives will be at the laboratory and they
will be installed as a unit at the manufacturing facility. Although great
care and control will be effected in assembling these items, precautions
must be taken during subsequent handling, installation, and testing to en-
sure the integrity of the seals.
Although the electronics and electromechanical devices can be
readily checked for proper operation at the last scheduled checkout prior
to installation in the vehicle or countdown, the effectiveness of the seals
cannot be easily determined. Obviously, an extremely high degree of con-
fidence must be assured in the ability of the sealed packages to function
properly in hard vacuum. To this end, the next program phase will require
investigation into the feasibility of checking gas pressure, leakage rates, or
some other parameter at the last scheduled checkout prior to launch.
Drive Motors
The DC motor has been selected for all the TV subsystem motion
control systems because of its efficiency and the availability of DC power.
Use of less efficientACmotors would also require a converter in the TV
subsystem or an AC source in the vehicle which would mean more circuitry,
a decrease in reliability, and more heat to dump out due to added circuits
and less efficient motors.
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The present design of the TV subsystem is based on the use of
Globe Industries' ModelX-116 subminiature DC motor. This motor was
selected on the basis of small size, weight, and suitable electrical charac-
teristics. This motor provides considerably more torque than is required
in the various motion control systems so, as a result, the motor is applied
conservatively with a good safety margin.
The performance and design features of the Globe motor, as they
relate to reliability, are as follows:
I. Failure Rate - No specific failure rate for the X-II6
motor is available. Therefore, the standing of this motor
relative to the generic failure rate obtained from TRA-873-74
cannot be ascertained.
2. Brush Life - The brush life of the commercially available
X-ll6 motor is i00-500 hours in a standard atmosphere,
continuous operation. The life obtained depends on the
loading and rotational speed. Globe Industries provided
data on the Model XA-0740 (similar to the X-ll6 except
for a rectangular cross-section) brush life in standard
atmosphere as follows:
a. 500 hours under conservative loading
b. 300 hours at 800 rpm and maximum continuous loading
c. 600 hours at 5000 rpm
d. I00 hours at 12,000 rpm
Although the brush life appears adequate in view of the
actual torque requirements and accumulated operating
time for a mission, improved brushes may be incorporated
for motors intended for the TV subsystem.
. Vacuum - This motor is not intended to be operated in
hard vacuum. The motor, along with gear trains and
potentiometers used in the camera control systems, will
be sealed into containers having controlled leakage rates.
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, Shock and Vibration - The X-l16 motor is limited to shock
and vibration of not more than 5g. This limit is due to the
structure of the body case and end bell attachments. Raytheon
has determined that a metal sleeve suitably fitted over the
length of the motor will enable the motor to withstand 25 g
shock and vibration.
Potentiometers
Potentiometers are considered to be critical items in the TV sub-
system as are all other electromechanical items.
The present design of the TV subsystem is based on the use of
Markite Corporation conductive plastic potentiometers. These potentiometers
were selected on the basis of satisfying system electrical, environmental,
mechanical, and reliability requirements.
The primary TV subsystem electrical, environmental, and mech-
anical requirements for potentiometers, which are met byMarkite pots,
are high resolution, high accuracy (or linearity), stability under environ-
mental conditions, and physical dimensions suitable for the intended appli-
cations.
The Markite potentiometers have performance and design features,
described below, which are desirable from the viewpoint of reliability.
. Failure Rate - No specific failure rates are available for
these potentiometers so the typical generic failure rate
found in TRA-873-74 is used.
. Life - Useful life is measured in many millions of revolutions
although no such number of revolutions is needed foi_ the
TV subsystem.
, Failure Mode - The possibility of catastrophic failures (opens
or shorts} should be extremely low due to the large cross-
sectional area of the molded, one-piece, continuous, resistive
element. The high wiper forces (usually 50-70 grams} maintain
electrical continuity under high g shock, acceleration, and vi-
bration. Typical test data show continuous contact during con-
ditions of 70 g vibration at 5 to 2000 cps, 100 g shock and 100 g
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acceleration in all planes. The use of precision stainless steel
ball bearings, both front and back, minimizes the possibility of
seizing or wearout as may be experienced in ordinary bearings.
Radiation - Markite potentiometers will function to 10 8 and
probably 10 9 rads radiation.
. Vacuum - Although the potentiometers will be sealed into
containers having controlled leakage rates for space usage;
Markite states that the potentiometers can _ithstand, and
not be harmec_by 8 days of exposure at 10- Torr. Additional
information relative to the test in which the statement is based
is being sought.
Reliability Aspects of Telescope
The Galilean telescope drum axis was reoriented from its original
position for reliability purposes. In the present orientation the drum rotation
is in a vertical plane. In the event of a failure mode wherein the proper lens
is selected but not indexed within specifications, the resultant pointing error
will be in the tilt plane rather than the pan plane. Pointing accuracy in the
pan plane is considered more essential since this affords maximum design
accuracy in navigation. Tilt pointing errors are considered less harmful
to mission success than pan pointing errors.
Reliability Aspects of Iris Design
For varying the aperture, a modified iris has been designed in
preference to the previous design of moveable fixed apertures. The latter
has an undesirable failure mode wherein a catastrophic failure can occur
while changing aperture openings with the result that the image cannot be
transmitted by the optical system. Failure of the modified iris system will
not cause the optics to be obstructed. Such a failure will result in a fixed
aperture which can be compensated to some degree by selecting a suitable
exposure time although the depth of field may not necessarily be at an op-
timum.
Z. 2. 2.9 Failure Mode Analysis
A failure mode analysis of the TV subsystem was conducted by
determining the various modes of failure, the probability of occurrence of
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each mode of failure, and the resultant degradation to the TV subsystem.
The purpose of the analysis is to rank the failure modes in critical order
and define the major failure modes. Appropriate effort may then be
logically directed in implementing reliability improvements.
Detail Analysis
Selection of items for failure mode analysis is based on the func-
tional blocks of the reliability block diagram, Figure Z. Z-5 . Items for
analysis included functional groupings of various types of parts, groupings
of integrated circuits, groupings of discrete parts, and separate, various
discrete parts.
The failure mode analysis data are presented in Tables z. z- 9
to Z.Z-1Z. The five highest critical failure modes in descending order of
criticality are summarized by the following:
I. Vidicon - open heaters or insufficient cathode emission
Z. 16 microcircuits of video preamplifier controls - open
3. 22 microcircuits of horizontal and vertical controls - open
4. 4 microcircuits of tilt control - open or shorted
5. 15 microcircuits of exposure control - open or shorted.
In the next phase of the program, the failure modes of the higher
criticalities will be examined for means to lower or eliminate the failure
modes. Possible means include use of improved parts, simpler circuits,
alternate and better ways of accomplishing a given function, and redundancies.
It should be stressed again that the failure rates used in this
analysis are not high reliability part failure rates. Therefore, the actual
TV subsystems to be constructed, will employ high reliability parts and
will have better reliability than that shown here.
The present design is based on Section 1 being powered continuously,
including the time during the lunar night when no photographic activity is
taking place. Further study will be made of the possibility of switching off
power for Section 1 items and switching in heater resistors during DSIf off-
time for increasing reliability while maintaining a suitable temperature.
This study is necessary since the thermal control system will be involved.
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Several aspects of the failure mode analysis procedure are re-
viewed here (see Tables Z. 2-9 through 2. 2-12).
The rate of occurrence of a failure mode of a time (or cycle)
sensitive part is related to its failure rate through the following relation-
ship:
%-.
k = ? k.
T _ i
i=l
where
k
T
k.
I
k
= total failure rate of the time (or cycle) sensitive part
= part failure rate due to the ith failure mode
number of failure modes.
The ratio of failures in each failure mode to the total expected
failures of the part were obtained from several sources: TRA-873-74 for
the more common parts, Bendix Systems Division for integrated circuits,
and engineering estimates for parts not otherwise covered. In developing
estimates, use was made of Section 6. i, "Environmental Effect on Part
Failures", of TRA-873-74.
The Mode-of-Failure column data (Tables 2.2-9 through 2. 2-12)
was based on the above. Failure modes which were considered insignificant,
with a very remote possibility of occurrence, were riot subject to further
analysis.
The probability of failure (kt) was determined by the product of
the total failure rate of the part, the rate of occurrence of a particular failure
mode, and the total operating time (or number of actuations for cyclic items).
The Effect Index Number is the level of degradation suffered by
the TV subsystem as a consequence of a particular failure mode. An Effect
Index Number of 1 corresponds to total failure or mission abort, while a
number approaching zero has no effect on the mission.
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The Combined Product is the product of Probability of Failure and
Effect Index Number.
The Criticality Ranking is the ranking of failure modes in order of
descending order of importance -- ranking of 1 being the most critical failure
mode of the TV subsystem.
2. 2. 2.10 Parts and Materials Control Program
The broad objective of the parts and mate rfaIs; control program
is to eliminate or minimize potential reliability problems associated with
component parts and materials including the choice of types, specification,
qualification, and application. (As used herein, qualification means all
methods of determination of suitability, as opposed to qualification testing. )
Since the TV subsystem will be produced in limited numbers, heavy
emphasis will not be placed on reduction of numbers of types of parts or
microcircuits.
Selection
In order to facilitate and control proper choices of parts, an ap-
proved parts list has been prepared for use in the TV subsystem, and about
85 percent of the parts and circuits required should be available from this
list.
Specifications
It is not anticipated that a large number of parts, circuits, and ma-
terials specifications will be required since existing high reliability specifi-
cations will be satisfactory in most cases.
Where additional requirements or modification of specifications
are required, individual purchase orders can be supplemented to achieve
the objectives.
Qualification
Qualification of parts, circuits and materials will be based upon
prior usage in space programs and a history of good reliability. However,
verification test program will be required on a limited number of items,
either because of lack of usage history, use in an unusual application, or both.
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Screening Aging Tests
Regardless of the type of part under consideration, manufacturing
conditions for the part are never constant. Therefore, it must be recog-
nized that potentially defective parts are likely to be present in any lot of
parts regardless of the type. Therefore, it is planned that all part types
will receive a nominal run-in (burn-in) at near full capacity and at ele-
vated ambient temperature.
In addition to these nominal run-ins, special screening tests will
be instituted on certain types of parts where such tests are considered to
be effective in eliminating "early" failures.
Additional Conside rations
As the television subsystem design and development progresses,
it may be determined that certain types of parts are not capable of meeting
the reliability requirement of the subsystem. In those cases, a detailed
analysis will be made to determine the causes of the inadequacy, and
recommendations will be made to improve the reliability of the part through
a suitable reliability improvement program.
Z. Z. 2.11 Preferred Parts List and Application Guidelines
Preferred Parts List and Application Guidelines, presented in
Tables g. Z-13 through Z. 2-24, form a preliminary document developed
to provide initial guidance to SLRV TV subsystem designers. These will
be revised periodically to pace the advancement of the program and design
phase of the TV subsystem.
Basic guidelines for the design of the TV subsystems are as
follows:
i. Avoid the use of parts containing liquids, such as wet slug
tantalum capacitors, aluminum electrolytic capacitors, etc.
_o Limit the use of electromechanical, rotary or switching de-
vices such as potentiometers, motors, relays, switches, etc.
3. Use only lubricants indicated.
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TABLE 2.2-13
MINIMUM ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTS FOR
TV SUBSYSTEM APPLICATION
Envir onm ent Op erating
Shock
Vibration
Sinusoidal
Random
Acceleration
Temperature
Acoustic Noise
2 x 10 -4 dynes CM 2
Pressure
V a cuum
M oi stur e
Radiation
Electrons
Gamma Ray
50 g, ii + 1 ms (3 axes)
in MIL-STD-202
5 - 20 0.5 in. double amplitude
Z0 - 57 ± 10g
57 - 99 0.6 in. double amplitude
99 - 3000 ± 30g
50 - 2000 cps at 0. 3gg/cps
_T_,_.,_, "'_'_+_'_S _C .... _ ,_,_ _,_ _,_ more
severe than the requirements noted above,
then the acceleration requirements will be
specified in the purchase specifications.
"_" 5 o
-65°C to + 85°C , -6 C to + lZ5°C ""
(non operating)
37.5 - 9600 cps at 150 db
Operation at maximum rated voltage at
2.5 mm Hg without arc over
-8
Stabilized at 1 x l0 mm Hg for 50 hours rain
MIL-STD-202, Method 106A
Integrated flux 2 x i013 electrons/cm
Energy level - i mev
DOSE: 7 x 10 6 Rads
.j.
Measured at the part case
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TABLE 2. Z- 14
Standard Resistapce Values for the I0 to i00 Decade
A B A B
I0.0 i0.0
I0. I --
10.2 10.2
10.4 --
10.5 10.5
10.6 --
I0.7 i0.7
10.9 --
11.0 11.0
11.1 --
11.3 11.3
11.4 --
ll.5 ll.5
ll.7 --
ll.8 ll.8
12.0 --
12. I 12.1
iZ. 3 --
12.4 12.4
12.6 --
12.7 12.7
12.9 --
13.0 13.0
13.2 --
13.3 13.3
13.5 --
13.7 13.7
13.8 --
14.0 14.0
14. Z --
14.3 14.3
14.5 --
14.7 14.7
14.9 --
15.0 15.0
15.2 --
15.4 15.4
15.6 --
15.8 15.8
16.0 --
16.2 16.2
16.4 --
16.5 16.5
i6.7 --
16.9 16.9
17.2 --
17.4 17.4
17.6 --
17.8 17.8
18.0 --
18.2 18.2
18.4 --
18.7 18.7
18.9 --
19.1 19.1
19.3 --
19.6 19.6
19.8 --
20.0 20.0
20. 3 --
20. 5 20. 5
20. 8 --
21.0 21.0
21.3 --
A B
21.5 21.5
21.8 --
22. 1 22. 1
ZZ. 3 --
22.6 22.6
22.9 --
23. 2 23. 2
23.4 --
23.7 23. 7
24.0 --
24. 3 24. 3
Z4.6 --
24.9 24.9
25.2 --
25.5 25.5
25.8 --
26. l 26. l
26.4 --
26.7 26.7
27. l --
27.4 27.4
27.7 --
28.0 28. 0
28.4 --
28. 7 28. 7
29.1 --
29.4 29.4
29.8 --
30. 1 30. l
30.5 --
30.9 30.9
31. Z --
A B
31.6 31.
32.0 --
32.4 32.
32.8 --
33.2 33.
33.6 --
34.0 34.
34.4 --
34.8 34.
35.2 --
35.7 35.
36.1 --
36.5 36.
37.0 --
37.4 37.
37.9 --
38. 3 38.
38.8 --
39. 2 39.
39.7 --
40. 2 40.
40.7 --
41. Z 41.
41.7 --
42. 2 42.
42.7 --
43. 2 43.
43.7 --
44. 2 44.
44. 8 --
45. 3 45.
45.9 --
A
6 46.4
47.0
4 47.5
48.1
2 48.7
49.3
0 49.9
50.5
8 51.1
51.7
7 52.3
53.0
5 53.6
54. 2
4 54.9
55.6
3 56.2
56.9
2 57.6
58.3
2 59.0
59.7
Z 60.4
61.Z
2 61.9
62.6
2 63.4
64.2
2 64.9
65.7
3 66.5
67.3
B A
46.4 68.1
-- 69.0
47.5 69.8
-- 70.6
48.7 71.5
-- 72.3
49.9 73.2
-- 74.1
51. 1 75.0
-- 75.9
52.3 76.8
-- 77.7
53.6 78. 7
-- 79.6
54.9 80.6
-- 81.6
56.2 82.5
-- 83.5
57.6 84.5
-- 85.6
59.0 86.6
-- 87.6
60.4 88.7
-- 89.8
61.9 9O.9
-- 92.0
63.4 93. 1
-- ]94. Z
64.9 195.3
-- [96.5
66.5 97.6
-- 98.8
B
68.1
mm
69.8
71.5
u_
73.2
75.0
76.8
78.7
m_
80.6
82.5
84.5
86.6
m_
88.7
90.9
93.1
94. 2
95.3
97.6
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TABLE 2.2-16
DIGITA L MICROCIRCUITS
Catalog
Function Vendor No.
Gate
NOR-NAND
Gate
NOR-NAND
with C.F.
Flip -Flop
Flip-Flop
with C.F.
Gate Dual
NOR-NAND
Gate
OR
Buffer
Flip-Flop
Gate
HaH-
Adder
Half -Shift
Register
Flip-Flop
Steering
Gate
Flip-Flop
Reset
Gate NOR
Single 4 Input
Gate NOR
Dual 3 Input
Gate NOR
Single 6 Input
Gate NAND
Single 4 Input
Gate NAND
Dual 3 Input
Gate NAND
Single 6 Input
Buffer
Gate
NOR-NAND
Single 3 Input
T. I°
T.L
T.I.
T.I.
T.I.
T.L
F.A.
F.A.
F.A.
F.A.
F.A.
G.I.
G.L
G.L
G.I.
G.L
G.I.
G.L
G.L
G.L
G.L
Signetics
SN-51 2
SN-513
SN-510
SN-511
SN-514
SN-515
MLB
MLF
MLG
MLH
MLS
NC-8/
PC-8
NC-9/
PC-9
PC-13
NC-10
PC-14
PC- 10
NC-I 1
PC-15
PC-ll
NC/PC-I Z
SEI01G
SEI01K
_VIilitary fd max Icbo fa p
No. n sec _a mc mw Package Remarks
-- 130 100 0.6 7 Flat-Pack
-- 130 100 0.6 7 Flat-Pack
-- 300 100 0.6 7 Flat-Pack
-- 300 100 0.6 7 Flat-Pack
-- 80 100 0.6 7 Flat-Pack
-- |00 00 0.6 7 Flat-Pack
-- 35 00 0.8 15 TO-5
-- 35 100 0.8 30 TO-5
-- 35 100 0. 8 15 TO-5
-- 70 100 0.8 45 TO-5
-- 70 100 0.8 75 TO-5
-- 30 Z00 Z0 Z00 TO-5 or
Flat Pack
-- 30 ZOO Z0 ZOO TO-5 or
Flat-Pack
-- 30 ZOO Z0 tO0 TO-5 or
Flat-Pack
-- ZZ 150 IZ 170 TO-5
-- ZZ 150 1Z 170 Flat-Pack
-- ZZ 150 IZ 170 Flat-Pack
-- TO-5
-- 16 I00 15 60 Flat-Pack
-- Flat-Pack
-- 70 IZ Z00 TO-5 or
Flat Pack
-- 60 I00 I 6 G = TO-5
K = Flat-Pack
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TABLE; Z.2-16 (CONT.)
Function
Gate
NOR-NAND
Single 4 Input
Diode & Gate
Power Gate
Shift Register
Ripple
Counter
Line Driver
One - shot
Multi -
vibrator
Buffer.
Exclusive
OR
High -Speed
NAND-NOR
Gate
NAND
J-K
Flip-Flop
5 Input
NAND Gate
5 Input
NAND Gate
Dual 3 Input
HAND Gate
Z & 3 Input
NAND Gate
Clock
Dr iver/Buffer
Vendor
Signetics
Signetics
Signetics
Signetics
Signetics
Signetlcs
Signetics
Signetics
Signetic s
Signetic s
Raytheon
T.L
T.L
T.L
T.L
T.L
T.L
Catalog
No.
SE-1OZG
SE-10ZK
SE-10S-104T
SE-II0
SE-IZZ
SE-IZ3
SE-IZOT
SE-121T
SE- 1 Z4
SE-150
SE-160
SE-130T
SE-140T
SE-Z01G
SE-Z01K
SN-530
SN-531
SN-53Z
SN-533
SN-534
SN-535
Military
No.
fd max
n sec
60
60
35
35
e_
50
35
Icbo
_a
100
100
Z00
ilOO
lOO
200
15o
2oo
ioo
8 50
-- 100
--. . ..
f
a P
mc mw
1 6
1 6
1 50
8 16
8 16
•. - 50
1 25
1 6O
1 60
ZO 6
G.8 15
5 30
5 30
5
5
5
5
Package Remarks
G = TO-5
K = Flat-Pack
Flat-Pack
Flat-Pack
Flat-Pack
Flat-Pack
Flat-Pack
Flat-Pack
Flat-Pack
Flat-Pack
G = TOm5
K = Flat-Pack
TO-5
Flat-Pack
Flat-Pack
30 Flat-Pack
30 Flat-Pack
30 Flat-Pack
30 Flat-Pack
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. Avoid the use of parts plated with cadmium or zinc unless,
as used, there is no potential for failure or degradation be-
cause of associated sublimation processes.
. The heat transfer of an operating device in vacuum is only
through the modes of conduction and radiation. The power
rating of such a device should be reduced 30% comparative to
its operation in a normal atmosphere, unless adequately heat-
s inked.
Table 2. g-13 is provided as a basic starting point for environ-
mental requirements for parts for the TV subsystem and therefore, the
requirements specified therein are minimum requirements.
In order to promote standardization, the resistance values shown
in Table _. Z-14 are consideredpreferrednominalvalues. Each decade of
resistance shall have iIs preferred nominal values though only those for one
decade are shown. The B columns give the preferred nominal values for
resistors with purchase tolerance of 1.0 percent. The A columns give the
preferred nomi_al values for resistors with a tolerance of less than 1.0
percent,
Resistance values other than those shown in Table Z. 2-14 shall not
be cons idered preferre"d nom'irral value s.
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2.2.3 TM Data Handling Subsystem
2.2.3. 1 Summary of l:'arametri¢ Study.
A reliability parametric study was conducted on the TM Data
Handling Subsystem (see BSR-887). In this study, the reliability versus
temperature, time, and number of both critical and non-critical inputs
was calculated. Based upon the results of this study, and the thermal
considerations obtaining in the subsystem, an operating temperature for
the subsystem of 55°C was established. Additionally, the number of both
critical and non-critical inputs was held to a minimum in the final confi-
guration. Preliminary calculation indicated that the non-redundant system
offered relatively low reliability, and therefore selective redundancy was
employed. Specifically, parallel redundancy has been employed in both
the A/D converter and in the clock divider. Triplicated input majority
voting was employed in the A/D converter, selector logic, and in the row
and column drivers of the programmer. The entire parametric study was
based on the assumption that all logic functions would be implemented
using Texas Instrument micro circuits, similar to the SN series. The
failure rates assumed are those determined by Texas Instruments and
published in their 1962 reliability report.
2.2.3.2 Functional Description & Block Diagram
A reliability block diagram of the TM Data Handling Subsystem
is shown in Figure 2.2-12. The telemetry data processor is designed to
accept digital inputs, low level (0 to 50 mv) analog inputs, high level
(0 to 5 v) analog inputs, and to convert these signals into a @igita! form
appropriate to the transmitter. The various input signals are time multi-
plexed under the command of the programmer and provide a PCM split
phase output to the transmitter. Time synchronization of these signals
is provided by the clock divider, which in turn is driven by the receiver
oscillator.
Z. 2.3.3 Reliability Mathematical Model
The reliability of the subsystem, assuming all inputs must
function, is simply the product of the reliabilities of the individual sub-
units. In this case, however, the majority of the TM inputs are of a
housekeeping nature, and the loss of any or all of these functions is not
detrimental to mission success.
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Preliminary design has indicated that the TM Data Handling Sub-
system will have the following inputs:
1. DC Low Level - 1Z total - none critical to mission
2. DC High Level - 70 total - four critical to mission
3. Digital 74 total - four critical to mission.
The resultant subsystem reliability will therefore be:
R =K3 xK4xK5 xK6 xK7 xK8
where the K's represent the reliability of the various subunits in terms of
survival of those inputs critical to the mission. K1 and K2 have been omitted
from this equation because they pertain to subunits which handle only low-
level inputs, and low-level inputs are not critical to the mission.
The model for this system is developed as described in the ensuing
sections.
High Level Multiplexer (K3)
This unit is comprised of a number of analog switches which se-
quentially connect, upon command from the programmer, one of the high
level input signals to a common output bus. To accommodate 70-DC high
level signals, 71 analog switches must be provided. The additional switch
is required to provide an input line for the low level signals, which have
The analog switch will have a failure rate twice that of a TI micro-
module (k) and the failure mode will be short/open in a 1:1 ratio. The fail-
ure rate then, for the four analog switches in the signal paths of the four
signals critical to mission success will be
X = 4x (Zk) = 8k.
R
However, there are 67 other analog switches in parallel with the output
bus, and a short on any of these switches will cause failure. The failure
rate caused by this effect will then be
1
k =67 (2k) --.
s Z
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The failure rate for the multiplexer will then be
k =k =k
T R s
= 8k + 67k = 75k
where k is the failure rate of a TI micromodule.
The multiplexer reliability may now be expressed as
-75k t
K3=E
A/D Converter (K4)
TheA/D converters used in this subsystem have an individual
component complement of 19 TI modules of failure, rate: k, 9 analog switches
of failure rate 2k, 19 resistors of failure rate k/6, and one comparator of
failure rate 2k, resulting ina total failure rate per converter of
kt = 19k + 9(2k) + 19(k/6) + 2k = 42k .
An individual converter will then have a reliability of
-42k t
K4*= E
However, the subsystem employs two A/D converters in a parallel
redundant configuration with a resultant reliability of
K4 :L1 <1K4,)21
which reduces to
-42k t -84k t
K4 = 2E -£
A/D Selector (K5)
The A/D selector requires ten TI micromodules to implement the
required logic functions. However, triplicated majority voting logic is
employed.
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whe r e
The equation describing the reliability of this type of redundancy
N
Pg
Pf
N
k
-xt/2
= reliability of gate function = £
-kt
= reliability of logic function = £
= number of logic functions to be implemented
= failure rate of TI micromodule.
Sub stituting
R=K5=
which reduces to
-_,1_E,__((-_,,_)_,-_,_
Ks:(3,-,_t.2_6_,_10
Clock Divider (K6)
The clock for this subsystem is comprosed of two units in a parallel
3 .... _1-- _ r. , •
•=uunu=Lz,_ conzzguraczon. Each clock is comprised of four TI modules of
failure rate K, one inductor of failure rate 0.95K, two capacitors with a
total failure rate 0. 019X, and one resistor of failure rate 0. 068K. The
total failure rate for one clock is
k = 5.04k
t
and the reliability of a single clock may be written as
-5.04kt
K6' =E
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The reliability of the redundant combination is
K6= i - (i - K6')2 I
Substituting and reducing
-5.04kt -10.08kt
K6 = 2E -E
Programmer (K7)
To facilitate this discussion a block diagram of the programmer
is shown in Figure 2. 2-13. In this diagram, fl through fn are the row
drivers and fl' through fm' are the column drivers. Because of their
criticality, the preliminary design has provided for triplicated majority
voting logic in both row and column drivers.
The crosspoint gates are represented as CG, through CGl_mz and,
because of the relatively large number, no redundancy is provided. The
reliability of the programmer may be expressed as the product of the row
drivers (RR), the column drivers (Rc), and the crosspoint gates (RcG).
K7 = R R . R c RCG
This sytem has 156 total inputs, and will therefore require that there be
at least that many crosspoint gates. This programmer, therefore, is
provided witha 13 x 13 matrix. This indicates that there are 13 row
drivers, 13 column drivers, and 169 crosspoint gates.
The reliability for both row and column drivers may be determined.
Triplicated majority rating logic is used, and the resultant reliability for
the drivers will be
-4kt -6kt) 13
R R = Rc = (3E -2E
Referring to Figure 2. 2-12 it is readily apparent that the failure
rate of the CG functionis that of CG, itself plus the probability that any CG
associated (in either row or column) will fail short. Oepn failures in
associated CGs have no effect.
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Figure 2. 2-13 Programmer Block Diagram
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Letting
Failure rate of CG = k/2
Fail Short
Fail Open
(of CGs) = 3/7
k = failure rate of TI micromodule
then
• 3k
CG function failure rate = k/2 + 12 (. 3) k/2 ÷ 12 (_) = 4. ik.
Because only eight functions are critical to the mission, the CG reliability
may be written as
-8 (4.1.) kt - 32. 8 kt.
RCG = E = E
and the total programmer reliability is then
Z6
-6kt) -3Z. 8ktK7 = (3E -4kt -2E E
Output Multiplexer (K8)
The output multiplexer is composed of a number of digital gates,
one being required for each digital input to the subsystem plus one additional
gate to accommodate the output of the A/D converter. Although only five of
these gates are in the signal path, the remaining 151 gates are in parallel
with the output, and a short in any of these gates will cause system failure.
An individual ;gate is 1/2 of a TI module and will therefore have a failure
rate of k/2. The failure ratio short/open is 3/7 as before• The output
multiplexer failure rate may be written as
3_herefore
k = 5k/Z+151(0.3) k/2 = Z5.15.
t
-25.15 kt
K8=E
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The resulting mathematical model for the TM Data Handling System is:
R = K3xK4xKSxK6xK7 xK8
-75 k -42 k t -84kt) kt -6k t) 10= e t(Ze -e (3e -4 -2e
(Ze -5.04kt -e -10.08 k t) (3e -4k t_z e -6kt) Z6
-3Z. 8 kt -Z5.15 kt .
e e
Z. Z. 3.4 Reliability Prediction
The TM Data Handling Subsystem Reliability versus time is shown
in Table Z. 2.25. This subsystem reliability was determined assuming
that there would be twelve low-level DC analog inputs, seventy high-level
DC analog inputs, and seventy-four digital inputs. Of the foregoing it is
also assumed that there will be four high-level analog inputs critical to the
mission and four digital inputs critical to the mission. There will be no
low-level analog inputs critical to the mission. Therefore, the overall
reliability for the data handling subsystem does not incorporate the re-
liability of the low level multiplexer or the DC amplifier (they are applicable
only to the low level analog signals).
Z. Z. 3. 5 Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis
This subsystem comprised a relatively large number (300)of micro-
circuits employed primarily as a digital logic system. Because logic modules
not in the signal path can adversely affect modules in the signal path, the
criticality analysis is based separately on the reliability of each individual
input function. The results of this analysis are presented in Tables 2. Z-26
through 2. 2-28, and 2. Z-29 through 2. 2-30. The overall function reliability
is computed as the product of the reliability of circuitry peculiar to the in-
put function and the reliability of circuitry not peculiar to the input function.
A detailed example of the methods used to determine criticality ranking is
given in Section 2. 2.4. 5.
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2. 2. 3. 6 Reliability Worksheets
The following pages are a number of reliability worksheets per-
taining to this subsystem. The quantities shown for the various components
are those required for a single subunit. The quantities must be adjusted to
reflect any redundancy incorporated in the subunit (e.g., in the case of a
parallel redundant subunit, twice as many components will be required as
are shown on the worksheet). The subunit failure rates shown are for a
totally non-redundant unit and should not be used when redundancy is em-
ployed.
2. 2.3.7 Conslusions
The criticality analysis described in Section 2. 2. 3. 5 provides a
useful tool for the improvement of system reliability, initial efforts to
improve subsystem reliability will be concentrated on those items whose
relative criticality ranking is highest. For example, an examination of
Tables, 2. 2-29 through 2. 2-32 shows that the three most critical input
functions to the TM Data Handling Subsystem are:
i. Penetrometer load cell.
2. RF ranging.
3. Sun Sensor.
It is anticipated that future efforts on the Data Handling Subsystem
will be directed toward improving the reliability of these input functions.
With regard to these specific functions, certain conclusions and recommen-
dations may be determined from the information presented in Tables 2. 2-29
through 2. 2-32.
Penetrometer Load Cell
This input function is first in criticality ranking because of its
effect on the mission: soil bearing strength measurements must be made.
A failure in this area could be catastrophic.
The input in question is a high-level DC analog voltage and must,
therefore, propagate through almost the entire Data Handling Subsystem,
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as contrasted to digital inputs, which pass through about one half as many
subunits. If, for example, this measurement could be converted to a digital
measurement, its relative criticality ranking could be changed from 1 to
perhaps 3 or 4.
RF Ranging
The loss of this function, although not catastrophic, ranks second
in criticality ranking. This relatively high ranking is due to the sizable
increase in mission time incurred by failure of this function. Also, this
function is a DC analog input. The most _traightforwardlmethod of im-
proving the criticality ranking of this function would be, as in the previous
case, to convert to digital format.
SunSensor
The sun sensor provides the only bearing information available,
and is therefore critical. The high criticality ranking of this input function
is due almost entirely to the effect of function failure on the mission and
not to the probability of function failure. In a case of this type, where the
function is already in digital form (with its attendant high reliability), the
most probable method of reducing criticality would be to provide a duplicate
input function in the TM Data Handling Subsystem at minimum increase in
weight and power.
Considering the relatively high reliability (0. 97258) of the TM Data
Handling Subsystem, any improvement in this subsystem would provide only
a negligible improvement in overaii system reliability. Therefore, major
reliability effort will be concentrated on subsystems which will result in
considerable improvement in the overall system reliability.
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Z. 2.4 Command Subsystem
Z. 2.4. 1 Summary of Parametric Studies.
A _eliability parametric study of this subsystem was conducted,
the results of which are given in BSR 887, Section 4.4. In this study, the
reliability vs temperature, time, and the number of output functions wer_
calculated. Preliminary studies indicated the need for an improvement in
over-all reliability. As a result, redundancy has been employed in a num-
ber of subunits of this subsystem. It was also determined that an operating
temperature of 55°C was consistent with the expected operating environ-
ment. These preliminary studies assumed that all logic functions would
be implemented with Texas Instrument Co. microcircuits, and all relia-
bility calculations were based upon TI microcircuit failure rates.
2.2.4. Z Functional Description and Block Diagram
The block diagram of the command subsystem is shown in
Figure 2. 2-14. The function of the command subsystem is to receive
coded data from the ground station, decode these data, and convert the
decoded data into controlled signals to the proper output decoder for sub-
sequent transmission to the pertinent device (TV subsystem, mobility
subsystem, etc. ). A preliminary investigation of reliability indicated the
need for some redundancy in those elements which are common to all out-
put functions. Therefore, the switch control and address decoder-selector
are implemented with triplicated majority voting redundancy, and the ad-
dress decoder employs parallel redundancy. The three output decoders,
because they are not in series with all output functions, are nonredundant
in this configuration.
2.2.4.3 Reliability Mathematical Model
The command subsystem is comprised of eight major elements,
viz, , receiver, switch control, two address decoders {in a parallel re-
dundant configuration), an address decoder-selector, communications and
penetrometer decoder, steering control decoder, and TV decoder. A
reliability block diagram of the system is shown in Figure 2. Z-14.
This analysis will develop mathematical models for the Command
Subsystem.
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where :
The basic equation for subsystem reliability is
Ht = HIXHzX II-(I-H3 )Z] xH4xH5xH6xH 7 (2.2-6)
H t = subsystem reliability, assuming all command
functions must operate.
H 1
H 2
_-(i -H3) ff
H 4
H 5
H 6
H 7
= reliability of receiver
= reliability of switch control
= reliability of parallel redundant address decoder
= reliability of address decoder selector
reliability of communications and penetrometer
decoder
reliability of steering control decoder
= reliability of TV decoder.
The individual item reliability calculations are as follows:
Receiver (H I)
The reliability calculations are based upon a receiver complexity
as outlined in LRVP-896 and containing the following items:
Failure Rate
Item Quantity Desisnation
Transistor 30 k 1
Resistor 102 k Z
Capacitor 76 k 3
2-158 IV
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Item Quantity.
Coil (RF) 17
Failure Rate
De signation
k4
Crystal 2 k5
Stripline 1 k6
Varactor Z k 7
Diode 4 k 8
TI Type SN Module 7 k
The reliability equation for the receiver may then be written as:
H = e'(30kl + 102kZ + 76)'3 + 17k4 + 2X5 + k6 + 2k7 + 4k8 + 7k)t( 2. 2-6a)
I
High reliability components have failure rates {at 55°C)as shown below,
and these failure rates are equated to equivalent TI module failure rates
as shown:
k = O. 02641
k = 0. 0041 = 0. 155k
1
k 2 = 0.0009 = 0.034k
k = 0.00025 = 0.009k
3
k 4 = 0. 005 = 0. 189k
k = 0.02 = 0.757k
5
k = 0.001 = 0.038k
6
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k 7 = 0.00Z = 0.076k
k 8 = 0.002 = 0.076k.
Substituting these equivalencies into Equation (2. 2-6a), the re-
ceiver reliability may not be written as
HI = e-Zl. 0Z3kt. (Z.Z-7)
Switch Control
The switch control,
selects one of the two address decoders. In the non-redundant configura-
tion, the switch control will require two TI modules. Because this is an
item critical to the operation of the command subsystem, triplicated
majority voting redundancy is employed. The equivalent reliability for
a unit having triplicated majority voting on input lines may be expressed
_pgZpf)Z (3_ZpgZpf)] N
g = (z.z-s)
whe r e
upon receipt of a command from the receiver,
P = reliability of vote-taking function
g
Pf = reliability of logic function
N = no. of logic functions to be implemented.
In this case, let
-xtlz
P = e
g
-kt
Pf = e
N = Z
k = TI module failure rate.
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Substituting these values in Equation (2. 2-8) and reducing, the reliability
of the switch control may be expressed as
H 2 = (3e-4kt-Ze'6kt) 2 (Z. 2-9)
Address Decoder
ule s.
are necessary for operation, will be
H 3 = -(1-e
Address Decoder SeleCtor
It is assumed that the address decoder will contain 40 TI mod-
The equation for the reduant configuration, assuming all modules
-40kt -80kt
= 2e -e (2.2-10)
The address decoder selector will probabiy require 21 TI mod-
ules in the nonredundant configuration. Utilizing triplicate majority
voting, Equation (2. 2-8) will apply:
-×t/2
P = e
g
-kt
Pf = e
N = ZI
k = TI module failure rate.
The reliability for the redundant address decoder selector may be ex-
pressed as
-4kt -6kt ZJH 4 = e -Ze . (Z. 2-11)
Because the output decoders to be discussed in the following
paragraphs are all driven from a common source, it will be assumed
that each output decoder will employ some buffering element in each of
the eight input lines to reduce the probability of interaction between
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decoders in the event of a "short" on an input line. The following three
subsections consider the reliability of the output decoders assuming no
interaction (i.e., all command functions must operate).
Communications and Penetrometer Decoder
This unit is composed of 36 TI modules to perform the logic
functions plus four TI modules as buffers. The math model may then be
expressed as
-40kt
H 5 = e (2.2-12)
Steering Control Decoder
This decoder requires 78 TI modules to perform the required
logic functions and four additional buffer modules. The resultant relia-
bility is
-82kt
H 6 = e (2. 2-13)
TV Decoder
The 16 logic functions of this decoder require 68 TI modules.
The four additional modules required for buffering (or isolation) increase
the total count to 70, resulting in the equation
-70kt
H 7 = e (2. 2- 14)
The reliability of the command subsystem may not be written by
substituting Equations (2. 2-7) and (2. 2-9) through (2. 2-14) into Equation
-21.0123kt) (3e-4kt
(2. 2-6) as follows:
H = (e
t
(3e-4kt _2e-6kt) 21
_2e-6kt) 2 f_(l_e-40kt)_
(e -40kt) (e -82kt) (e -70kt)
H
t
= (3e-4kt_2e -6kt)
23
(2e -40kt -80kt) -213kt-e (e )
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2. 2.4.4 Reliability Prediction
The over-all reliability of the command subsystem may be
determined by taking the product of the component reliabilities. If it is
assumed that all output functions must survive, the command subsystem
reliability will be as shown in Table 2.2-33. It will be noted that the
items other than the receiver which incorporate redundancy are extremely
reliable, and improvement in over-all subsystem reliability could be
best accomplished by providing some measure of redundancy in the out-
put decoders.
The following chart indicates the improvement in the command
subsystem reliability that could be realized by providing parallel redun-
dant output decoders.
Time - Months
1 2 3 4.5
Pre sent System
Redundant Comm. &
Present System + Penetrometer Decoder
0. 9576 0. 9 153 0. 8754 0. 8150
• 9644 .9282 . 8939 .8407
i! I!
+ Redundant Mobility
De code r .9743 .9487 .9229 .8850
11
" + Redundant TV Decoder .9694 .9377 .9075 .8594
All decoders Redundant •9934 .9857 .9769 .9615
2. Z. 4. 5 Failure Mode, Effect,and Criticality Analysis
The command subsystem incorporates both digital and analog
circuitry; therefore, the failure mode and criticality analysis are pre-
sented in two sections. The first section pertains to the receiver which
is essentially an analog device. Table 2. 2-34 shows the results of this
analysis on the receiver. The various functions of the receiver, e.g.,
the IF amplifiers, mixer, limiter, etc., are handled separately. For
example, there are 16 bias resistors in the IF amplifiers. These resis-
tors have a component failure rate as shown in the chart, and a failure
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mode as shown in column 6. The probability of failure in a given mode
is determined by multiplying the quantity of the component by its associ-
ated failure rate and the ratio of the specific failure mode under consid-
eration. This probability of failure is determined assuming 2000 hours
of operation. The next column, "mission degradation", represents the
best assessment of the effect on the mission of the failure of a specific
component in the mode being considered. The next column indicates the
combined product of "mission degradation" and "probability of failure. "
The last column provides a rank of the combined product such that one
will be able to assess the relative criticality of the specific components
in the receiver in a specific failure mode.
The remainder of the subsystem, exclusive of the receiver, is
treated as a digital logic system, and the data pertaining to this portion
of the subsystem are showninTables 2. 2-35 and 2. 2-36.
To provide a meaningful failure mode analysis and to properly
assess the criticality of the various logic modules, the relative subsystem
reliability has been calculated for each of the output functions independ-
ently. This approach was taken because a given signal path is affected by
modules not in the signal path, due to the configuration of the logic.
Additionally, there are approximately 300 modules incorporated in the sub-
system, and these modules are not readily identified by function or
nomenclature.
The information pertaining to the communications and penetro-
meter functions are contained in Tables Z. 2-35(a) and 2.2-36(a). Infor-
mation pertinent to the TV decoder is in Tables 2.2-35(b), 2. 2-36(b),
and 2. 2-36(c); information pertinent to the mobility decoder is provided
in Tables Z. 2-35(c and d) and 2. Z-36(d and e).
To best explain the method used in the determination of the
criticality ranking, an example is presented showing the methods used.
Referring to the output function "select omniantenna", it may be seen
from Table 2.2-35(a) that there are eight series modules in the signal
path peculiar to the function and 19 parallel modules. This situation is
illustrated in Figure 2. Z-15, where F (1) through F (8) show the eight
series modules in the path of the specific output function. F' (1) through
F' (19) show the 19 modules which may be considered to be in parallel
with the output function. Inasmuch as the entire logic system is
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implemented with Texas Instrument micromodules and both the total
failure rate and the ratio of short-to-open failures are known, the reliability
of the circuitry peculiar to this function may be written as:
-(8k + 0.3 x 19k)tR = e
where
short
open
3
k = failure rate of TI micromodule and 7
of TI micromodule.
= failure mode ratio
This then represents the reliability of the communications and
penetrometer decoder with respect to the selected output function. The
next item on the chart refers to the reliability of the circuitry not peculiar
to the function. This would be the product of the reliability of the receiver,
the switch control, address decoder, and address decoder-selector. The
over-all function reliability will then be the product of the reliability of
this circuitry, not peculiar to the function, times the reliability of the
circuitry peculiar to the function; i.e. , the series and parallel modules
in the communications and penetrometer decoder. Turning now to
Table 2. 2-36(a) we see that the output function "select omniantenna" is
listed, and the effect of this failure (no omniantenna) follows immediately.
The possible remedial action in this situation would be to use the direct
antenna. The probability of function failure will be equal to one minus
the over-all function reliability as shown in Table 2.2-35(a). The next
column "defective function failure on mission time" represents the best
estimate to date of the probable over-all effect on the mission of the loss
of this specific output function, assuming that any possible remedial action
will be taken. The next column, "mission degradation", represents the
best estimate as to the mission degradation incurred by the required ad-
ditional mission time. The next column, "combined product times 10 -3'',
represents the product of "probability of function failure" times "mission
degradation. " This combined product is representative of the relative
effect of any output function on a mission combined with its probability of
failure. This combined product is then ranked, and the rank order is
shown in the last column, "criticality ranking", wherein we have estab-
lished the rank order of the combined product and thus indicated the rel-
ative criticality of the various output functions.
2.2.4. 6 Reliability Worksheets.
Following on p. 2-186 are the reliabilityworksheets for this subsystem.
The quantities shown for the various components are those required for a
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single subunit. In the case where redundancy is employed, the quantities
should be adjusted (e. g. , for parallel redundant elements, twice the in-
dicated quantity will be required). It should also be noted that the total
failure rate shown is that of a nonredundant system and is not applicable
to any element incorporating redundancy.
2..2.4. 7 Conclusions
An examination of Tables Z. Z-35 and Z. 2-36 will provide an in-
dication of the criticality ranking of the various output functions of the
command subsystem. It will be noted that, by and large, all output func-
tions have the same over-all probability of failure, and the primary rea-
son for the relative criticality is the effect of a given function failure on
mission time.
That portion of the command subsystem common to all output
functions employs considerable redundancy, but the three output decoders
are totally nonredundant. Following is a list of those output functions
which are in the first four criticality ranks and a reference as to which
of the output decoders provides the function:
Criticality Output
Rank Function De code r
1 Camera Az, Right TV
1 Camera Az, Left TV
Normal TM out Communications and
Penetromete r
Penetrometer TM out Communications and
Pe ne tr ome te r
2 TV TM out Communications and
Penetromete r
TWT heater ON Communications and
Penetromete r
2-184 IV
BSR 903
Criticality
Rank Function
2 TWT HV ON
3 Start penetrometer
motor
Output
Decoder
Communications and
Pe ne tr ome te r
Communications and
4 Stop Mobility
The format of these commands and the number of circuit ele-
ments required for execution will be quite difficult to change. Therefore,
other means of improving reliability should be considered.
One attractive approach which seems worthy of consideration
is to employ parallel redundancy in all three output decoders. This ap-
proach will increase the over-all subsystem reliability at 4. 5-months
duration from the present 81. 50/oto 960/o at the expense of about 1/4 ibo
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2. 3 EXPERIMENT (PENETROMETER)
This section is a summary of work carried out on the systems assurance
task for the SLRV penetrometer subsystem. The systems assurance task
consists of the following five major areas of effort:
1. Component Reliability Characteristics and Parametric Studies
2. Failure Mode and Criticality Analysis.
3. Reliability Block Diagram and Mathematical Model
4. Reliability Prediction
5. Parts Selection Program.
The reliability studies have been directed to emphasize lunar operation of
the penetrometer subsystem based upont/ie penetrometem concept and design
and reflected in the penetrometer engineering test model (ETM). Thus, the
reliability studies contained herein are not a reliability evaluation of the ETM
itself, the main purpose of which is to demonstrate the operation and feasi-
bility of the IITRI penetrometer concept. Rather, it is an initial evaluation
of the expected lunar performance of the penetrometer concept with the ETM
providing the basic design inputs. This reliability study then reflects any
adaptation of the penetrometer concept, as contained in the ETM, and any
design and engineering considerations which must be made to obtain satis-
factory lunar operation.
2. 3. 1 Component Reliability Characteristics and Parametric Studies
This section considers the basic reliability characteristics of the
various parts and units making up the penetrometer subsystem. The ap-
plicability of particular designs or part types for a lunar mission from a
reliability standpoint is discussed when necessary, and parametric re-
presentations of performance are indicated where available data allow.
2. 3. 1. 1 Electrical-Electronic Subassemblies
There are four principal areas in the SLRV penetrometer subsystem
in which electrical-electronic parts and components find application. These
applications are in the: (1) LVDT (linear variable differential transformer)
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which is used as the force measurement transducer, (2) switching cir-
cuitry, (3) drive motor, and (4) penetration depth measurement. The re-
liability factors for each will now be considered.
LVDT Unit
The LVDT unit being considered for the penetration force meas-
urement is a DC input and output device, consisting of a self-contained
electronics package for conversion and demodulation, and the differential
transformer. The unit being employed in the ETM and upon which the pre-
sent parametric analysis is based, (G. L. Collins Model SS-203), is a trans-
ducer designed for commercial application; with appr0prlatemodification, it
is capable of meeting the high reliability requirements for lunar vehicle
application. The rated operating temperature range of the present unit is
-54°C t_+iZl°C, which compares favorably with the possible range of lunar
surface temperatures (-173°C_X_+IZ7°C), although operating restrictions do
at present appear for the low temperature range.
A
rate as a function of the ambient operating temperature over a range of pos-
sible lunar operating temperatures. The parametric studies carried out for
the LVDT have considered the use of failure rates for standard military
electronic parts. ! Table 2. 3-1 indicates the failure rates applies to the
various parts and the complete LVDT unit at three representative temperatures.
The following assumptions were made in the use of failure rate
data for Table 2. 3-1:
1. In power dissipating parts, the operating level is at 0. 1
the power rating.
2. Capacitors are operated at O. 3 of rated voltage.
3. Glass H insulation is utilized in the transformer with a
180 ° rating.
4. In the establishment of the device failure rate, all parts are
considered to be in series.
1
RADC Reliability Notebook, RADC-TR-58- 111.
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Figure 2. 3-1 shows the estimated LVDT failure rate resulting from the
analysis over a temperature range of 0 to 125°C.
The failure rate characteristic indicated, as determined by data
in the "RADC Reliability Notebook", considers the use of standard MIL-type
parts in the LVDT. However, in the interest of evaluating the possible im-
provement in the reliability characteristics which might be obtained through
the use of high reliability parts, the use of parts with, for example, Minute-
man reliability characteristics will be considered. Although little detailed
and generally applicable information, such as is found for standard parts,
is yet available for parts which have resulted from part improvement pro-
grams for the Minuteman, information on general trends in such part failure
rates will be used. Such information is contained in the "RADC Reliability
Notebook", where expected target failure rates for such electronic parts are
given. Another reference used for comparing standard and high reliability
part failure rates is an Advent Reliability Report. 1
On the basis of the various sources giving comparisons of such
lallure rates, a moc[lllCatlon OI Ine ,,v_l lallure r_tL@ uh=lauL=li=_iu= _ao
made. The electronic parts which have primarily been the subject of high
reliability studies are resistors, capacitors, and semiconductor parts.
Estimates of improved performance of such parts applied to the LVDT unit
indicate possible failure rate reductions by a factor of i0 for resistors and
semiconductors, and a factor of 2 for solid tantalum capacitors. The trans-
former reliability characteristics are assumed to remain the same. For
comparison, the result of such a reduction in failure rates is also indicated
in Figure 2. 3-I. It should be noted that this is only a single estimate of
improvement based on the assumed part characteristics stated above and
scattered data on high /'eliability parts.
To illustrate the expected reliability performance of the LVDT elec-
tronic package during a lunar mission, the expected reliability trends, based
upon the application of the failure rates indicated in Figure 2. 3-1 in the
exponential failure distribution, are shown in Figure 2. 3-2. Basic mission
profile data supplied by Bendix Systems Division was utilized in the develop-
ment of the curves shown. This includes a total of 58 penetrations at a landing
1
Communication Satellite, Project Advent, Final Technical Report, Section 8 -
Reliability, Report of Long Life Reliability Effort During the Period 1 January
through 29 May 1962. Air Force Contract AF 04(647)-476, Document No.
635D4288, Vol. 14, Air Force Space Systems Division, by General Electric,
Missile and Space Division.
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point and between landing points, taking a total mission time of 65 hours.
This includes a duty cycle of 8 hours of operation and 16 hours of non-
operation during each earth day if a single earth tracking station is used.
At this rate, 300 penetrations can be accomplished per lunar day for day-
only operation, and 600 penetrations per lunar day for day-night operation.
For the particular curves shown, an operating temperature of 60°C is as-
sumed throughout the mission. This is based upon the condition that enough
power is supplied during the lunar nigh*., either through operation of sup-
plementary heaters or, if necessary, by means of a trickle charge to main-
tain such a temperature. The thermal analysis for the penetrometer sub-
system has indicated that the temperature will vary between approximately
10°C and 65°C under such conditions throughout the lunar day and night, and
the higher temperature of 60°C was selected to apply throughout the mission.
Figure 2. 3-1 indicates that there is little variation in the failure rate over
this temperature range, and thus the choice of 60°C is quite suitable for
analysis purposes. In addition, the temperature range indicated by the
thermal analysis appears to present no particular problems to the reliable
operation of the LVDT unit. With regard to this present study, it is as-
sumed that only the transformer portion of the LVDT is carried within
the penetrometer probe tip and that the remainder of the electronic parts
are contained within the temperature-controlled charnber in the SLRV.
In Figure 02.3 -Z, the prime horizontal scale is indicated as number
of penetrations, which is a direct measure of the amount of penetrometer
data obtained. Corresponding scales of elapsed mission time for lunar
day-night and lunar day-only operation are also indicated. For the curves
shown, it is assumed that for the lunar day-only operation the LVDT electronics
is powered during DSIF operation hours only, and that no deterioration occurs at the
storage temperatures to be encountered. In this case the reliability characteristics
for day-night and day-only operation are identical when considered on the
basis of number of penetrations. Two curves are shown, however_ when
considering the use of both standard and high reliability parts. In one case,
it is assumed that the LVDT electronics are on during a complete earth
day, including 8 hours of operation and 16 hours of non-operation for the
SLRV vehicle and penetrometer (under the condition of a single earth tracking
station). In the other case considered, the electronics are powered only
during the 8-hour operational portion of the earth day. The resulting in-
crease in reliability as a function of the number of penetrations under the
condition of the shorter actual operational period are indicated. In this
case, it was assumed that the resulting on-off cycle has no deteriorating
effect upon the LVDT unit.
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Switching Circuit
A study of failure rate-temperature characteristics similar to that
presented for the LVDT unit has been carried out for the switching and con-
trol circuitry. Three circuits have been designed and analyzed and formed
the basis for the parametric study discussed here. The circuit diagrams
and description of operation of the three switching configurations have been
presented in Interim Report No. 2, 1 February 1964. Circuit No. 1 consists
of two relays, three limit switches, and two RC circuits; circuits No. Z and 3
consist of three relays and three limit switches. The principal differences
between circuit No. 2 and No. 3 are in component arrangement and operational
sequence. The failure rate-temperature parametric characteristics for the
three circuit&.are shown in Figure Z. 3-3. In this case, only the use of
standard parts has been considered, as the use of electronic part types for
which Minuteman reliability considerations could be made is relatively small.
Although the gross reliability characteristics of the three circuits
as indicated in Figure 2. 3-3 are very similar, circuit No. 1 was selected
for the ETM from an operational standpoint and is used as the basis of study
in switching circuit application for the flight model. Table 2.3-Z indicates
the various part failure rates for three selected operating temperatures.
The performance of the switching circuit for a lunar mission is in-
dicated in Figure 2. 3-4. The reliability is indicated as a function of the num-
ber of penetrations with supplementary scales showing total elapsed time for
lunar day-night and day-only operation. The assumptions made establishing
the reliability characteristics in this case are identical to those for the LVDT
discussed in the preceding section, and the reliability characteristics are
again shown for 8-hour and 24-hour on-time duty cycles during each earth day.
Considering the general performance of the electronic parts in the
LVDT and switching circuit, the trends in the curves in Figures Z. 3-1 and
2. 3-3 indicate that,, in the operation of the electronics, high temperatures
(particularly above 100°C) should be avoided for maximum reliable per-
formance. The thermal studies in the program indicate that adequate tem-
peratilre control can quite easily be employed to maintain temperatures be-
low this level. In addition, Figures 2. 3-2 and 2. 3-4 indicate the advantage
of supplying power to the electronic units in the penetrometer only while
the S LRV is in operation (8 hours per earth day for the case of only one
earth tracking station). Under such an operational profile, the electronics
are assumed to be in a stored condition in which no deterioration occurs
(failure rate = 0).
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Penetrometer Drive Motor
The drive motor presents a particular problem in the penetrometer
design, since from a reliability viewpoint, it is vital to the operation of the
penetrometer. On the other hand, it is known that DC motor operation in a
hard vacuum such as is expected at the lunar surface presents great prob-
lems because of brush wear. Several firms have been contacted concerning
this problem, and some information has been obtained on possible motor
performance under a lunar type environment.
Some information has been obtained from Inland Motor Corporation
and Ball Brothers Research Corporation on the hard vacuum operation of
low-speed torque motors. Some experience has been obtained with satellite
operation of such motors. For instance, 18 months of operation have been
obtained with such motors in the OSO satellite. These motors operate at
30 rpm in an estimated vacuum of 10-10 tort. Some limited tests have also
been performed up to 2500 hours with such motors at approximately 10-9 tort.
Available information on these motors indicates, however, that despite the
long life characteristics of this type of motor, an excessive power penalty
may result from their use under the low-speed operation for which they
are recemmended.
The Globe SD type motor has been utilized in the ETM. The motor
originally considered as a possibility for use in the penetrometer was the
Globe SS model, an adaptation of the SD giving longer brush life under vacuum
conditions. Globe Industries has indicated experience with supplying such
motors for X-ray equipment and has performed some very limited tests of
included motors running in the vicinity of 8000 rpm and vacuum conditions
of 10 -9 torr, which at least approaches the possible lunar operating con-
ditions. For such environments, a preliminary estimate of expected motor
life of 90 to 200 hours was obtained from the manufacturer. The majority
of the motors would fail within that time period. The life distribution under
the conditions of wear that exist is most likely normal. Such a motor was
regarded to have a very high criticality factor as indicated in the Interim
Reliability Report, particularly for the motor operating times required for a
tube extension speed of 0.75 in. /sec. A motor which appears to give much
more suitable operating characteristics is the Globe MM type. Here, for
a small power and weight increase, the expected life range is increased to
an estimated 190 to 750 hours. Coupled with the 0. 5 in./sec tube speed,
consideration of the MM motor has allowed a reduction in the motor criticality
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level. The use of AC brushless motors was ilso considered; however, the
power and weight penalties (largely in the conversion circuitry) were con-
sidered to over-shadow the possible increase in expected life. Table Z. 3-3
presents a brief comparison of motor performance.
TABLE 2. 3-3
COMPARISON OF POSSIBLE PENETROMETER DRIVE MOTORS
Expected
Globe Motor Power Weight Life Range
(Type) ( Watts ) (oz) (hours)
SS 5 7 90-160
MM 6 8 190-250
AC Brushless 12 12 300-500
The possible reliability characteristics of the MM motor are in-
dicated in Figure 2. 3-5. Three curves are shown in this figure. One curve
indicates the general wearout characteristics of the motor based on the life
range of 190-250 hours suggested by the manufacturer. It was assumed in
this case that the life distribution follows a normal distribution with a mean
value of 220 hours. Taking 190 hours to be the point of 95% probability of
survival, the resulting standard deviation of the distribution becomes 18. 2
hours. It should be noted that the above figures include the life characteristics
of the brushes, bearings, and speed reducing gear assembly, although the
brush life is probably the dominant factor in the distribution. Because this
curve was to reflect primarily the wearout characteristic, it appeared de-
sirable to superimpose a random failure characteristic for evaluating the
motor performance. The second curve indicates this possible random fail-
ure characteristic, the data for which was obtained from the "RADC Relia-
bility Notebook". The DC motor failure rate for a speed of 8000 rpm (ap-
proximately the motor speed for the present penetrometer design) is 5 per-
cent per 1000 hours. The winding failure rate is obtained by taking the fail-
ure rate for class H at 60°C (0.050%per 1000 hours) multiplied by a 1. 5
motor application factor. The sum of these two failure rates gives 5. 075%
per 1000 hours. For use in the graph in Figure 2. 3-5, a more conservative
figure of 6% per 1000 hours was selected as the random failure rate. The
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composite reliability characteristic is indicated in Figure 2. 3-5 as the
product of the wearout and random failure reliability characteristics. The
motor reliability is indicated as both a function of the motor operating time
and the equivalent number of penetrations. Up to about 180 hours of opera-
tion (5400 penetrations), the random characteristic dominates, while beyond
this point the wearout characteristic becomes dominant in rapidly decreasing
the expected reliability. The figure indicates that satisfactory motor opera-
tion is possible, on the basis of available information up to about 160 hours
of operating time, giving about 4800 penetrations, and a reliability figure
of approximately 0. 99.
Penetration Depth Sensing
In the ETM design of thepenetrometer subsystem, penetration
depth is indicated by the setting of a potentiometer which is coupled to the
tube storage drum assembly. The only electrical part of the position sensor
is the potentiometer. The estimate presently being used for a potentiometer
failure rate is derived from data for variable composition resistors in RD-101,
"Reliability Assessment Handbook, " Astro Reliability Corporation. The
failure rate determined from this source is 0. 0194% per i000 hours at 60°C
and will represent the failure rate to be used in further analysis in this re-
port.
2. 3. i. 2 Mechanical Components
The following paragraphs discuss the reliability considerations for
the various mechanical components in the penetrometer. Where possible
at present, quantitative analysis is presented. Otherwise, the discussions
of the reliability and design factors in mechanical component operation re-
present a qualitative parametric analysis.
Bearings
The problems associated with the design and/or selection of bearings
for use in a space environment are sufficiently complex as to cause much
concern to designers. This applies to bushings as well as rolling contact
bearings.
In addition to the usual space problems of temperature, lubrication,
high vacuum, radiation, and vibration, bearings used in the penetrometer
should exhibit low coefficients of friction and "quiet" operating characteristics.
It may well be necessary to trade off parameters in order to achieve a well
balanced design.
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In the current problem, those attributes which must take prededence
are:
1. Operation in hard vacuum
2. Low coefficient of friction
3. Quiet operation
4. Good resistance to damage under high dynamic loading
5. High accuracy and low positional tolerance in mountings.
From a preliminary review of the field, three bearing types are
indicated for possible use in the penetrometer: (1) rolling contact, high
precision, miniature ball bearings, (2) rolling contact, miniature, roller
and/or needle-roller bearings, and (3) bushings or miniature journal bearings.
The following section will briefly discuss the relative merits of
each of the bearing types in terms of the five principal characteristics which
these bearings:must exhibit.
Perhaps the single most important attribute which these bearings
must exhibit is a low coefficient of friction. The high precision ball bearings
in an unshielded, unsealed configuration exhibit the following coefficients of
friction 1 (these values are approximate):
2. Self-Aligning ball bearings O. 0010
3. Angular contact bearings 0. 0013 - 0. 0030.
All of these values are of course quite low, in general lower than
any other type of bearing; however, as will be seen later, there are other
mitigating factors. The need for quiet operation, as evidenced herein, has
become a major selection criteria during the past 10 years for miniature
bearings. The need for quiet operation has resulted from an attempt to
reduce both airborne and structure-borne machinery noise. In general,
1
Wilcox, D. F. , and Booser, R.E. Bearing Design and Application, McGraw-
Hill Book Company, Inc. , New York, 1957.
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low-noise characteristics are obtained by improved bearing metrology. In
addition, maximum silencing can be achieved by exercising the same or
comparable metrology control on bearing mating parts. Low-noise bearings
are primarily available in the deep groove, and angular-contact, radial ball
types. To achieve the required precision along with low noise characteristics,
preloading of the bearings is used in many applications.
The mounting of miniature ball bearings is most commonly achieved
by light press fitting or cementing the outer races in place. While this
achieves the desired rigidity, positional accuracy may suffer, and subse-
quent loosening often occurs. A better method of handling this problem is
to use a flange mount. With this technique, the bearing is pressed in place
(with a somewhat heavier press) external to the actual unit. The flange is
then attached to the unit proper, positioned to the desired tolerance, and
locked in place. This procedure has an advantage from a load-resistance
viewpoint which will subsequently be discussed.
Much of what .has been said about miniature ball bearings applies
to roller and needle-roller bearings. The corresponding coefficients of
friction are :
1. Cylindrical roller bearings 0. 0011 - 0. 0015
2. Spherical roller bearings 0. 0018
3. Needle-roller bearings 0. 00Z.
Cylindrical roller bearings are generally employed where the
loads are high, since this type of bearing is well suited for such heavy radial
loads. A special advantage of this type of bearing over the ball bearing is
its ability to sustain a much larger shock load without plastically indenting
or brinelling the races. The load carrying capacity of a bearing is principally
dependent upon its hertzian contact area. The larger the contact area, the
greater is the indentation resistance. An additional advantage enjoyed by
these bearings is the absolute minimum outer diameter for a given bore size
of any of the rolling contact bearings. This is a very important consideration
when over-all minimum size is important.
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Mounting considerations for roller bearings are similar to those
for ball bearings. It should be mentioned that if a separate flange (as pre-
viously discussed) is used, whether the bearings are ball or roller, addi-
tional shock and vibration resistance can be achieved by introducing some
flexibility into the mounting. The flange can be so designed that some
elastic deformation will occur under dynamic loading and, hence, decrease
the stress in the races.
One additional bearing type that remains to be considered is the
bushing or miniature journal bearing. Initial considerations indicated
that several types might lend themselves to the subject application. These
types are the sintered bronze bushings with solid film lubrication, the com-
pacted graphite-carbon bushings with or without solid film lubrication, and
the Teflon or epoxy filled bushings with solid film lubrication.
Subsequent investigation proved that the compacted carbon-graphite
type of bushings is nonfeasible because of the harc_ vacuum associated with
a lunar environment. The possibility of excessive outgassing and loss of
compaction due to deterioration of the binder dictate against the use of this
material. The use of powdered'bronze (sintered, porous) bushings carry a
weight penalty, over both the graphite and plastic, as well as a lubrication
problem. The nature of sintered bronze is such that the surface geometry
is not the optimum for adherence of solid film lubricants. Thus, of the
three journal (bushing) types of bearings considered initially, the most
promising for use in the flight model penetrometer subsystem is the plastic
bushing.
The use of plastics as bearing materials in applications involving
a lunar environment (space environment) is dependent upon the behavior of
plastics in space environment. Those factors in the space environment
which affect the behavior of plastics are: 1
I. Vacuum and thermal vacuum
2. Ultraviolet radiation
3. Particle radiation.
The principal factor of the space environment which is of concern here is
vacuum (and thermal vacuum). In some cases, vacuum degrades plastics
IRingwood, A. F. Behavior of Plastics in Space Environments, Modern
Plastics Magazine, January 1964, p. 173.
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by volatilizing components essential to the optimum properties of the part.
In others, it improves the properties by the same volatilization mechanism
whereby impurities are outgassed.
-6 -10
Hard vacuum in the range of 10 to 10 torr has virtually no
effect on thermoset materials, l This classification includes silicone resins,
polyurethane resins, epoxies, polyesters, and phenolics. The latter three
plastics require fairly high temperatures before measurable outgassing
products can be detected. In general, for these materials the loss of
weight due to any outgassing (vacuum-thermal environment) results in a
decrease in elongation and an increase in tensile strength and the modulus
of elasticity.
Among the thermoplastic materials, the two most feasible ma-
terials for space use are nylon and Teflon. Nylon, in general, is a stable
polymer, essentially unaffected by vacuum at ambient and satellite orbit
temperatures. Though some outgassing of the impurities in nylon does occur,
their removal may actually improve the physical and mechanical properties
of the plastic. Consequently nylon, in general, is a good selection for space
applications.
Recent experiments have investigated the behavior of various
filled and reinforced Teflons under hard vacuum and thermal-vacuum con-
ditions. In no case was there any sign of degradation of a Teflon resin due
to the effects of hard vacuum exposure alone. In a thermal-vacuum en-
vironment, atemperature of 710°F is required to effect a 10-percent weight
loss in one year. Teflon, like nylon, should withstand space vacuum with
no loss of physical or mechanical properties.
We are vitally concerned with the expected behavior of both nylon
and Teflon under space environments, the former in terms of a possible
gear material and the latter as a possible bearing material. In addition,
the behavior of epoxies is of importance in terms of a coating for the
pressure rolls to prevent possible cold welding to the tube. Many of the
desired properties of a "good" bearing material are similar to those re-
quired for a "good" nonmetallic gear material. Nylon, for example, is
quiet in operation, resists abrasion, and wears at a low rate. Improve-
ment in the mechanical properties, rigidity, and wear resistance is ob-
tained for some applications by adding fillers such as fiberglass and MoS 2.
1
Ringwood, A. F. Behavior of Plastics in Space Environments, Modern
Plastics Magazine, January 1964, p. 173.
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Teflon has an exceptionally low coefficient of friction, and inert-
ness to corrosion and chemical deterioration. In terms of bearings, un-
modified Teflon can be used to a PV value of approximately 1000, while Teflon
filled with a glass fiber can be used for PV values in excess of 30,000.
Correspondingly, for comparison, a maximum value of PV equal to 50,000
is given for porus metal bearings. In this index, P equals the pressure
(psi), and V equals the surface velocity (fpm); hence, the PV value gives
an index of the energy dissipated on a unit area of the bearing surface.
It is a common relative measure of bearing capabilities.
Specific factors for consideration in the use of Teflon for bearings
are given in Figures 2. 3-6 through 2.3-8 and Table 2.3-4. It is interesting
to note that lower temperatures tend to increase the compressive yield
stress of Teflon as shown in Figure 2.3-8. Tables 2.3-5 and 2.3-6 gener-
ally summarize the requirements and capabilities for plastics used as gears,
and bearings, respectively. Before any recommendations can be made,
however, some consideration of the required lubrication must be made.
This is discussed in the following pages.
TABLE 2.3-4
EFFECT OF SHAFT MATERIAL ON
WEAR OF BEARINGS OF TFE
#
Shaft Material Relative Wear
Carbon steel
Cast iron
Stainless steel
Hard chrome plate**
Bronze **
Aluminum alloy **
1
Ito2
1.5to 3
I0 to 20
ito2
20 to 50
, All materials have 16-mu in. finish.
** High rate of shaft wear.
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The selection of bushings or sleeve-type bearings for use on the
SLRV penetrometer subsystem requires a rather extensive investigation
of the most applicable type of lubrication. Because of the nature of the
bearing, some type of lubrication is definitely required. An unlubricated
shaft, riding in an unlubricated journal (as opposed to rolling contact
bearings), could result in cold welding or excessive wear. The environ-
ment to which the penetrometer will be subjected is definitely hostile to
mechanical devices and to the more common lubricants. Thus, the dictates
of the environment are such that consideration of solid or bonded film
lubricants must be part of any parametric study.
The nature of the penetrometer operation and its operational en-
vironment dictate the use of boundary lubrication. The basic require-
ments of any boundary lubricant are:
, Resistance to penetration by surface asperities under
relatively high loads
Z. The ability to shear more easily than the base materials
3. The ability to encourage relative motion between the
sliding surfaces to occur in the lubricant layer.
Table Z. 3-7 lists the degree to which certain solid lubricants possess
these requirements.
When the lubricant is applied as a dry powder or grease or in
oil suspension, it is generally referred to as a solid lubricant. When it
is applied in conjunction with binders in a uniformly thin layer, confining
a high concentration of lubricant to a given area, it is referred to as a
bonded dry film. These latter coatings are especially important in the
aerospace technology. The extremely low atmospheric pressures en-
countered in aerospace environments, generally far below the vapor pres-
sures of greases and oils, have made bonded coatings essential for lubri-
cation under these environments. Bonded coatings have often been used in
the past when a component may not be used for extended periods, but when
called upon, must function reliably. Consideration of Tables 2.3-7 through
2.3-9 indicates that the most likely lubricant for use in the penetrometer
subsystem:is molybdenum disulfide (MoS2) in a bonded dry-film form.
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TABLE 2. 3-8
USEFUL RANGE OF SOLIDS FOR DRY LUBRICATION
Lubricant
Molybdenum disulfide,
commercially available,
particle-size grades
Graphite powder,
lubricating grade
Tungsten disulfide powder,
commercially available
Teflon powder and
sintered shapes
Teflon and other plastics
containing fillers
Organic binder coatings,
graphite-MoS 2 type
Inorganic binder coatings,
graphite-MoS 2 type
Teflon
Load* (psi)
2000 to yield
point of metal
2000 to I00, 000
2000 to yield
point of metal
150 to 3000
50 to 4000
ZOO0 to yield
point of metal
ZOO0 to yield
point of metal
Minimum 50
Maximum not
investigated
Temperature (F)
-300 to +750_#
-300 to + 1200
Low not investigated
Maximum 850"*
-300 to +500
Maximum 500
-I00 to 500
-300 to 1000
Maximum 500
Speed affects the load capacity to a marked degree, but solid lubri-
cants should only be considered at low speeds. As speed increases,
load carrying capacity decreases.
** In inert and reducing atmospheres these solids are used at tempera-
tures above 2000 F.
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Table 2. 3-10 presents representative characteristics and applicabilities of
this type of lubricant. Bonded dry-film coatings are similar to paints in
their constructional makeup. These coatings have three basic components:
1. A pigment to provide lubrication
2. A binder to cause the pigment to adhere
3. A vehicle or solvent system for controlled application.
Binder-pigment combinations may be organic/inorganic, organic/organic,
inorganic/organic, and inorganic/inorganic. Organic/organic systems are
used for light load applications. Organic/inorganic, and vice versa, sys-
tems are general purpose lubrications, while inorganic/inorganic systems
provide better high temperature lubrication.
The best binder for a particular application depends upon service
conditions. In addition, the service life of the lubricant depends upon the
lubricant-to'binder ratio. Typical curves are illustrated in Figure Z. 3-9.
Optimum service is obtained from a lubricant-to-binder ratio of 4:1. Above
this ratio, the film tends to crumble, since there is insufficient binder to
hold the lubricant particles together. In addition, the film adherence char-
acteristics are poor.
Optimum wear life of a dry film is achieved with an initial coat-
ing thickness of 7 x 10 -4 in. as shown in Figure 2. 3-10. Thicker films
seem to have little adverse effect, but thinner films may severely reduce
the life of the coating. For optimum operating conditions, the substrate
should be relatively hard. In general, the harder the substrate, the lower
the frictional forces and the longer the surface life. From extensive ex-
perimental investigation, it appears that the optimum wear life is obtained
when the substrate hardness is approximately 60 R and its surface finish
is 20_ in. rms. This is illustrated in Figure Z.3-Cll.
The use of graphite as a portion of the pigment (in mixture with
MoS } is not feasible for a lunar environment. Graphite requires an ab-
2
sorbed layer of moisture to function as a lubricant. This requirement
precludes its use as a lubricant in hard vacuums. MoS Z does not require
moisture and will perform successfully under hard vacuum conditions.
As mentioned previously, the most efficient form for the lubricant under
hard vacuum is an inorganic bonded dry film.
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Dry films may be applied manually, by brush, spray, or dip, or
these latter operations may be performed automatically. For large batches,
tumbling is generally the cheapest and most efficient method. For optimum
service life, dry films should be deposited on surfaces which have been
vapor blasted to 20-30_ -in. rms.
Thus, it can be concluded that for lubrication of bearings and
gears for the penetrometer subsystem, based upon the preceding discussion,
the most applicable method would be to use a bonded dry-film lubricant.
This lubricant would most probably have MoS as a vehicle in an epoxy or2
vinyl butyral binder. Figure Z.3-1Z illustrates the coefficient of friction
properties of MoS Z as a function of the load.
Returning to bearings and their selection, the bearing applications
in the penetrometer subsystem can be grouped into two general areas:
(1) those bearings contained internally within the motor and which run at
relatively high speeds, and (Z) those bearings which are external to the
motor. This latter grouping can also be split into two divisions. The
first contains the four bearings in the storage module subjected to low
speeds and low loads (quite low PV value). These bearings will most prob-
ably be of the flanged bushing type, manufactured from fiberglass filled
Teflon, lubricated with MoS Z.
The second division contains the four bearings in the tube drive
module. These bearings are subjected to low speeds, but relatively high
loads (100-1b radial load) indicating a moderately high PV value. In the
current preliminary design for the flight model penetrometer subsystem,
these bearings are shown as radial ball (rolling-contact) bearings and
were selected because of the PV value. However, current indications
are that the aforementioned plastic bushings can also operate successfully
in this area. The use of plastic bearings would, of course, effect a weight
savings and, in general, provide at least as reliable a unit. The deter-
mination of the bearing type which will ultimately be used is a portion of
the work planned for Phase II.
The bearings contained within the motor will most probably be
rolling contact (radial-ball) bearings. Discussions with motor manufact-
urers indicate that one type of bearing that has been used in space environ-
ments is a steel or steel-Teflon ball bearing lubricated with MoS_. Typical
of such bearings is the "Bar-Temp" bearing manufactured by the/Borden
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Bearing Company. This radial ball bearing type is the one shown in the
design drawings and mentioned above.
Gears - Reliability - Design Factors
The gears in the penetrometer can be grouped within three specific
areas: (1) planetary gear reduction unit associated with the motor, (Z) the
larger gearing which couples the motor to the drive wheel, and (3) worm
and wheel gearing employed in the position sensing circuit. All of the
gearing in the first two areas is of the involute, spur type. For the purpose
of discussing preliminary reliability design cirteria, this gearing can be
further grouped into two classes:
I. High speed - low torque gearing
Z. Lower speed - higher torque gearing.
The first category of gearing is used in the first stages of the motor gear
reduction unit, while the second category is representative of the drive
wheel gears.
To understand the various problems associated with gear relia-
bility in a space environment, one must first understand the various ways
in which gears may become unreliable. Since gear performance will prim-
arily be evaluated by using design techniques and information, a knowledge
of the gear design problem is necessary. The gear must essentially fulfill
three requirements.
First, the gears must operate together without interference, with
a proper length of contact, and without undue noise. The solution of this
problem requires a knowledge of gear geometry. Secondly, the gear must
have the ability to transmit the applied loads without failure and with a
certain margin of safety. This involves the ability of the teeth to resist
not only the load resulting from the power transmitted but also the increases
in the load due to impact and shock caused by inaccuracy of tooth contour,
tooth deflection and acceleration, stress concentrations at the root of the
tooth, and finally cyclic loading, or tooth fatique. The total resulting load
is commonly referred to as the dynamic load. Third, the wearing qualities
of the tooth must be considered. The surface material along the tooth
profile must be able to withstand the stresses imposed by the contact load,
this load is known as the wear load.
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Thus, the problem of designing and/or selecting reliable gears
resolves to one involving considerations of:
1. Geometrical design consideration
. Geometry, material, manufac'ture, arid :Operational
loading considerations
3. Environmental and operational "stress" considerations.
For the high-speed, low torque gears, the major problem appears
to be one of excessive adhesive wear. The load-carrying capacity does not
appear to present a problem. The most likely choice for this area is non-
metallic gears. For many of the same reasons as were given in the section
on bearings, fiberglass filled, nylon spur gears lubricated with MoS 2 pre-
sent attractive qualities. Information on their most probable behavior in
a hard vacuum and on their wear qualities was given in the preceding
section.
The operational requirements for the lower speed, higher torque
gears seem to indicate metallic spur gears. These gears should be made
from surface hardenable steels,to allow for a hard w_ar surface and a tough
inner case. In addition, the hard surface adapts well to the possible use
of MoS_ as a lubricant. Detailed parametric studies, including experimen-
z
tal investigations, to evaluate the reliability of alternate gear designs are
planned for Phase II. However, it currently appears that the two classes
of gears discussed here will both be employed in the penetrometer.
The problems associated with the third gear group, the worm
and wheel, are minor. The speeds and the loads are both small. The
current design calls for a bronze worm gear and a steel worm; however,
indications are that fiberglass reinforced plastics can also be used here.
In either case, a bonded film lubricant (MoS2) is required.
Mechanical Reliability of Penetrometer Tubes - Fatigue as a
Failure Mode
Having discussed the requirements for gears, bearings, and
lubricants for the SLRV penetrometer subsystem and having made recom-
mendations in these areas, it remains to discuss the penetrometer tube
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and the storage drum drive springs. A material suitable for the penetro-
meter tube will be evaluated quantitatively. The results of this evaluation
will be assumed to apply to the storage roll springs as well as to the tube
itself.
The penetrometer tube is the heart of the SLRV penetrometer.
This component alone dictates requirements for relatively high reliability.
In addition, however, this device is a relatively new concept in comparison
with the other elements in the system, and the degree of confidence which
can be associated with a specific reliability number is correspondingly less.
Thus, in order to obtain the highest possible confidence level on the tube
reliability, an exhaustive analysis must be made. The major failure mode
for the tube itself is fatigue fracture. The study of this failure mode con-
stitutes the subject of the following discussion.
The preliminary analysis of tube fatigue life has already been
discussed in Volume III, Book Z, Section 6. However, part of that dis-
cussion will be included herein to provide continuity. In addition, the
present discussion is concerned with the flight model hardware in a lunar
environment, while the previous discussion centered about the ETM. The
techniques discussed are similar, but the numbers will differ. The afore-
mentioned analysis was principally concerned with the 50-percent relia-
bility level for mean life. The current discussion will associate probability
of failure at the value stated for a given stress level in the penetrometer
tube.
The geometry of the tube remains unchanged (0.004-in. thick,
3/4oin. diameter); however, the material and the hardness of the material
are different. Reliability parameter studies and material behavior char-
acteristics in a lunar environment have dictated that the tube hardness be
lowered to a value of 40 -_ 45 points on a Rockwell C scale, and the tube
material for the present analysis be changed from AISI 1095 steel to either
a Chrome-Vanadium Alloy Steel (SAE 6150) or a Chrome Silicon Alloy Steel
(SAE 9254). For the present discussion, and in consequence of fabrication
requirements, consider the use of the former steel.
A typical stress-number of ClYCles (S-N) diagram for the SAE
6150 steel is given in Figure Z.3-13. The stress cycle through which any
particular point on the tube must pass is different for the ETM than that
1
The S-N curves used were constructed from data contained in The
Mechanical Properties of Four Heat-Treated Spring Steels, Hankins G.A.
and Ford G.W.
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considered for the SLRV penetrometer. The addition of roller guides,
constraining the edges of the tube, causes that portion of the tube to ex-
perience relatively high compressive stresses. From Volume Ill, Book Z,
Section 6, they are assumed equal to the yield point stress og the material
(apparently a conservative figure) which is
S = 16Z,O00 Ib/in.
YP
Z
The stress cycle is illustrated in Figure Z.3-14. It should again be men-
tioned that, when dealing with tensile stresses, the concept of stress in-
1 [
(S.I. = l_i-¢J, i _/ j) may be useful. When compressivetensity
I
stresses are present, tl_e sign value of the stresses becomes quite impor-
tant, and the stress difference (S.D. = (_.-_.) i _ j) is commonly
I j max t
used. Thus, the S.D. vs stress state diagram above is the result. The
values for _'i are as previously given except for (_i) B which is equal to the
yield point stress of the material.
From a calculation of the stresses in the tube,
are obtained for Figure 2.3-14:
S R = S.D.c - (-S.D.B) = 140,000 + 14Z,000
the following values
Z
= Z9Z, 000 Ib/in.
_ SR 29Z,000 146,000 Ib/in.Z
SA Z - 2 -
S.D.c + (-S.D.B) 140,000 - 142,000 Z
SM = Z = Z = -6000 Ib/in.
The preliminary fatigue evaluation employed the Goodman Diagram
to compensate for the existence of a tensile mean stress (stress intensity).
This effectively lowered the S-N curve from its initial position. It can be
shown, however, that a mean stress (stress difference) which is compres-
sive will not similarly affect the S-N curve. For engineering cal_ulations,
the existence of a compressive mean stress will not affect the S-N curve
to any appreciable degree. Thus, the unmodified S-N curve for the tube
material (as shown in Figure Z.3-13) will be used with an Alternating
Stress Difference (SA) of 146,000 psi. An extension of this curve to lower
values of N is given in Figure 2.3-15. Thus, by intersecting the curve as
2 -Z3Z IV
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Figure 2.3-14 Typical Stress Cycle
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shown at S A = 146,000 psi the 50-percent fatigue life, N50, for the tube
can be obtained. This value is
NS0 = ZZ0 cycles.
From a reliability standpoint, a reliability of 50% is relatively poor. A
more desirable approach would be to express the fatigue life N over the
entire probability range, using alternating stress (stress difference) as a
parameter.
It is indicated inthe literature that the fatigue life distribution
at a specific constant value of alternating stress follows the log-normal
distribution, orthat log N is normally distributed. 1 (See Figure Z.3-16.)
Some authors indicate that at the extreme ends of the distribution, for
probability of failure greater than 0.9 and less than 0. 1, the extreme value
distributions of Gumbel and/or Weibull are more representative. However,
in this discussion the log-normal distribution will be applied throughout.
This distribution is given by
IV[ 1
F(N) = "No'4 Z= e Z
Zo-
(log N - log C) z
where
N is a particular number of cycles
log G is the mean value of log N
is the log standard deviation
M = log e = 0.4343
log = log to the base 10.
The establishment of a probability of survival or failure relation-
ship using the log-normal distribution requires information on the two
statistical parameters describirig the distribution function; the measure of
Dieter G, E., Mechanical Metallurgy,
New York, New York, 1961,
McGraw-Hill Book Co. , Inc,
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central tendency (log C), and the measure of the dispersion about the mean
(v 7. It is at this latter point that difficulty is encountered, for data is gen-
erally not obtained in sufficient quantity to allow an estimation of this para-
meter. Thus, data for S-N curves generally contain no information on the
variance about the mean value.
To proceed to the desired ends, use must be made of whatever
variability data on fatigue life of steel _re available. From the literature,
variability data for Bofors FR86 steel are available. This steel is a high
class alloy steel, exhibiting good metallurgical control in its manufacture.
It is assumed (with considerable justification) that these variability data
are applicable to SAE 6150.
The variance data for the FR86 steel are given for stress values
which are in general different than those for which we wish to plot probability
of survival. To allow extrapolation of the data, the curve shown in Figure
2.3-17 was drawn. This curve relates _ for FR86 steel to the level of
AlternatingStress Difference. This curve indicates, as would be expected,
a decrease in _ as (SD). increases. In addition, it is assumed that the
mean values of the distr_ution are contained in the conventional S-N
diagram.
The _pplicatlon of the valiance data in estimating failure proba-
bilities involves selecting the value of _ for the appropriate stress value
and applying it, together with the mean value data, to the log normal dis-
tribution. The resulting probability of survival (or failure) curve for
the particular stress level can then be plotted on log normal probability
paper as a cumulative distribution. Such a curve for the tube fabricated
from SAE 6150 is shown in Figure 2.3-18. Here the probability of sur-
vival (failure) is plotted as a function of the number of stress cycles for
an alternating stress difference of 146,000 psi.
The reliability vs cyclic life is strongly influenced by the alter-
nating stress difference which in turn is controlled by the contact pressure
between the tube edges and the roller guides. A bounded solution for the
50-percent values of N for the two extremes of contact stress, yield
point and zero, are 220 cycles and 17,000 cycles, respectively. The
curves shown in Figures 2.3-18 and 2.3-19 respectively represent a
parametric representation of reliability with S A (a function ofcontactpressure)
as a parameter.
1
Fatigue and Fracture of Metals, Proceedings of the Symposium held at
MIT in June of 1950; edited by W. M. Murray, John Wiley and Sons, Inc,
New York.
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The curves can be plotted easily on the basis that when log N=
10g C the probability of survival is 0.50, and when log N = log C + log cr
the probability of survival is 0. 1517, giving two points which identify the
probability of survival line for a particular value of alternating stress.
Thus, through the use of fatigue life information as given in the
S-N curve and the application of available data on the fatigue life standard
deviations for a particular material to a class of similar materials, the
probability of survival of a device under fatigue can be estimated, given
that either the stress or expected life is known.
Parametric studies on the tube indicate that under lunar environ-
ment another applicable tube material might be one of the 18-8 class of
stainless steels. These steels exhibit moderate fatigue resistance (not as
good as say chrome vanadium or silicon manganese} but exhibit better
behaviorial characteristics under hard vacuum and low temperatures near
the cryogenic region.
In accordance with the above discussion and in keeping with the
preceding analysis for SAE 6150 steel, the following analysis for a typical
AISI, 18-8 class stainless steel is presented.
A typical stress-number of cycles (S-N) diagram for an 18-8
stainless steel is given in Figure 2.3-20 (see the unmodified curve). The
applicable stress cycle for any particular point on the tube is as presented
in the preceding analysis. The compressive stress level which the tube
sees as a result of contacting the roller guides is a function of the contact
pressure. The exact amount of contact pressure depends upon several
factors. For the purposes of this analysis, the level of compressive stress
was permitted to vary between the material's yield point and zero.
A typical 18-8 stainless steel exhibits a range of values for the
ultimate stress S and the yield point stress S , depending upon the
u
amount of work hardening done on the materia_ p Figure 2.3-21 illustrates
this relationship (assumed linear}. Since the computed value for the max-
imum tensile stress in the tube is 140,000 psi, it is assumed that the yield
point stress of the 18-8 steel is 150,000 psi. The corresponding value for
S is 237,000 psi. For these stresses, the material must be work hardened
u
to approximately R = 40.
C
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The values of the mean stress intensity S M and the alternating
stress intensity S A vary, as the level of compressive stress varies. The
relationship between S M and the compressive stress is illustrated in
Figure 2. 3-22. As the level of compressive stress decreases, the value
of S M goes from compression to tension. When S M is compressive, the
unmodified S-N curve can be used; however, when S M is tensile, the S-N
curve must be modified through the use of a Goodman diagram. This fact
was discussed in the preceding analysis.
To ultimately provide a range of reliability data, several values
of Sh4 are considered. The corresponding values of SA are shown in
Figure 2. 3-20. To plot these modified values of the S-N curve, the afore-
mentioned Goodman diagram was used. Figure 2. 3-23 illustrates this
diagram. For values of S M equal to -5000 psi and 0 psi, the unmodified
S-N curve can be used. For values of S M equal to +20, 000 psi, the Good-
man diagram must be used to modify the S-N curves. These points are
shown in F_igure 2. 3-Z3. The resulting lowering of the endurance limit
values (Sel) due to the use of the Goodman diagram is shown as a function
of the mean stress difference S M in Figure 2.3-24.
The S-N curves contained in Figure 2. 3-20 are converted to cor-
responding P-S-N curves (probability of failure) using the same techniques
discussed in the preceding analysis of chrome existing steel. To achieve
the desired results, use must be made of any exciting variability data on
the fatigue life of stainless steel. A quite limited amount of such data is
available, with the variability given as a function of the alternating stress
intensity. To encompass a sufficiently wide range of values for S A, the
existing data must be extended.
Such an extension of variability data is shown in Figure 2. 3-25.
Also on the same curves are indicated the values of _i and SAi associated
with the aforementioned point of analysis. Using these data and the assumed
log-normal distribution, the reliability curves for the seven specific
values of SAiPreviously mentioned are plotted in Figures 2.3-26 and
2.3-27.
Thus, as before, through the use of the S-N curve and variability
data, the probability of survival of a device under fatigue can be estimated,
given that either' the stress or expected life is known.
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One additional specific problem associated with the use of 18-8
stainless is the fact that it cannot be heat treated, but must be work hard-
ened. This requires a change in the procedure for manufacturing the tube.
indications based upon discussions with spring manufacturers are that the
fabrication of springs (penetrometer tube) from stainless steel can success-
fully be accomplished.
Considerations similar to the above also apply to the Negator springs
used to load the tube storage and wire storage drum. For these springs,
the manufacturer states that a life of 5000 cycles should be obtained from
any of their stock springs and that springs manufactured from 18-8 stain-
less steel are available. The balancing springs (coiled, helical) in the LVDT
unit can likewise be manufactured from the same material.
Pressure Drive Rollers
The pressure drive rollers will most probably fail to operate prop-
erly in either of two modes. The rolls can slip and hence fail to extend or
retract the penetrometer tube; conversely, they could cold weld to the tube
and thus impede or prevent tube motion. The obvious solution to each of
these problems in turn represents no solution to the other and, in fact, may
tend to worsen it. Thus, the problem of slippage could be greatly reduced
by increasing the normal contact force between the rollers and the tube:
however, this increases the possibility of cold welding. On the other hand,
the problem of cold welding can be eliminated by hbicating the tube (or the
rollers) with MoS 2, which would increase the tendency for the rollers to
slip. The solution to this problem must be in the form of a trade-off be-
tween the requirements for preventing the two failure modes.
The most likely solution fulfilling these requirements is to coat
the contacting surfaces of the pressure rollers with a 1-3 rail thick coating
of an epoxy resin. The epoxy coating will effectively eliminate the possibility
of cold-welding. In addition, the coefficient of friction between steel and
epoxy is relatively high. In fact, if alumina (A1203) powder is mixed with
the epoxy prior to its application to the rollers, this coefficient of friction
can be increased. Concentrations of alumina up to 20% will not seriously
affect the strength of the epoxy. The resin exhibits a good strength char-
aiteristic in terms of Hertizian loading. Thus, the use of reinforced resin
may represent a suitable solution to pressure roller failure.
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Thus, from the preceding discussions of operational feasibility,
design integrity, and the various parameter studies, the materials and/or
configurations for the critical mechanical component parts for the SLRV
penetrometer subsystem can now be selected. Table 2.3-11 indicates IIT
Research Institute's preliminary recommendations for the critical mechan-
ical components for the SLRV penetrometer subsystem. It should be
pointed out that, while the conclusions and recommendations made herein
reflect good engineering approaches to preliminary design, the actual feas-
ibility of these items must be evaluated experimentally. Similarly, to
make an intelligent reliability assessment of the penetrometer, extensive
experimental evaluation of materials and configurations under simulated
space environments must be made. These are, of course, a large part of
the scope of work for Phase II.
....... _ Penetr0meter Electrical Wiring Considerations
Although the electrical wiring in the penetrometer subsystem has
not been considered as a separate component for reliability study, opera-
tion of the penetrometer does depend upon the reliable performance of the
interconnecting wiring. In the penetrometer subsystem, the electrical
stresses should not present any great problem in view of the low voltage and
current levels which are expected. The principal problems which must be
considered are the mechanical stresses and the interaction of the insulation
material with the lunar environment. The most severe stresses to be ex-
pected on the wiring would probably be under conditions of lunar night
operation, where a portion of the connecting wiring to the penetrometer
probe tip would be exposed to extremely low temperature state, the actual
temperature of the wiring depending upon the heat transfer characteristics
of the wiring configuration, the length of time of exposure, and the internal
penetrometer and external lunar temperatures.
From information available on the general properties of insulation
materials available for space applications, TFE and FEP fluorocarbons
presently appear to offer the most suitable characteristics. 1 The high and
Survivability of Wire on Moon Tested, " Aviation Week and Space Tech-
nology, Vol. 78, No. 21, May 27, 1963, p. 77, McGraw Hill Publishing
Co.
Adams, H.S. "Problems in Insulated Wire and Cable in Space Vehicle
Systems," Electro-Tech., Vol. 72, No. 3, Sept. 1963, p. 133, Conover-
Mast l=_bl. Co.
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low operating temperature limits are beyond the expected lunar surface
temperatures of -173°C to +127°C. Particularly important is the low
temperature flexibility characteristic. Both materials perform suitably
o
at ± 180 C. The outgassing and radiation resistance characteristics under
vacuum conditions appear to present no significant problems. The flexure
life required (up to 4000 cycles) also appears to be well within the flexure
life limits of stranded insulated wire, particularly if smaller size wires
in the area of No. 24 are used.
Z. 3. Z Failure Mode and Criticality Analysis
A failure mode and criticality analysis has been carried out to
determine the primary modes of failure, the estimated likelihood of each
failure, and the effect of the failure upon penetrometer subsystem opera-
tion. The analysis has been conducted essentially along the lines suggested
in the system assurance program document. The initial results of this
study were discussed in the Interim Reliability Report, with the work
presented herein representing an updating of this portion of that particular
study. In rating the severity of failure, a rating designation has been
adopted which reflects the penetrometer subsvstem operation and capabil-
ities. This preliminary lising is indicated as:
0. 75 - I. 00 Failures of penetrometer subsystem affecting
entire vehicle (including catastrophic failures)
0.60 - 0. 75 Failure mcdes resulting in penetrometer sub-
system failure only
0.40 - 0.60 - Failure of force sensor
0. 25 - 0. 40 - Failure of position indicating sensor only
0 - 0. 25 - No effect.
The various failures are then rated for criticalness by obtaining the product
of the probability of failure occurence times the effect. Criticality rank-
ing levels range from 1 to 13, with a one-rating being the most serious
failure, and a 13-rating being the least serious.
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Table 2.3-12 indicates such a failure mode analysis as was carried
out for the electrical portion of the penetrometer subsystem, with particu-
lar attention given to the switching system failure modes (switching circuit
No. I). Details of the switching circuit are shown in Figure 2. 3-28.
A further updating of this criticality analysis has been carried out
with the aim of numerically rating the criticality level of the failure modes,
and, in particular, simplifying the failure mode designations for the switch-
ing circuit, based on the rather detailed failure mode analysis indicated
in Table 2.3-12. This revised criticality estimate for the electrical por-
tion of the penetrometer subsystem is indicated in Table 2.3-13. The
probability of failure estimates are based upon a 4000-cycle (penetration)
mission. In this case, the use of standard electronic parts is conserya-
tively assumed. Consideration of higher reliability parts, as was done
in Section 2.3- I. 1 under the headings "LVDT Unit" and "Switching
Circuit", could further reduce the criticality level. The degradation index
shown for each failure mode is based upon estimates of the effect of the
particular failure upon the operation of the entire SLRV, and upon the de-
gradation in data gathering capability.
A similar criticality analysis was also performed on the mechani-
cal portion of the penetrometer. The following list categorizes the possi-
ble mechanical failures of the penetrometer subsystem:
. Failure of the penetrometer tube under one of the following
mode s :
a. Column buckling due to axial load
b. Local buckling and fracture due to transverse bending load
c. Fracture due to fatigue
d. Static fracture due to environmental effects
e. Jamming in the extended position due to soil accumulation
Failure of the penetrometer drive mechanism under the
following modes :
a. Slippage of the drive and pressure rolls
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TABLE 2.3-IZ
CONTROL CIRCUIT AND ELECTRICAL SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS
Malfunction
Switching Circuit Result
I) A I will not close
2_) LSI will not open
3) LS2 will not close
4) LS3 will not close
5) B I will not close
6) LS2., LS3 will not open
7) LS1 will not close
8) A will not close
9) B will not close
I0) R I open
I I) C I short
12.) R z open
13) C z short
14) Leads for I_3 short
15,) Leads for LS3 open
No operation
C 1 cannot discharge, prevents later actuation
of A and keeps motor running reverse
Motor keeps running forward
Motor won't reverse; may damage tube;
motor keeps going forward {drive slips?)
Motor keeps running forward
Motor remains in reverse position, starts
following cycle backwards
A 1 not switched off, motor keeps running
in reverse
B is not actuated, motor starts reverse next
cycle, keeps running reverse
No operation
C1 cannot discharge A won't actuate later,
motor keeps running reverse
Coil A keeps drawing power, A 1 cannot
switch unit on
C 2 cannot discharge, prevents B from
actuating, motor keeps running in reverse
Coil B keeps drawing power
Same as LS3 won't open
Same as LS3 won't close
LVDT Sensor
Position Indicating Potentiometer
Drive Motor
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.
b. Improper guiding of the tube resulting in ultimate jamming
c. Failure of the wiping mechanism producing ultimate jamming
of the drive mechanism due tocontamination
d. Failure of the drive mechanisms due to failure of the
drive gears
e. Failure of the drive mechanism due to failure of the
bearings
Failure of the penetrorneter storage assembly under the
following mode s :
a. Failure of the probe by buckling of the flattened tube due
to failure of the Negator drive to tension the storage roll
b, Failure of the penetrometer due to poor tube tracking and
ultimate jamming due to improper operation of the storage
drum and drive system
c. Failure of the penetrometer due to slippage and jamming of
of _he _ube, due /.u " "" = _,._=_,_ ...........
storage drum
Failure of the sensor assembly under the following modes:
a. Failure of the sensor due to mechanical failure of the
LVDT
b. Failure of the sensor due to the fracture and jamming of the
penetrometer tip
c. Failure of the sensor due to contamination
d. Failure of the sensor due to faultyreadings because of
failure of balancing mechanism
Failure of the sensor due to jamming of bearings and guides
because of friction.
e.
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While the above is not a complete list on the parts level, it is
representative of the failure mode analysis on a subsystem level. Included
in each of the latter three categories must be the following general failure
mode s :
I. Failure of the static support structure either due to
fracture or excessive deflection
Zo Failure of the operational mechanical structural elements
such as shaft bearings, bearing mounts, brackets; guides
and/or guide rollers.
In this analysis, item 1 shall be considered as a unit under structural
failures (with an assumed reliability of 1.00), while item Z shall be simi-
larly considered as mechanical element failures.
The preceding listing represents a preliminary listing of the most
logical and most probable mechanical failures which could affect the pene-
trometer subsystem. Criticality levels for these various failure modes
were analyzed in the Interim Reliability Report. However; parametric
analyses and design studies have eliminated or reduced the likelihood of
occurrence of many of these failure modes. The most critical failure
modes, as reflected by the subsequent reliability mathematical models
and reliability prediction, are presented in the following listing. For the
purposes of generality and continuity, the criticality listing will include
only the abbreviated list of the failure modes. The numbers associated
with the listings will indicate the relative significance of the mode:
I. Failure of the penetrometer tube due to:
a. Fracture due to fatigue - major failure
b. Local buckling and fracture due to transverse bending
load - secondary failure
Z. Failure of the penetrometer drive mechanism due to:
a. Slippage of the drive and pressure rolls - major failure
b. Failure of the bearings - secondary failure
c. Failure of the drive gears - secondary failure
Z-Z60 IV
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4.
Failure of the penetrometer storage mechanism due to failure
of the Negator drive springs - major failure
Failure of the sensor assembly due to failure of the penetro-
meter tip - major failure.
Table 2.3-14 summarizes the preceding discussion and assigns
appropriate probability ranges for failure modes, as well as degradation
indices and levels of criticalness for the failure modes. Designations for
failure probability and effect and resulting criticality levels are identical
to those used in the preceding electrical analysis.
It should be noted that in Table Z. 3-14 the assignment of the various
indices, while being as objective as possible, still is subjective to a
certain extent. The manner of index assignment precludes complete
objectivity. However, the use of a technique such as this greatly enhances
the design reviews. The figures in the failure mode column refer to the
identification of the failure mode column refer to the identification of the
failure modes contained in text.
The highest level of criticalness is (as indicated by the large dif-
ference is associated numerics) assumed to be the governing failure mode.
Thi d i _h b i f _i ............. I-.... "^_1 --^_1 _ ....
ciated reliability prediction. The criticality analsis is predicated upon
operation over a 4000-cycle (penetration) total mission.
TABLE 2. 3- 14
MECHANICAL FAILURE CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
Failure Failure Mode
Sub-A ssembly Mode s Probability
-Z
Penetrometer Tube la i.5 x i0
-3
Drive Mechanism 2a I.5 x I0
-3
Drive Mechanism Zc I.5 x I0
-)
Drive Mechanism Zb I.5 x I0-_
Storage Module 3a 1. 5 x 10_3
Sensing Mechanism 4a i.5 x i0 4
Penetrometer Tube ib I.5 x i0-
Degradation Combined Critical
Index Product Level
90 13.5 x 10_3_ 10.
0.77 1.5x 10 6
-3
0.90 1. 35 x 10 7
-3 8
0.90 1.35 x 10 3 10
0.50 0. 75 x 10 3
0. Z5 0.38 x 10 11
0.85 0. 128 x 10 -3 13
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Z. 3. 3 Mathematical Models and System Reliability Block Diagram
This section describes the reliability mathematical model and
associated reliability block diagrams for the SLRV penetrometer subsys-
tem. The reliability mathematical model with which we shall be concerned
must exhibit two characteristics:
I. The model must reflect the effects of variation of at
least the most significant parameters affecting system
ope ration
2. The model must indicate the reliability relationship
between the components of a system and their effect
on the performance of that system (as shown in a
reliability block diagram).
Thus, a representative model must be concerned with: (1) the output or
performance of an individual component (or module), and (2) the functional
relationships between the totality of components or modules which together
form the system's structure. One representative model for a system such
as the penetrometer is that of a nonmaintained system which is typical of
aerospace and satellite systems.
2. 3. 3. 1 Reliability Mathematical Model
This section discusses the formulation of a reliability mathe-
matical model of the SLRVpenetrometer subsystem. The model formula-
tion in terms of the constituent modules and the various reliability expres-
sions for these modules is included herein.
Over-all System Block Diagram
The over-all penetrometer subsystem reliability block diagram
is illustrated in Figure 2. 3-29. This diagram forms the basis for subse-
quent reliability mathematical model development. The determination of
this diagram is based in part upon the mechanical functional block diagrams
shown in Figure 2. 3-30, 2. 3-31, and 2. 3-32. These figures illustrate the
sensor unit subassembly including the tube, probe, pressure sensing unit,
the tube drive subassembly, and the tube storage subassembly. The con-
stituent reliability block diagrams shown in Figure 2. 3-33, Z. 3-34, and
Z. 3-35 are a direct extension of the functional module figures.
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D
R 3 = 7r R3.
i=A x
Figure 2.3-33 Constituent Reliability Block Diagram
for Probe and Tip Module
1%ZA RZ B 1%ZC 1%ZD
4 H H H kSpur DriveDrive Bearings ShaftGears Wheels
D
1%2 = _ 1%2.
i=A l
Figure 2.3-34 Constituent Reliability Block Diagram
for Tube Drive Module
R5 A R5 B R5 C R5 D R5 E R5 F
Tube HDrum Shaft
Spring
H Hw,..HDrum Drum ShaftBearing Spring H Wire /Drum _-Bearings |
F
R 5 = 7r 1%5.
i=A I
Figure 2.3-35 Constituent Reliability Block Diagram
for Tube Storage Module
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The mechanical components in the penetrometer subsystem can
essentially be placed into one of two categories -- static items or dynamic
items. Parts which fall into the static classification include such items
as fasteners, framework, all structural elements, shafts (in general),
mounting brackets, and similar items. These parts are characterized by
a high inherent reliability. The second class includes the dynamic elements
such as bearings, gears, certain shafts, and the tube. These latter items
are in general more sensitive to environmental and operational stressing,
and generally exhibit a lower reliability.
Figure 2. 3-30 represents the sensor unit subassembly (tube and
probe). Here the basic element is the LVDT, and the other components
form functional series relationships from the LVDT. Figure 2. 3-31 repre-
sents the drive mechanism subassembly. The basic element is the struc-
tural framework; grouped around it in serial relationships are the drive
wheel subsystem, the pressure wheel subsystem, and the tube guide sub-
system. Figure 2. 3-32 represents the storage mechanism. Here, the
basic element is taken to be the tube storage drum and its supporting shaft,
and the other subsystems are arranged in serial and parallel fashion. In
fact, for all of the subassemblies, the various fasteners would appear in
parallel in a fully detailed reliability diagram. This in effect introduces
some redundancy into that portion of the system.
Referring again to Figure 2. 3-29, it should be noted, that, in
addition to the elemental blocks contained therein, the switching circuit
override and tube destruct elements have been added to fully represent the
reliability characteristics of the system. The system as illustrated exhibits
a serial relationship. This is a realistic approximation of the actual system
as well as a mathematically tractable model. The total system reliability
is given by
9
RT(t) = _ Ri(t)
i=l
where
RT(t) = system reliability at time t
R.(t) = individual block reliability at time t.1
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The most meaningful common parameter in which to express the various
reliabilities is elapsed time. This time is that reflected by the mission
profile. For the electronic components, this is the time during which the
various circuits are energized, For the mechanical components, however,
the significant parameter is cycles of operation, since they are operated
only intermittently. To have a common parameter in these cases, the
following relationship is employed:
t = kN
where
N = number of cycles of operation or penetrations
t = elapsed operating time
k = transformation constant.
It should be noted that k has the units of elapsed time per penetration
cycle. Assuming an average penetration speed of 1/Z in. per second and
a total extension of 3Z in. , the approximate operating time per cycle is
Z minutes. Using this value of time, the numerical value for the trans-
formation constant is
k = O. 0034 hr/cycle.
is required for relating the number of cycles (penetrations) to total mis-
sion time. Thus
N = "(t) K':t
where
K = (0. 894 average penetration) /(hour of mission
time) if no shutdown for lunar night occurs
K = (0. 447 average penetration) /(hour of mission
time) if lunar night shutdown is included.
The use of this factor is subsequently discussed.
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Mechanical Subsystems
The individual reliabilities of the various parts of the penetrom-
eter depend upon the elements which make up each of the "blocks". Mechan-
ically speaking there are three "blocks" which are combinations of several
items:
i. Tube Drive Block
2. Tube and Probe Block
3. Tube and Storage Block.
The constituent reliability block diagram for item l above is
shown in Figure 2.3-33. In establishing this diagram and those shown
in Figures 2.3-34 and 2.3-35, it has been assumed that the reliability of all
static components such as supports, flanges, screws, etc., can be taken
as unity. Thus, they need not be considered in the diagram. This leaves
only the critical dynamic elements shown. As a consequence of this assump-
tion, the reliability of block 3 in Figure 2. 3-29 is given by
D
R3(t ) = _ R3. (t)i=A i
where R3i is the specific subblock reliability. From considerations of the
failure mode analysis for the various items, the following preliminary
reliability expressions have been generated:
I. The probe (tip) probably exhibits a normally distributed
probability of failure. Its reliability function is accordingly
(N - O) z
oO
1 2o- 2
R3A (N) =t u _ e dt (2.3.3-I)
where
= standard deviation
@ = mean value.
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To assess the reliability in terms of various values
of elapsed operating times, the two characteristic parameters
must be evaluated. From a combination of engineering
evaluation, conservative estimates, and failure data on
functionally similar equipment the following values have
been assigned to the parameters as a preliminary estimate:
= 40 cycles
0 = 4103 cycles.
Two values of reliability will be computed, the first for
a 4000-cycle mission and the second for a 2000-cycle
mission. The reliabilities will be assessed using the
standardized normal variate tables. This involves making
the substitution in Equation (2.3.3-I) of
N-@
Z :
0"
Zo
and
oo -Z 2
P 1
R_ (N)-- \ e Z
oA o 2_
Z N
dZ=a
for N = 4000 cycles, Z N = -Z. 575, a = 0.995
thus R3A (4000} = 0.995
for N= 2000 cycles, Z N = 52.6
R3A (2000) - I. 000
The principal failure mode for the tube is fatigue, and
correspondingly the applicable distribution is the log-normal.
Thus
1 log N- log 82
oo g dt
R3B(N) = _ M e 2_
t
(z.3.3-z)
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where
.
N
= number of cycles
log @ = mean of log (t/k)
M = log e = 0.4343
= variance of the log N
log = lOgl0.
This particular reliability function has been evaluated in
the preceding paragraphs. The value of reliability depends
upon the level of the alternating stress difference (SA),
which in turn depends upon the value of the compressive
stress in the tube. For the purposes of this discussion,
assume a value of SA = 125 x 103 psi. From Figure Z. 3-Z6,
this yields
R 3 (4000) = 0.990
B
R 3 (z000) _ 1.000.
B
It should be noted that a firm value for a tube reliability
estimate is dependent upon the level of compressive stress
in the tube. Experimental determination of this value in
Phase II is imperative.
The principal failure modes for bearings (as expressed in
the literature) are wear and surface fatigue. The most
representative failure probability distribution for these
failure mechanisms is reflected by a form of the Weibull
distribution 1 .
C
b
(2.3.3-3)
Schube, E,, "Ball Bearing Survival," Machine Design Magazine,
July 19, 1962, The Penton Publishing Co., Cleveland, Ohio.
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where
(t/k) = N = number of cycles
0
= decrease of central tendency
b = a measure of the variance.
It should be noted that this reliability mathematical model
was developed for rolling contact bearings. However, for
the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the
model is equally applicable to the linear bushings within
the probe tip as well as the bushings (journals) elsewhere.
Indications are that the bushings are at least as reliable as
the rolling contact bearings in the penetrometer subsystem.
Using the techniques described in the referenced article,
the following values for the reliability parameter can be
assigned:
e = 0.30 L
o
where
= . 10 +450 4x
L
O
b
= B10 life of bearing
= 1.01
From these data
R 3 (4000) = 0. 993
C
R 3 (2000) = I. 000.
C
Since there are two linear bushings, the reliability R 3 (t)
must be entered twice into a serial reliability relation -C
ship.
4. On the basis of general experience with springs, a repre-
sentative failure distribution for helical springs { and
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assumed to apply to Negator springs as well) is also
given by
[___]bR 3 (t) = e - (2.3.3-4)
D
where
@
b
= a measure of central tendency
= a measure of variance.
Using the techniques described in the cited reference,
following values for the reliability parameters can be
assigned:
0 = 2.44 L = 2.48 x 104
O
where
P = 90% design point of the springs
b = 2. 539.
the
From these data
R 3 (4000) = 0. 990
D
R 3 (2000) = 0. 999.
D
Again, there are two helical springs, so that R3D(t) must
also be entered twice in serial reliability relationships.
The constituent reliability block diagram for item 2, the Tube
Drive Modules is shown in Figure 2.3-34. In this figure, a block has been
included for the shaft. This was done to reflect the ultimate possible need
for considering the design of this component in reliability assessment.
However, for the purposes of the present mathematicalmodel, its relia-
bility (RZc) may be considered to be equal to unity. Thus, only three
blocks need to be considered.
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Block A represents a single pair of spur gears. Gear reliability
must be evaluated in terms of gear pairs. The most probable mode of
failure for a gear is surface fatigue and wear. From considerations of
fatigue failure, a log normal failure distribution is used for preliminary
considerations. The reliability relationship for such a distribution is
given by Equation (2.3.3-2). Employing techniques discussed in the
evaluation of Equation (2.3.3-1) the parameters are
log (0) = 3. 960
O = 9500 cycles
= 0.15.
Evaluating the reliability function:
R 2 (4000) = 0.993
A
RZA(2000 ) = 1.000.
The representative reliability relationship for bearing failure
is given by Equation (Z. 3.3-3). In this case there are four bearings and
R2B must be eneterd four times in a serial reliability relationship. The
remaining block in Figure 2.3-34 represents the pair of drive rollers.
The most probable mode of failure for these components is slippage. Argu-
.... J- .... L -- --tZ .... J --.'--." ......... kl A l.. _d.'_." --_ 4-2 _-- _
creasing failure rate with time as well as a decreasing failure rate with
time. For the purpose of the present model, it will be assumed that a
sufficiently high preload is placed upon the wheels so that the failure rate
remains constant.
Thus
-k N
R 2 (t) = e (2.3.3-5)
D
where
k = constant failure rate.
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In this case, the following value has been assigned as a preliminary
estimate
-6
k = 0.5 x i0 failure/cycle..
Evaluating the expression for reliability:
R2D(4000 ) = 0. 998
R2D(2000 ) = 0. 999.
The constituent reliability block diagram for item 3, the tube
drive module_ is shown in Figure 2.3-35. In accordance with the dis-
cussion in the preceding paragraphs, reliabilities R5B and R5E will be
assumed to be unity. The tube drum spring and the wire drum spring are
in fact Negator springs. For the purposes of the preliminary model, the
reliability function given by Equation {2.3.3-4) can be used. Similarly,
R5F and R5C are givenbyEquation(2.3. 3'-3).Each of the bearing blocks
indicated in Figure Z.3-35 are representative of two bearings. Thus, both
R5C and R5F must be entered twice in a serial reliability relationship.
The associated numerical reliability values also apply here.
Table 2.3-15 presents a summary of the mathematical models
used for the reliability characteristics for the various mechanical elements,
along with the assumed values of the parameters, and reliability estima-
tions for 2000 and 4000 penetrations which will be used in the penetrometer
subsystem reliability predictions in Section 2.3.4.
Electrical-Electronic Reliability Model
The electrical-electronic portions of the penetrometer subsystem
are represented in Figure 2.3-29 by five separate units. These units are
represented by the following reliability designations:
Drive Motor R
1
LVDT Transducer R 4
Switching Circuit R 6
Position Indicating
Potentiom eter R
7
Switching System Override R 8.
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For the present, the motor reliability R1 is considered to have
three separate components which take into consideration winding and wiring
reliability (random failure characteristic) RIA, motor bearing and brush
reliability (random failure characteristic) RIB, and a total wearout relia-
bility characteristic RIC, which for the present motor application is
expected to be largely determined by the brush and commutator wear under
vacuum conditions. Because operation of the motor is vitally dependent
upon proper functioning of all three segments, the reliability terms are
considered to have a serial relationship:
R 1 = R1A RIB R1C"
For the present, the winding reliability factor is represented by
= -k
RIA e IA t (2.3.3-6)
where t is the motor operating time, given by t = kN, N being the number
of penetrations. The determination of this factor follows the conventional
procedure presented in the "RADC Reliability Notebook, " where modified
transformer failure data are used for representationofmotorwine}ingrelia-
bility characteristics.
In considering the bearing and brush factors, deterioration is
assumed to occur only while the motor is in actual operation; hence_ the
elapsed operating time t is again given by t = kN where operating time is
again related to the number of penetrations. In this way, the brush and
bearing random failure characteristic is represented by
-k
R = e IB t. (Z.3.3-7)
IB
It should be noted that the above procedure for estimating RIB also
follows the procedures presented in the "RADC Reliability Notebook" for
predicting motor reliability. In addition to the above reliability factors,
information has been obtained from the motor manufacturer (Globe
Industries) regarding the general reliability characteristics of the motor
presently being considered as suitable for lunar application. This motor
life information, which has been regarded as representing the general
wearout characteristics of the motor and gear reduction unit, has been
fitted to a normal failure distribution. Details on the motor life charac-
teristics have been discussed in Section g. 3. I.
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The motor brush and commutator reliability, on the basis of
these data, is then represented by the normal distribution as follows:
2
l.t-e )
l -F(--F--RIC = -- e dt (2.3.3-8)
t •z4 /
where
e is the mean brush life
is the standard deviation.
Because deterioration is considered to occur only during motor operation,
the k factor is again used to transform the number of penetrations into
actual operating time.
The remainder of the electronic-electrical portions of the
penetrometer subsystem have failure rates which are determined by the
particular operating environment. Considerations in the determination
of these failure rates have been discussed previously. The reliability
functions for the remainder of the electronics package are given as
follow s :
-k At
R4= e
-k 6t
R6=e
-k 7t
R7= e
for the LVDT unit (see Section Z. 3. I. I)
for the switching circuitry (see Section 2.3. I. I)
for the position indicating potentiometer (see
Section 2.3. I. I).
In addition, the operation of the switching circuit override must be con-
sidered, and its reliability characteristic is given by
-k 8t
R8= e
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Considerations for the estimation of particular values for the failure
rate k 8 will be discussed in Section 2. 3.4.
The last block in Figure 2. 3-29, the tube destruct mechanism,
is a pyrotechnic blow-off device. Such a typical device, exhibiting good
reliability under hard vacuum, is an Exploding Bridge Wire detonator.
Experience has shown that the reliability for this element is essentially
independent of time. In this case, the assumed value for the reliability
is given by
R9(t) = C = constant = 0. 999.
(z.3.3-9)
It should be noted that, for R 8 and R 9, these values actually represent
in this case the probabilities that these elements do not abort or impede
normal penetrometer operation. For instance, R 9 in this case represents
an estimation of the probability that the tube destruct mechanism does not
fire during normal penetrometer operation.
Modes of Operation
Figure Z. 3-29, the System Reliability Block Diagram, indicates
a series relationship between the various units of the penetrometer sub-
system, with the resulting reliability estimation representing the proba-
bility of the entire subsystem operating satisfactorily. However, modes
of partial operation and the corresponding probabilities of partial success
may also be considered. Referring to Figure 2. 3-29, units I, Z, 3, 5,
and 6 represent those portions of the subsystem which must operate without
failure. Because these particular portions of the penetrometer (the drive
motor, tube drive configuration, the tube and probe, tube storage con-
figuration, and the switching circuit) are concerned with the actual opera-
tion of the penetrometer tube, the operation of these portions of the pene-
trometer can be considered to represent the minimal operational mode of
the subsystem. Catastrophic failure in any of these units will result in
total disablement of the penetrometer. Reliability factors for units 8
(switching circuit override) and 9 (tube destruct) must also be considered
in this case from the viewpoint of their probability of nonoperation_ while
the switching circuit and tube drive units are operating properly. Opera-
tion of either of these two emergency units during normal penetrometer
operation could constitute a failure, particularly in the case of the tube
destruct unit which is only utilized to free the SLRV in the event that the
penetrometer ceases to function while the tube is in an extended position.
2- 280 IV
BSR 903
The next mode of operation includes operation of the LVDT unit
to give force measurement data. A third mode of operation can be described,
wherein the LVDT unit fails, and the depth indication unit operates. A
fourth mode of partial penetrometer operation is possible if the penetrom-
eter operating time can be monitored. Some elementary information could
still be obtained on depth of penetration and whether or not an over-force
condition was encountered. These modes of penetrometer operation are
summarized in Table 2.3-16. The product of the reliability terms for the
units in a particular mode of operation is then the probability of at least
those units operating in that particular mode throughout the selected mission.
The various units in the penetrometer subsystem are identified as follows:
1 Drive motor and reduction gears
2 Tube drive module
3 Tube and probe
4 LVDT force transducer
5 Tube storage
6 Control circuit
7 Position circuit
8 Switch override
9 Tube destruct.
TABLE 2.3- 16
PENETROMETER SUBSYSTEM MODES OF OPERATION
Ope rational Mode
II
III
IV
De s c ription
Complete operation
Operation of force
sensor only
Operation of posi-
tion sensor only
Operation of tube
only
Identification of Operational
Units and Reliability
RIRzR3R4R5R6R7R8R 9
RIRzR3R4R5R 6 R8R 9
RIRzR 3 R5R6R7R8R 9
RIRzR 3 R5R 6 R8R 9
IV 2- 281
BSR 903
2.3.4 Penetrometer Subsystem Reliability Predictions
This section presents a summary of the reliability characteristics
of the SLRV penetrometer subsystem in the form of a total subsystem relia-
bility prediction. Two predictions are considered, one for a medium length
mission of 2000 penetrations, and a longer length mission of 4000 penetra-
tions. The predictions are for successful operation of the entire penetrom-
eter subsystem. The major conditions considered for the prediction are an
operating temperature of 60°C for the penetrometer electronics (standard
MIL parts application), with the electronics being in operation (in a pow-
ered state) only during the 8-hour operating time per earth day. Table 2. 3-17
then summarizes the reliability estimates for each portion of the penetrom-
eter subsystem, and gives a total subsystem reliability estimate. The
considerations in the derivation and estimation of the various constituent
reliability predictions has been covered for each part of the penetrometer
subsystem in previous sections of this reliability report.
The end of Table 2. 3-17 thus gives the present reliability pre-
dictions for 2000 and 4000 penetration missions as 0.983 and 0.860, respec-
tively. It should be noted that the major portion of the reliability decrease
for the longer mission is accounted for by the mechanical portion of the
penetrometer. It is in this area that much of the specialized design work
and investigation is required if the longer mission would be anticipated.
The present reliability estimates indicate that redundancy in the electronic
portions of the penetrometer is not a necessity_ particularly in view of the
relatively small number of electronic parts and the high part reliabilities
which may be obtainable. In general, it should be noted that the reliability
figures are indeed estimates which are based on the ETM design, with con-
sideration for extension of application to the lunar environment and mission
profile and using the design and reliability information presently available.
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TABLE Z. 3-17
SLRV PENETROMETER SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY PREDICTIONS
'- Unit Unit Unit
Reliability Reliability Reliability Reliability Reliability
Unit Identification Designation 2000 Cycles 2000 Cycles 4000 Cycles 4000 Cycles
l - Drive Motor
2A - Spur Drive Gear Set
ZB - Bearings
2C - Shaft
ZD - Drive Roller Set
3A - Probe Tip
3B - Tube
3C - Bearings
3D - Springs
4 - LVDT Unit
5A - Tube Drum Spring
5B - Shaft
5C - Tube Drum Bearings
5D - Wire Drum Spring
5E - Shaft
5F - Wire Drum Bearings
6 - Switching Circuit
7 - Depth Measurement
8 - Switch Override
9 - Tube Destruct
No. Units
Used
I R I
I RZA
4
I
i
I
'I
I
Z
2
I
l
l
Z
I
l
Z
I
I
l
I
RZB
R2 C
RZD
R3A
R3B
R3C
R3D
R 4
RSA
R5B
RSC
R5 D
RSE
RSF
R 6
K 7
R 8
R 9
o. 995
_,I. 000
.000
I. 000
0. 999
_' 1. 000
'_ 1. 000
_-'I. 000
O. 999
O, 998
O. 999
1. 000
_, 1. 000
O. 999
l. 000
,_l. 000
O. 998
0. 999
0. 999
0. 999
0. 995
_, 1. 000
,_, 1. 000
1. 000
0. 999
•"_ !. 000
_._ 1. 000
_,, 1. 000
0. 998
O. 998
O. 999
I. 000
•-_ 1. 000
0. 999
l. 000
_.s !. 000
0. 998
0. 999
0. 999
0. 999
0. 990
O. 993
O. 993
I. 000
0. 998
0. 995
0. 990
0.993
O. 990
0.997
0. 990
I. 000
0. 993
0. 990
I. 000
0.993
0. 996
0. 999
O. 999
O. 999
O. 990
O. 993
O. 972
!. 000
O. 998
O. 995
O. 990
O. 986
0. 980
0. 997
O. 990
1. 000
0. 986
0. 990
l. 000
0. 986
0. 996
0. 999
0. 999
0. 999
Total Penetrometer Subsystem Reliability 0. 983 0. 860
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2.3.5 Parts Selection Program
2.3.5. 1 Basic Elements of a Parts Program
A parts selection program may be considered as involving
basically two aspects of project control. The first is the internal proce-
dure for determining part application, required part design specifications,
reliability evaluation, part selection, and vendor selection. The second
aspect involves the relationship with the parts vendors where the basic
reliability task involves the assurance that the parts supplied by the vendor
meet the required specifications.
The various tasks and procedures which might make up a general
parts and materials selection program are outlined below. The elements
of such a program include:
I. Part and material selection for a specific application
a. On the basis of operational characteristics
b. On the basis of reliability characteristics
2. Selection of vendors or manufacturers
3. Assurance of proper part application
a. During design phase
b. During assembly
4. Establishment of specifications for procurement
a. Electrical, mechanical, and environmental require-
ments
b. Material and process control requirements
c. Handling requirements
d. Reliability assurance requirements
(I) Qualification tests
(2) Acceptance tests
(3) Reassurance tests
e. Requirements for inspection of vendors facilities and
processes
2-284 IV
BSR 903
5. Liaison with parts vendors
a. For improved component design
b. For improved processes
6. Specification for part use
a. Handling
b. Storage
c. Testing
d. Assembly.
The degree to which any of the above items may be specified or developed
will depend upon several factors, including the complexity of the device,
the over-all project reliability requirements and procedures as may be
set by the prime contracting body, the number of production devices to be
built thus determining the number of component parts required, and the
funds which may be allocated to the reliability assurance task.
In concept, the above considerations are applicable to both the
mechanical and electrical areas. However, the particular application of
such general concepts to mechanical parts, because of specific problems
in that area, will be discussed in the following section.
With regard to the penetrometer subsystem in general, and the
electronic/electrical area in particular, two of the significant factors will
L-_nh_h]'r, h_..........a high reliability requirement, with a relatively small number
of production units. Thus, the availability of materials, parts, and com-
pleted units for testing must be considered closely in the development of
the penetrometer flight model in order that attainment of realibility goals
will be established. Specific areas to which consideration must be given,
are listed in document BSR751. These areas include:
i. Selection and application of parts and materials
2. Reduction of parts (if feasible)
3. Specification of parts and materials
4. Qualification of parts (if necessary)
5. Screening and aging tests.
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Particular considerations regarding the application of effort in
these areas to the development of the penetrometer flight model will now
be discussed.
Selection and Application of Parts and Materials
Selection of parts and materials for the flight model by the de-
sign engineers shall be reviewed by the reliability activity. Criteria for
evaluation will include: derating factors, environmental compatibility,
performance capability, application considerations, documented reliability
(long-life) levels_ etc.
Reduction in Number of Types
Summary listings of each type of part will be made, along with
the principal required operating characteristics. These will be reviewed
by type, along with the application of the part to determine those cases
where it would be possible and desirable to replace specific selections
with alternates -- the objective being to mainimize the number of different
types of parts used in the penetrometer subassembly of the flight model.
Specifications
Parts purchased for assembly into the flight model of the pene-
trometer subassembly will be purchased to applicable military and/or
NASA specifications, where such procedures are possible and where such
parts will meet the reliability requirements of the penetrometer subsystem.
As part of the activities under "Reduction in Number of Types", above ,every effort
consistent with the over-all objectives of the flight model will be made to
minimize the number of special parts used.
Oualific ati ons
Parts will be purchased whenever possible from suppliers who
are on a qualified parts list for the particular selected part and capable
of meeting the reliabillty requirements. Inspection procedures will be
instituted on such parts to assure that the parts qualify within the frame-
work of the flight model program.
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Screening/Aging Tests
The extent to which such tests would be used in the development
of the flight model will most certainly depend upon the reliability require-
ments of a particular part and the effort which can be devoted to such tests
within the scope of the total program. On the other hand, where reliability
requirements and lack of data dictate, testing will most definitely have to
be considered. For instance, one area where a need for thorough testing
is expected is in the motor operation. Because little data are generally
available in this area, performance and reliability characteristics under
the anticipated operational and environmental conditions must be established
in a suitable test program. Tests and procedures will also be considered
for the process of screening suitable parts or groups of parts for actual
application in flight model penetrometers.
2.3.5.2 Mechanical Considerations in a Parts Program
The detailed preparation of a parts selection program for high
reliability parts, such as may be used in the electronics industry, has
little applicability or signigicance in terms of the mechanical parts for
the SLRV penetrometer subsystem. In the first place, the classical parts
program is usually associated with large numbers of parts. In addition,
these parts are capable of being subjected to rather simple life tests.
Finally, the industry itself has been established in the disciplines of part
reliability.
In constrast to this situation, the mechanical parts or compo-
nents for the penetrometer are few in number, and only a very small
quantity of any specific component will probably be used throughout the
entire program {it is noted, again, that this situation also exists to some
degree even in the penetrometer subsystem electronics). Furthermore,
many, if not most, of the components are unique designs and as such are
not available commerically. All of this leads up to the fact that most
careful consideration must be given to the procedures for selection and
specification of mechanical components for the SLRV penetrometer sub-
system. The following paragraphs outline a comprehensive and realistic
mechanical parts selection program applicable to the penetrometer flight
model development in Phase II.
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Material Selection
The materials which will be used for the aforementioned com-
ponents will be subjected to a rigorous analytical h_es_igationi(in terms
of applicable parameters). Themater_al/materials indicated most appli-
cable will be life tested under simulated environmental and operational
stresses to the greatest extent possible in the laboratory.
C onfiguration Evaluation
Once the material has been evaluated and selected, the compo-
nents will be fabricated and tested, again under simulated operational
and environmental stress conditions. Obviously, redesign and reevaluation
will occur if any of the components fail to meet requirements.
Interaction Evaluation
Having completed the first two steps in the parts selection pro-
gram, the components will be assembled into a unit experimentally evalu-
ated again under simulated operational and environmental stresses. This
test will be planned to evaluate the interaction problem between the various
components and between the components {as a whole) and their over-all
environment.
As an example of this approach, consider the single most crit-
ical mechanical component in ths system, the penetrometer tube. The
techniques and results of a preliminary parametric study on the tube ma-
terial from a fatigue standpoint (the most probable failure model were
discussed in Section 2.3. I. 2. The results of that study indicated that
there were three possible material choices, silicon manganese steel,
chrome-vanadium steel, and an 18-8 series stainless steel. The latter
material appeared to have a slight advantage over the first two for use in
the penetrometer system. However, for the sake of completeness, all
three of these materials must be further investigated under items "Material
Selection, " "Configuration Evaluation, " and "Interaction Evaluation" of
the aforementioned parts selection program. Such an investigation would
entail:
I. Preparation of a number of fatigue test specimens from
each of the three materials. Several groups of specimens
from each type of material would be tested, each group
at a specific level of hardness. The tests would be standard
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fatigue tests to failure at various stress levels under
simulated lunar environments. These test data will
provide P-S-N data for reliability computations as well
as comparative fatigue life data. i
_o Penetrometer tubes would be fabricated from these groups
of materials at different hardnesses and cyclicly tested to
failure in a fixture which simulates the operational cycle
of the actual penetrometer. As before, this testing will
be carried out under simulated lunar conditions.
. Finally, the most promising material, in terms of the re-
sults of the first two evaluations, will be fabricated into a
penetrometer tube, assembled on an actual penetrometer,
and tested under simulated lunar conditions.
Thus, by using the outlined procedure, a comprehensive evaluation of the
component can be achieved.
It should be noted extreme care will be employed in the selec',
tion of commercial components. IIT Research Institute personnel will
work closely with the engineering personnel of the vendor to ensure that
the component ultimately purchased will be of high quality and exhibit the
required capabilities. In addition, all purchased components will be sub-
jected to steps 2 and 3 of the aforementioned parts selection program.
The unit resulting from this type of part selection and evalua-
tion should exhibit optimum performance for the specific design in terms
of intended use and operational and environmental stresses.
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Z. 4 NAVIGATION
The reliability block diagram for the navigation subsystem is shown
in Figure g. 4-1. The reliability of this subsystem for a 4.5-month mis-
sion is 0. 9675 and somewhat higher for missions of lesser duration as
shown in Table Z. 4-1.
TABLE Z. 4- 1
NAVIGATION SUBSYSTEM
Item
RF Ranging Unit
Sun Sensor
Inclinometer
Odometer
Navigation Subsystem
Reliability
1 Mo. Z Mo. 3 Mo. 4.5 Mo.
• 9944 .9889 .9834 .975Z
.9989 .9979 .9969 .9953
.9993 .9986 .9979 .9969
.9999 .9999 .9999 .9999
.99Z5 .9855 .978Z .9675
Remarks
Energized during
DSIF control hours.
Z. 4. 1 RF Ranging Unit
The first part of this section develops a reliability model for the
CW ranging system. This model is then applied to a subunit reliability
and criticality analysis as described in the following section.
Z.4. 1. 1 Reliability Model
The reliability model used for this preliminary analysis assumes
that all failures are random and catastrophic. The failure rate for each
subunit of the system was obtained by summing up the failure rates for all
of its constituent parts.
k=n
Y
i = L- ' kik
k=l
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RF RANGING UNIT
EI
SUN SENSOR
E2
INCLINOMETER
E3
I I
D_ e" . K=_ -- I=_ . I1=.
'_ -- "1 " "2 ^ "3 ^ "4
ODOMETER
E4
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whe r e
1
kik
n
.th
= total failure rate for 1 subunit of the system
.th
= failure rate of k th component in 1 subunit
.th
= number of components in the x subunit
.th
The reliability of the x
-k .t
R._t) = e 1
1
R. (t)
1
subunit as a function of time is:
.th
probability that the 1
end of a time period t.
subunit will be operational at the
The reliability of the total system was taken to be the product of
the reliabilities of all subunits in the system, since all subunits are essen-
tially in series with each other. Thus,
i=n
RT(t ) = R.(t)l
i=l
whe re
RT{t } = reliability at time t of the total system
N = number of subunits in the total system
-k i t, the
Since the reliability of each subunit is of the form e
overall reliability of the system may be Calculated as follows:
-kT t
RT(t ) = e
whe re
i=N
kT i
i=l
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2.4. 1.2 Reliability and Criticality Analysis
A preliminary reliability analysis of the CW ranging system was
made using the reliability model discussed above. Since the final designs
of the circuits for each subunit have not yet been made, it was necessary
to estimate the number and types of components in each subunit. The esti-
mates are based mainly on standard circuit designs of the type which might
finally be used in the system. The failure rates for all components were
derived from Mil-Handbook 217, "Reliability Stress and Failure Rate Data
for Electronic Equipment" dated August 1962.
The component failure rates from this source are presented as
functions of ambient temperature and the main stress ratio. For transis-
tors, diodes, and resistors the main stress ratio is the ratio of operating
power to rated power. The main stress ratio for capacitors is the ratio
of operating voltage to rated voltage. The stress ratios used in this analysis
are given in Table 2.4-2 under the column designated as part derating.
These stress ratios were selected as an initial compromise between weight
and size, and reliability. The ambient temperature was assumed to be
50°C. This corresponds to the maximum internal compartment tempera-
ture expected during lunar day operation. On the basis of these two factors,
a single part failure rate was obtained for each type of component used in
the system. These part failure rates are given in Table 2.4-2.
The number of components of each type and the subtotal failure
rate for each type of component are also given in the last two columns of
Table 2.4-Z. This component failure analysis indicates that silicone transis-
tors are the most critical type of component in the system. A first step
in improving the reliability of the system could be to use Minuteman relia-
bility transistors. The total failure rate for the system is 3. 875 percent/
1000 hours. This corresponds to a mean-time-to-failure of Z5,800 hours.
Figure 2.4-2 shows a plot of reliability as a function of the number of hours
of operation for the complete ranging system.
The CW ranging system block diagram used for the reliability
and criticality analysis is shown in Figures 2.4-3 and 2.4-4. A reliability
prediction worksheet has been filled out for each distinctive type of subunit
in the system. The component failure rates used on these worksheets are
the same as those given in Table 2.4-2. The subunit failure rates derived
on the following 14 worksheetsiare used for the subunit reliability and criti-
cality analysis presented in Table 2.4-3. The probability of failure for each
1The worksheets begin on page 2-299.
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Figure IV-2.4-3 SLRV Mounted Ranging Circuitry
Figure IV-2.4-4 Surveyor Mounted Repeater Translator
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subunit was calculated for 1,250 hours. This is the time required to travel
the maximum mission distance of 60 kilometers at the slowest speed, and
therefore, represents approximately the maximum number of hours the
SLRV will be moving on the lunar surface. It has been assumed that the
ranging system is operated only when the drive mechanism is operated,
and that none of the subunits are activated during the lunar night.
The subunit criticality factors used in the analysis are defined
below.
Criticality Effect
1.0 Complete failure of the system
0.7 Failure of a portion of a subunit that causes
loss of fine ranging
0.5 Failure of a subunit that causes complete
loss of fine ranging
0.3 Failure of a subunit that causes degradation
of fine ranging
The 0.3 criticality is applied to the two Z-Mc phase comparators and the
phase shifter. One of these units can fail with only a slight effect in ranging
accuracy. The 0.5 criticality is applied to the Z-Mc crystal oscillator.
If this unit fails, fine ranging will be completely lost. The 0. 7 criticality
is applied to the signal summer and the range separation filter. Both of
these subunits have some components that effect only the Z-Mc fine ranging
signal. All other subunits are assigned a criticality of 1.0, since the
failure of any of these subunits will result in a catastrophic failure of the
ranging system.
The product of the criticality factor and the probability of failure
for each subunit is formed in column four of Table Z.4-3. The highest
products represent the most critical subunits in the system.
There are six subunits with criticality products greater than
1.0 x 10 -3 They are listed below in order of a decreasing product:
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IZ5 Mc high gain limiting amplifier
145 Mc high gain limiting amplifier
80 kc phase comparator
mixer
Z Mc phase comparator
2 Mc phase comparator (quadrature)
The major contributors to the failure rate of each of these subunits are
silicon transistors. A transistor failure in any of the first four subunits
listed above will cause a complete system failure, while a failure in the
last two Will result in loss of accuracy in the fine ranging. The reliability
of the transistor used in these units can be increased by selecting transis-
tors which can be operated at a stress ratio of 0. 1 or less. This would
reduce the transistor failure rate from 0. 042 per cent/1000 hours to 0. 020
percent/1000 hours. A second alternative would be to use Minuteman
reliability transistors, which have failure rates between 0. 003 percent/
1000 hours and 0. 001 percent/1000 hours for a stress ratio of 0.2 at 40°C.
If this does not provide enough reliability, Minuteman components could be
used throughout the system. If this is done, it appears possible to decrease
the failure rate derived in this analysis by a factor of ten.
2.4.2 Sun Sensor
The sun sensor essentially consists of four eyes and electronics;
each eye has 16 solar cells. Although the system can continue to function
with the loss of one eye (operate in a degraded mode) the reliability of the
sun sensor has been calculated on the basis that all parts operate success-
fully.
The reliability of the sun sensor, based upon DSIF control hours of
648 for a 4.5-month mission is 0.995. Table 2.4-1 shows the reliability
of this unit for various mission months. The prediction work sheet on the
following page shows the failure rates and sources of failure rate data for
each part.
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Z. 4.3 Inclinometer
Since 1959 the average improvement for Honeywell failure rates
has been approximately Z0% per year. This has been due mainly to a combina-
tion of increased emphasis on design and piece part application reviews,
tighter process controls, and better parts. The following component parts
and their associated high reliability failure rates were used in determining
the overall inclinometer reliability.
The reliability of the inclinometer for a 4.5-month mission is 0. 9969
as shown in Table Z. 4-1. The failure rate for each of the parts in this unit
is shown in Table Z. 4-4.
TABLE Z. 4-4
PARTS FAILURE RATE
Carbon Resistors 9 @ .0006%/1000 hours 0054%/1000 hours
Diodes 9 @ 0022%/1000 hours 0198%/1000 hours
Zener Diode 1 @ 03%/1000 hours 03%/1000 hours
Accelerometer Microsyn 1 @ 1%/1000 hours 3%/1000 hours
Transformer 1 @ 3%/1000 hours 3%/1000 hours
Capacitors {Mica) i _ 002%/1000 hours oi%/ ......_UUU _UU_
Capacitors {Tantalum) 1 @ 01%/1000 hours 01%/1000 hours
Switching Transistors Z @ 003%/1000 hours 006%/1000 hours
Ball Bearings Z@ 01%/1000 hours 0Z%/1000 hours
Total Failure Rate .493%/1000 hours
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Z. 5 MOBILITY SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY
The mobility subsystem consists of four-traction-drive assemblies,
a steering lock assembly, and the support structure. The traction drive
assemblies and steering lock assembly are controlled by the command sub-
system which is not included in this analysis.
Z. 5. 1 Block Diagram
The reliability block diagram (Figure Z. 5-1) requires a series
arrangement of the support structure, traction drive assemblies, and
steering lock assembly for mission success. Though the LRV can operate
with three of the drive motions functioning, such an arrangement would
result in a degraded mode of operation because of the decrease in climbing
ability and increase in mission time. The analysis will be limited to that
required for total mission success; i.e., four drive motors functioning.
2.5.2 Mathematical Model
The reliability mathematical mode is as follows:
where:
R M = M 1 x M z x M 3 x M 4 x M 5 x M 6 (Z. 5-1)
RM= Mobility Subsystem Reliability
M 1 = Reliability of Support Structure
M 2 = Reliability of TDA-1
M 3 = Reliability of TDA-Z
M 4 = Reliability of TDA-3
M 5 = Reliability of TDA-4
M 6 = Reliability of Steering Lock Assembly.
Since the four traction drive assemblies are identical and assuming equal
operating periods for each, Equation (Z. 5-1) can be reduced to:
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R M = M 1 x M 2 x M 6. {2.5-Z)
The reliabilities for each of the subunits are expressed by the following
equations :
-kt
M 1 = e (2.5- 3)
-klt I -kgt I -k3C 1 -k4t 1
MZ = RelTD M x e x e x e x e (2.5-4)
-k5C 2 -k6t 2 -k7C 3 -k7C 4 -k7C 5
M6=e xe xe xe xe
-k 7C6 -k 8C7 -k 8C8
xe xe xe
(z.5-5)
where::
Rel = Reliability of Traction Drive Mechanism
TDM
(Refer to Section 2.5.5. Z for equation).
k 1 = Failure rate of dual idler wheel
k z = Failure rate of idler wheel bearings
k = Failure rate of track rim
3
k = Failure rate of leg strut bearing
4
k 5 = Failure Rate of lock tongue
k 6 = Failure rate of lock actuator
k 7 = Failure rate of chassis position sensor 1 to 4
k 8 = Failure rate of actuator position sensor 1 and Z
t = operating time
C = cycles of operation.
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Substituting Equations (2.5-3), (2, 5-4), and (2.5-5) into Equation (2.5-2)
yields the following mathematical model for the mobility subsystem:
-kt 4 -4[(k 1+k2+ kd)tl +X3CII
R M = e x (RelTDM) x e ' x
-k 5C2 -k6t2 -k 7 (C 3 + C 4 + C 5 + C6) (2. 5-6)
e xe xe x
-×8 (c7 + c8)"
e
2.5. 3 Prediction
Assuming a mission distance of 25 km, a vehicle speed of 0. 16
mph, and the number of turns the vehicle makes to cover 19 landing point
surveys and traverses as 1000, the mission reliability can be obtained
using the prediction worksheets (Table 2.5-1), the data shown in Table
Z. 5-2, and Equat'_on (2. 5- 6). Thus:
and
-0. 0004 4 -4 (0. 0504) -0. 001
R M + e x (0.995) xe x e x
-0.00198 x 10 -6 -0.01 x 10 -5 -0.01 x 10 -5
e xe xe
RM + O. 8009.
This low figure for the reliability is essentially the product of the high
failure rate of the track rim. The failure is caused when the track is torn
as a function of tensile forces rather than wearout of track tread.
Z. 5.4 Criticality of Track Rim
It is seen from kt values of Table 2.5-2 that the failure of the
track rim has the highest failure compared to the other units of the sub-
system. Therefore it can be stated that the other units will have a low prob-
ability of failure and consequently lower criticality.
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TABLE 2. 5-2
MOBILITY SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY DATA FOR
25-KM MISSION DISTANCE
U_IIT _. x 10 -5 t or C k (t or C)
Traction Wheel
Drive As sembly
TDM 0.005
Dual Idler Wheel 0,99/hr, 100.9hr 0 o 0010
Dual Idler Wheel
Bearings 4. 7/hr 100, 9hr 0,0047
Track Rim 0° 16/meter ZS000meters 0.0400
Leg Strut Bearing 4, 7/hr 100.9hr 0 ° 00Z7
Steering Lock
As s embly
R ema rk s
(7)
(1)
(1}
(1)
Lock Tongue 0,0ZS/cy 4000cy 0.0010 (Z)
Lock Actuator 7. 1/hr 0° llhr 0 °781 x 10 -5 (3)
Chassis Pos. Shnsor 10.O001/cy lO00c_r 0.100 x 10 -5 (4}
" " " 2 " 1000cy 0. I00 x 10 -5 (4}
" " " 3 " 1000cy 0. I00 x 10 -5 (4)
" " " 4 " I000 cy 0° I00 x 10 -5 (4)
Actuator Pos. Seusorl " Z000cy 0°Z00 x 10 -5 (5}
" " " Z " Z000cy 0. Z00 x 10 -5 (5}
Support Structure 0 °0004 (6)
NOTES: (1) For LRV speed of 0.16 mph.
(Z) For 1000 turns at 4 cycles per turr_
(3) Assuming actuator operating time of 0. 100 sec and 4000 operations.
(4) Assumes each position sensor switch operates once for each of the
1000 turns,
(5) Assumes each position sensor switch operates
Z000 times.
(6) Based on reliabilit T of 0.9996.
(7) Based on TDM reliability of 0. 995 from Section Z. 5.5.1.
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The probability of failure for the track rims is obtained from
the equation:
-XC
P = P -- 1 - e (2.5-7)
F
WiPer'S::
PF = probability of failure
k = failure rate of 4 track rims
C = number of cycles.
Therefore, using the XC value for the track rim in Table Z. 5-Z, the prob-
ability of track failure during the mission becomes:
and
0.16
PF=l-e
PF = " 1479.
The criticality of the track rim, which is the product of the
probability of failure and the subsystem degradation caused by failure,
can next be determined. Since failure of the track rim v_uld be cata-
strophic, the subsystem degradation would be 100% and therefore the
criticality level for the track rim becomes:
Criticality = PF x % Deg.
-3
= 0. 1479 x 1 = 147.9 x 10
The above criticality level is based on a postulated value for the
failure rate of the track rim, since the track was of a unique design and
no previous data were available. However, during Phase II of the LRV
Program, extensive study and life testing will be made to determine the
actual failure rate of the track rim and also ways to reduce the failure
rate to give a lower criticality. Some possible ways to decrease the
failure would be: (I) to increase the thickness of the stainless steel rim
giving greater tensile strength and, (2) improve the manufacturing methods.
A 30% increase in the track rim thickness of the four tracks would probably
add about 1 lb to the total LRV weight. The reliability of the mobility
subsystem would increase from 80% to 87%.
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The following sections discuss in detail the reliability and failure
mode analysis of the traction drive mechanism (TDM).
2.5.5 Traction Drive Mechanism
2.5.5. 1 Introduction and Summary
The traction drive mechanism reliability as a function of vehicle
travel in the drive mode is plotted in Figure 2.5-Z. These curves are
plotted from the data presented in Table Z. 5-3. The cross-hatched area
represents the region of probability for equal time at high and low speed.
Whether the high or low value is more exact depends upon the manner in
which the speeds are distributed.
in Figure
has made
The reliability for the free wheeling mode of operation is shown
2.5-3. This, of course, is not applied until some prior failure
the free 1 __1-_wn_L_,lg mode necessary.
Failure Mode Summary
The failure mode analysis as presented in detail in Section 2.5.5.4
indicates that the most critical assembly is the drive motor. The motor
winding and brush failures are the major contributions to this reliability
problem. The second most critical assembly is the drive wheel. From the
mission standpoint this is probably the most critical since it applied to both
the drive and free wheeling modes. The explosive coupling is next most
critical with the transmission being last in order of criticality.
Conclusions and Recommendations
On the basis of this analysis, the reliability of the traction drive
mechanism for Z0 kin of vehicle travel!ies between 0. 993 and 0.996. The
present configuration should be evaluated to determine whether any re-
design is advisable and whether some preliminary testing should be under-
taken prior to redesign. As a task in Phase II, it is recommended that:
. The drive wheel (or drum) assembly be carefully analyzed
and that at least a minimum reliability demonstration be
provided.
2. A reliability demonstration program for the explosive
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Distance
(Kin)
I0
20
40
60
TABLE Z. 5-3
TIME DISTANCE RE T.ATIONSHIP
Time (hr}
n + 10.8 rpm
38.6
77.2
154
232
n + Z rpm
Z08
416
830
IZ50
Distanc e
TABLE Z. 5-4
RELIABILITY OF MOTOR
WINDING AS A FUNCTION OF DISTANCE
Motor Winding Reliability (D I)
n + 10.8 rpm n + Z. 0 rpm
l0 Km .99970 .99846
20 Km .99940 .99688
30 Km .99880 .99389
40 Km .99830 .99067
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decoupling mechanism be pursued to establish its perform-
ance characteristics.
. Efforts be made to secure adequate motor reliability, either
by verification of available information or by a suitable test
program.
. That a suitable qualification test program be devised and
performed for the complete traction drive mechanism.
2.5.5. Z Reliability Model
Block Diagram
Figure Z. 5-4 portrays the critical elements in the power flow
path as the electrical energy is converted to mechanical energy and delivered
to the output of the drive wheel.
It can be seen from Figure 2.5-4 that the critical elements are
those affecting the continuity of the electrical circuit and the mechanical
parts which either provide a power transmitting function or are stressed by
ope ration.
Mathematical Model and Definitions
The reliability of the traction drive mechanism represented in
the block diagram can be expressed with two equations,
D = D • D D 3 . D 4 . D D 6 D 7 . D 8 (Z.5-8)o 1 Z 5
where D is the probability {reliability) of unqualified success in the drive
mode, a°nd,
! !
D = D 6 . D 7 • D 8m (2.5-9)
where D is the probability of a minimum performance as represented by
m
the free wheeling mode of operation.
The terms shown in the block diagram are defined as follows:
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D 1 = Reliability, DC Motor Winding
D 2 = Reliability, DC Motor Brushes
D 3 = Reliability, Shaft Bearings (for DC motor and nutator
transmi s sion)
D 4 = Reliability, Bellows
D 5 = Reliability, Transmission Gears
D 6 = Reliability, Drive Coupling functioning as a coupling
l
D 6 = Probability that the coupling will disengage if explosive de-
vice operates
D 7 = Probability that the explosive device does not inadvertently
activate
!
D 7 = Probability that the explosive device will operate if and when
required
D 8 = Reliability, Drive Wheel Bearing.
Derivation and Significant Factors
This section describes the derivation of the defining equations for
the reliability terms itemized above and the philosophy and background upon
which the derivation is based.
Motor Winding
Motor considerations are based upon the use of the 5-ounce motor
which was determined to be the optimum selection in the parametric tradeoff
studies.
where
The reliability of the motor winding is expressed as follows:
-kt -k kd
D1 = R(t'I = e C e TrDn (Z. 5-10)
k = failure rate
and
t = time required to travel a distance d as shown in Table 2. 5-3,
d d
= -- =k (Z.5-,I)
v TrDn
k = conversion constant
d = distance traveled
D = diameter of the drive hub
n = rotational speed of the hub
V = linear velocity of the vehicle.
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Mathematically this may be represented as,
-k -(k
t
D 2 = R(t ) = e = e
where
+k )t
r w (z. 5-12)
k = failure rate due to random failures
r
k = failure rate contribution due to wearout.
w
The brush characteristic then will be a combination of a step distri-
bution on a failure distribution which is predictable in the time domain.
Graphically this might be represented as shown in Figure 2. 5-5.
Experience with transformers and electric motors has led to the
estimated failure rates, as a function of temperature, given in the RADC
Reliability Notebook. On page 137, the rate for a transformer with class
HT insulation is given as 0. 5% per 1000 hours, at a hot-spot temperature
of 180°C. This temperature is conservatively high for the power input and
motor size. On page 139, RADC, a factor of 1.5 is applied to the trans-
former failure rate to cover the increased hazards of general-purpose motor
operation. Thus the insulation failure rate is 0.75% per 1000 hours.
A variation in motor speed affects the time required to travel a
specific distance and will affect the motor winding reliability. Since low
speeds are associated with motor loading it is logical to assume that stresses
producted by hot spot temperatures will occur at low speeds at a time when
friction generated heat is minimum. For this reason it is assumed that time
is the critical variable and the data calculated on this basis are presented in
Table 2. 5-4.
Motor Brushes
The motor brush reliability is a more complex function involving
the contributions of random failure and brush wearout.
Over a large number of tests not all brushes will fail at the same
time so the failure distribution can be closely approximated by the Gaussian
distribution about the mean life of the sampling as shown above.
The random failure rate contribution to the reliability D Z can be
obtained from the summary Table 2. 5-5. The accuracy to which one can de-
termine the wear out contribution is dependent upon the information one
has about the failure distribution curve. The latest data provided to Ben-
dix Research Laboratories Division by Inland Motors Corporation indi-
cates the brushes have a minimum life of 10 x 106 cycles and the mean
life is 20 x 106 cycles. If one assumes a Gaussian distribution of failures
around this mean life a calculation of faihre rates can be made by assuming
some interpretation of minimum life. Assuming that this value of 10
million cycles is near the 5-sigma limit (essentially a11brushes exceed
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this value on the basis of wear-out), the effect of the "tail-out" becomes
almost negligible so far as brush reliability is concerned• The more con-
servative approach is the former and this has been used for calculating the
values shown in Tables 2. 5-6 and 2. 5-7. The failure rates were converted
to the time base by:
k - percent failure x 1000 hrs (2. 5-13)
w time to travel the distance
TABLE 2. 5-6
BRUSH FAILURE RATES
Distance
10 KM
20 KM
40 KM
60 KM
Motor
Ray.
2.13xi06
4.26xi06
8.52xi06
12.78xi06
Sigma
Region
Over 5 sigma
Bet. 4&5 sigma
Bet. 3&4 sigma
Bet. 2h3 sigma
Failure*
Rate
• 00006%
• .006%
.27%
4. 55%
n
l
k
w
Percent/
1000 hrs.
.00155
.0778
1.75
19.6
n
k 2
w
Percent/
i000 hrs.
.000Z88
.0144
.326
3.64
From normal distribution tables
The reliability of the motor brushes is presented in Table 2. 5-7.
TABLE 2. 5-7
MOTOR BRUSH RELIABILITY
Distance Reliability D 2
Km i0. 8 rpm 2.0 rpm
i0 • 99996 .99972
20 .99986 .99952
40 . 99715 .99646
60 . 98925 .95437
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Shaft Bearings
The life of ball bearings has been the subject of very extensive and
continuing tests by bearing manufacturers. Under apparently identical con-
ditions of loading, the life has been found to conform to a Weibu11 distribution,
with the form
b
Fo=l-e (2. 5-14)
where F e is the fraction of the original population which have failed after
e8 revolutions, e is the "characteristic life" under the given loading con-
ditions and b is the "Weibu11 slope". (See Weibu11, W. - "A statistical dis-
tribution function of wide applicability" - Journal of Applied Mechanics,
September 1951, pp. 293-297.) Typical value s ofb range from 1.2 to 1.4
for bearings mounted with ordinary care, and much higher when extreme
care is exercised. The characteristic life for ordinary care is given by
New Departure's general catalog, page 35, as
4
LIFE = 3800 /_icapacity} (2. 5-15)load /
where life is in hours, and the capacity is the rated load at operating speed.
This relation can be reduced to
4
= x i06 / C \ (2.516 
where 8 is characteristic life in revolutions, C is rated capacity at 1000
rpm, and P is the effective radial load. The following table gives the rated
capacity of the bearings for 3800 hrs. average life at 1000 rpm, their maxi-
mum effective radial loads, and the average life in revolutions for the maxi-
mum effective loads,
Bearing Number
Size
Rated capacity, ib
Effective radial load
Life in revolutions (8)
per New Departure Catalog, 1961.
a b c d
R-2 R-3 R-4 R-4
17 40 43 43
11.8 8.4 28.0 16.0
9. 8xlO 8 ll70xlO 8 12.8xlO 8 l18xlO
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The individual shaft bearing reliability for 8 motor revolutions is
and total shaft bearing reliability is
b
D 3 = D3a. D3b" D3" c D3d
The resulting shaft bearing reliabilities are shown in Table Z. 5-8.
D 3 -
Bearing a
b
TABLE Z. 5-8
SHAFT BEARING RELIABILITY
Shaft Bearings:
.99933 .99865 .99690 .99495
.99999 .99999 .99998 .99997
c .99950 .99900 .99770 .99626
d .99996 .99993 .99984 .99974
D 3 = D3a. D3b. D3c. D3d .99878 .99757 .99443 .99094
Bellows
This flexible part provides a positive sealing mechanism to make
it possible to maintain an atmosphere within the motor and transmission.
This prevents evaporation of lubricants and plasticizers, minimizes wear
rates on motor brushes and eliminates metal welding associated with high
vacuum environment.
(z.5-17)
(z.5-18)
Any failure of this part, whether it occurs in the flexible member
or the joining regions will result in a loss of this pressure and to some
subsequent failure. How soon the subsequent failure will occur depends
upon the severity of the bellows failure. For this analysis it has been
assumed that any bellows failure is a critical one.
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The failures which can be anticipated in the flexible member as
well as the joining regions are associated with manufacturing methods,
process controls and environment. As such they can logically be assumed
to be random with time, therefore
-kt
D 4 = e (2. 5-19)
Table 2. 5-9 is based on the failure rate of 0. 1 percent/1000 hours
listed on Table 2. 5-5 and the time shown in Table 2. 5-3.
TABLE 2. 5-9
BELLOWS RELIABILITY
Distance
Km
Bellow Reliability D 4
i0.8 rpm 2 rprn
l0 0. 99996 0. 99980
20 0.99992 0.99960
40 0.99990 0.99920
60 0.99977 0.99870
Transmission Gears
Because of the low stress levels in all modes of operation and the
relatively low life requirement, wearout and fatigue failures of the gears
are considered to be negligible. However, there is a lubricated sliding
contact at the gear teeth and when this condition exists random failures
associated with the processing of parts and lubricants and the assembly of
the component can occur. Generally such failures are caused by contami-
nation even though the most careful techniques and white room equipment is
used.
The reliability evaluation for the transmission gears is based upon
a 25 percent derated gear pass as shown in Table 2. 5-10.
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TABLE Z. 5-10
TRANSMISSION GEAR RELIABILITY
Transmission Gear Reliability (D 5)
Distance
Km i0.8 rpm Zr_
I0 0. 99998 0. 99990
20 0. 99996 0. 99979
40 0. 99992 0. 99958
60 0. 99990 0. 99937
Drive Coupling
The drive coupling reliability must be evaluated in the two modes
of operation related to its function. As a coupling it must transmit the power
from the motor shaft to the transmission and, secondly, it must permanently
decouple the drive when some malfunction in the drive unit prevents it from
operating satisfactorily.
In the drive mode, the reliability (D6) of the device is dependent
upon its design. In this application, it is estimated that it has been derated
to i0 percent, providing a margin of safety over the maximum torque cap-
ability of the motor more than adequate for the anticipated mission. On
this basis the failure rate indicated in Table Z. 5-5 was used to calculate
the values shown in Table Z. 5-ii.
TABLE 2. 5-i 1
COUPLER RELIABILITY
Distance Couple r Reliability (D 6)
Km i0. 8 rpm 2 rpm
I0 0.99998 0.99990
20 0.99996 0.99979
40 0.99992 0.99958
60 0.99990 0.99937
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The reliability of the device as a decoupler (D'6) is also a function
of the design of the device. Considerable experience has been accumulated
in the design of explosively actuated mechanisms such as safety and arming
devices, explosive bolts for stage separation, explosive actuators, thrust
termination devices, et. cetera. On the basis of information provided in
Aerojet-General Ordnance technical bulletin no. 13, (reporting on labora-
tory qualified devices and space flight results on explosive bolts used in the
Able-type rockets; Able 0...Able 1. .Able 3...Able 4...Able Bravo
• .Transit...Tiros...Echo...Able Star. --no reported or suspected
failures)one can conclude that a properly designed decoupler could have a
mechanical failure rate which is neglible. This particular application, on
the other hand, has problems peculiar to its design which have not been
fully evaluated. These problems are associated with the need to mechani-
cally decouple the drive and to assure that the device does not re-engage.
This involves a more complex mechanical design and one in which prior ex-
- 1 "
plosive _,Al,uw_and _,,_+,l_+_,._,_v. experience may not be entirely, applicable. In lieu
of information to the contrary, a high reliability has been assigned to this
function .......
Explo s iv e De couple r
In considering the explosive decoupling device, again two effects
must be evaluated, l_irstly, the effect on the drive mode, inadvertent firing
of the device. Since an E. B.W. uses thermally stable chemicals and the
device cannot readily be initiated with radio frequency radiation, static
electricity, or even with direct application of voltages up to 500 volts, it
is reasonable to assume that inadvertent firing during the mission operation
is negligible.
Secondly, effect on the ability to go into the free wheeling mode,
the probability that the device will fire when called upon.
Reliabilities of Exploding Bridge Wire initiators (D_7) are reported
to be . 9995 over environmental extremes which include those estimated for
this mission.
Drive Wheel Bearing
For the calculation of the drive wheel bearing reliability (D8) the
Weibull distribution was used. In this case, however, the mean life of the
bearing, taken from data supplied by the manufacturer (Messinger), was
used as the characteristic life. The values for D 8 are shown in Table 2. 5-12.
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TABLE 2. 5-12
WHEEL BEARINGS RELIABILITY
Distance
Km Drive Wheel Bearing Reliability (D 8)
10 0.99986
Z0 0.99976
60 0.99910
While these reliability estimates will serve for this evaluation,
the situation here is not comparable to the shaft bearings which are hermet-
ically protected from the environment. As it is now presented, the data
makes no provision for the time element and relates the reliability only to
the distance travelled. Whatever may be the initial conditions of dust pro-
tection and lubrication sealing, after some period of time there will be some
deleterious effect. Admittedly, by proper design, sublimation and/or evap-
oration can become diffusion rate limited and performance can remain high
over the mission duration involved. This has not been adequately proven.
Before terminating the discussion of the reliability data, one might
question the validity of using constant failure rates in the time regime to
evaluate reliability at slower speeds with the variable being the time required
to travel a certain distance. While it is true that the number of stress
cycles required to travel a certain distance are the same in all cases, the
stress rates vary with speed as do localized temperatures. Since it is
assumed that slower speeds are caused primarily by load requirements it
can be expected that temperatures due to electrical power losses will rise.
On the other hand, heat from friction and elastic deformations will decrease
at lower speeds. These tend to be self compensating to a degree, and it has
been assumed that the net effect is comparable to increased operating time
at the original higher speed conditions.
The previous analysis was based upon daytime operation on the
moon. In general it might be expected that this provides the most stringent
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requirements because most of the expected degradation is anticipated from
the higher temperatures. Before dismissing the effects of lunar night on
operation and survival, however, some examination is in order.
The traction drive mechanism must be designed to withstand thermal
shock even though night operation is not required. During a lunar day mis-
sion it is possible for the vehicle to run into a shadow which will create a
much more severe thermal shock than the normal moon surface tempera-
ture gradient. This thermal shock can occur when the vehicle path carries
it into a region which has been shaded for an extended period of time, for
example, early in the lunar day when the shadowed region has not been ex-
posed to the sun. Under these conditions, the lunar surface will not have
been warmed sufficiently by conduction to provide heat to the traction drive
mechanism.
As it is presently designed, the traction drive mechanism would
not operate during the lunar night. Even though enough heat were generated
in the motor to keep the motor and transmission functioning, it is unlikely
that enough would be transferred into the drive wheel outer bearing race to
prevent interference in the bearing. To what extent this problem can be
relieved by supplying additional heating power is not readily determined.
In any case, lunar night operation would require a redesign requiring addi-
tional weight and power.
Z. 5. 5. 3 TDM Reliability Predictions
Mission Operation
As indicated above, the value for the operational reliability of the
traction drive mechanism is given by:
D O = D 1 . D 2 . D 3 . D 4 . D 5 . D 6 . D 7 . D 8 for unqualified suc-
cess in the drive mode (see Table Z. 5-13) and;
mode.
D _._
m D'6 "
D' 6 and D' 7
D' 7 . D 8 in the minimum performance or free wheeling
are tabulated in Table Z. 5-14.
A tabulation of the numerical values of these reliabilities is shown
in Table Z. 5-1 5.
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TABLE 2. 5-14
TRACTION DRIVE RELIABILITY FREE WHEELING MODE..{Dm)
Distance D' 6 D' 7 D8 D
Km m
i0 1 • 9995 • 99986 .99936
20 1 • 9995 . 99976 .99926
40 1 • 9995 . 99945 .99895
60 1 • 9995 . 99910 .99860
TABLE 2. 5-15
TRACTION DRIVE MECHANISM RELIABILITY
Drive Mode Free Wheeling ModeDi stance
Km D Do m
i0.8 rpm Z rpm
I0 .998Z2 .99642 .99936
20 .99643 .9929Z .99926
40 .98640 .98270 .99895
60 .97731 .93365 .99860
It must be remembered that D O and D m do not necessarily relate to the
same time base. It is much more likely that the unit will have operated
for some extended period before D m is applied. In this case, D 8 will
not be starting at 0 kilometers. From the mathematical standpoint this
has no significance if the failure rate is constant. If, however, there is
some factor of either time or distance which alters the failure rate of the
wheel bearing (affecting D8) over the regime under consideration, extreme
care must be exercised in interpreting the results from this analysis. This
only accentuates the need to know more about the wheel bearing behavior.
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Che ckout
The Traction Drive Mechanism is inoperative during the checkout
period. Explosive actuator checks are standard procedure, any inadvertent
firing could not go undetected. Continuity checks on electrical circuits are
also routine. No reliability correction factor need be applied for the check-
out.
Launch to Lunar Landing
The Traction Drive Mechanism is also inactive during this period.
Remote monitoring of ground check points would provide condition informa-
tion but _uula.... have no effect on the reliability. As a mechanical device de-
signed for shock and vibration, the traction drive mechanism will not be de-
graded by extremes experienced during lunar landing.
Z. 5. 5.4 Failure Mode, Effect and Cirticality Analysis
Probability of Occurrence
One of the difficulties in extracting the probability of occurrence
data from the values for reliability is that of proportioning to total failures
among the several modes of failure. The quantity of test required to ac-
complish this accurately is not yet available. In lieu of more exact infor-
mation the following assignments have been made.
1. Motor winding failures have been equally divided between
open and insulation failure.
2. Motor and transmission bearings are 70 percent fatigue fail-
ures (seizure) and 30 percent wear (high friction).
3. Essentially all bellows failures are due to fatigue.
4. Gear failures are wear-out or lubrication breakdown type.
. Drive sprocket bearing failures are Z0 percent fatigue-type,
40 percent metal-to-metal welding and 40 percent seal fail-
ure.
In view of this arbitrary assignment, the element criticalness is
likely to be less significant than the criticalness rating for the part.
2-344 IV
BSR 903
Degrading Effect on Performance
The degrading effect of the failure on the performance of the unit
is assigned in accordance with the definitions of the degradation categories
presented below:
Category 1 -
Failure causes abort
Category 2 -
Failure requires transfer
to free wheeling mode 0.7
Category 3 -
Failure produces a degraded
mode of drive operation 0.4
Category 4 -
Failure has slight effect 0. i
On the basis of these definitions all of the failure modes presented
in Table 2. 5-16 fall in the first three categories.
C riticalne s s
The criticalness level of the failure as represented by the product
of the probability of occurrenc_ _,_ the degrad_tiov rating are shown in
column 3 of Table 2. 5-16. For further definition, rankings for the specific
faihres are presented in the fourth column.
On the basis of this analysis one must conclude that the motor is
the most critical component from the performance standpoint. From the
mission viewpoint, however, there is always the chance to go to the free
wheeling mode. If one combines the criticalness effect of the motor with
that of the explosive actuator (value 4. 2) the over-all result indicates the
drive wheel to be most critical. This is most logical since a failure in the
drive wheel affects the performance in either mode of operation.
2. 5. 5. 5 Problem Areas and Improvement Analysis
As a result of the reliability analysis certain problem areas emerge
as significant factors in the reliability. Some design improvements and
IV 2-345
BSR 903
_D
!
u_
m
<
U3
<
Z
<
0
_D
I--.I
o.
I14
I
_o-.-
l
I _"_ I_'_ ,,_I::II I_'BI I_ '''°"
OOOO OOO OO
o
.,,'I
,.+3o_ .,_m _,_
_ " + ._._._
d AAAAA _ _ & &
P3
: )kO 0
:_
0
A
o oo
_,-I _-t r't
l!i
._o
..=1._1-.1
2-346 IV
BSR 903
component developments which are required to improve the reliability of
the traction drive mechanism are suggested in the following paragraphs.
De sign Improvements
The reliability analysis indicates that the electric motor is a key
problem area in the traction drive mechanism. Much doubt exists over
the meaning of life data supplied by the vendor and the method by which
this should be intepreted. The analysis to date does not indicate that the
motor is excessively stressed with respect to the power requirement;yet
some of the part life expectancy data indicate that a more detailed exami-
nation of motor bearings and brushes is required. The state-of-the-art of
bearings has been advancing rapidly, and this particular problem is one of
selection rather than development. Advances in brush development are not
obtained as readily; however, some effort has been directed at solving this
problem. Bendix is already investigating some recently proposed motor
designs which appear to offer advantages in both weight and reliability.
Because of the critical nature of the drive wheel assembly a com-
plete design analysis and re-evaluation is in order. A re-examination of
the grease retention and contaminant exclusion problems is already being
undertaken. It is recommended that this have high priority in Phase II of
this program.
A more rigorous study should be conducted of the lunar night envi-
ronmental effects on the traction drive mechanism. This study should con=
tain a re-evaluation of metallic material selections, lubrication, explosive
components and all non-metallic materials.
C omponent Developrnent
There is an apparent need to develop a small drive motor with
adequate brush life. A motor properly sized to accomplish the mechanical
functions within reasonable weight and size limitations is only marginal
with respect to reliability.
At a very early date the drive wheel assembly should be built and
tested in a simulated lunar environment (within the limits of available equip-
ment). Effectiveness of the grease seal in a high vacuum enviromuaent is
especially important. Because of the critical position this assembly has
in the operation of the mobility system, time should be allowed for a reli-
ability demonstration.
The explosive decoupling device is a new design upon which no
substantiated reliability data are available. The mechanical portion of this
device should have a reliability demonstration.
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2. 6 DEPLOYMENT
The deployment subsystem reliability block diagram is shown in Fig-
ure 2. 6-1. A mission success for the subsystem is defined as the deploy-
ment of the LRV from the Surveyor and subsequent erection of the TV
camera, steerable antenna, omni-antenna, and RF ranging antenna.
The presumed sequence of events would be as follows:
Upon landing of the Surveyor on the lunar surface, a ground command
will be sent and received via the Surveyor command subsystem and
will be transferred to the LRV through the umbilical connector and
_'_rness..._ _-:__,_o command ......will Lhen fire the squibs associated with the
release of the LRV right and left struts and release of the four LRV
tracks. A second ground command will then be sent for firing the
squibs associated with partial release of the steerable antenna, release
of the right and left ejector springs, a delayed release of the omni and
RF ranging antennas and release of the umbilical connector. The
second command results in ejection of the LRV from the Surveyor.
Upon landing on the lunar surface the omni and RF antennas erect.
A ground command is then sent to the LRV through its command sub-
system for firing of the squibs associated with the release and erection
of the TV camera and steerable antenna. This completes the deploy-
ment function.
The reliability mathematical model for the deployment subsystem is
obtained by using the reliability block diagram. Since this block diagram
indicates a series arrangement of the sub-units, the total reliability is
obtained by the product of the reliabilities of all of the sub-units. The
total reliability is then given by the expression:
i-- 23
R B = riB. 1
i= l
The reliability equation for each sub-unit is shown in Table 2.6-l,
which indicates the reliability of each sub-unit for the mission, together
with the total reliability of the subsystem. As shown in Table 2. 6-I the
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subunif_reliabilities are high because some operate for a short period of
time to accomplish the mission and others are one cycle operations such
as squib firing, ejecting springs, etc. This then produces a high subsystem
reliability of 0. 99850 for the mission.
Because of the above high reliability and the provision for dual firing
circuits for each squib, the probability of failure for the subsystem will
be low.
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Z. 7 STRUCTURE AND THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY
ANALYSIS
This section contains the reliability analysis for the SLRV structure
and thermal control subsystem for determining the reliability block diagram
and mathematical model.
The structure and thermal control subsystem provides the mounting
and temperature control requirements for the SLRV subsystems. The
structure consists of the two body elements (with steering straps) and the
struts. The thermal control subsystem includes: (1) thermal coatings
applied to the SLRV structure, (2) a thermal plate used to mount the elec-
4---^ : ^1_--^_ for _^_ _-_--1 .... _-I.. ^ _1_ .... 1 ._.... 1_4-^.1 ......... 1_^'---- 4-1...
electronics to the thermal plate, (3) strip heaters installed in six units
for maintaining temperatures during lunar nights, and (4) the on-off control
relay and temperature limit switch for commanded operation of the heaters
and to turn the heaters off automatically if a temperature lin_it is reached.
The reliability block diagram for the structure and thermal con-
trol subsystem is shown in Figure 2.7- 10 A mission success is defined
as that obtained from the proper function of the structure and thermal
control elements. Thus the reliability block diagram indicates a series
chain of the elements. It had been planned to use redundant elements for
the control relay, temperature switch, and heaters, but an investigation
of the probability of failure for these parts (based on a mission time of
4.5 months) indicated a very low probability of failure° In addition, the
strip heaters are actually redundant in construction since the heater ele-
ments are wired in parallel and openings in the elements would not prevent
the heater from operating. Consequently, the redundant parts were elim-
inated giving a series chain for the reliability block diagram.
Figure 2.7-2 shows the reliability block diagram for the redundant
configuration. The parallel combination of control relays, A3, provided
to ensure a success if one relay did not operate. Series relay, A4, was
provided to ensure success if either relay of A3 failed because of a shorted
contact. A parallel combination of the temperature limit control switch
was provided to ensure success in the event that the switch failed in an
open condition. Finally, the strip heaters for each unit were parallelled
to provide success if one heater failed due to an open condition.
Z-35Z IV
BSR 903
In
,-4
o
o
t)
,--4
4-*
!
°,-4
o
Z
._-_
O
,--4
m
4-;
,-4
.m
.,.4
,--4
IV 2-353
BSR 903
v
i I
i
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
i
I
I
i I
I
W
I
i
I
d
I
I
If0
I
4_
O
,i--I
O
O
[..4.-4
O
u_g_
oe-(
2-354 IV
BSR 903
From Figure 2.7-1, the mathematical model for reliability becomes
the product of the reliability A 1 through AI0 or
10
RA = _ ai. (z.7-1)
i=l
Since the strip heaters are identical and operate at the same time,
Equation (Z. 7-1) can then be rewritten as
4
RA _- II R i X (A5) 6 - (2.7-2)
The reliability equations for the subunits
=k itl
A 1 = e
-k 2tl
A 2 = e
-K3C 1
A 3 = e
-k4C 2
A 4 = e
=k 5t2.A 5 = e
are as follows:
(z.7- 3)
(2.7-4)
(z.7-s)
(2.7-6)
(z.7-7)
where: k 1 =
k
2 =
failure rate of support structure
failure rate of thermal plate and cover
k3 = failure rate of on-off control relay
k4 = failure rate of temperature limit switch
k 5 = failure rate of strip heater
t = operating time
C = cycles
Substituting the above equations into Equation Z. 7-Z the mission reliability
becomes:
-klt -kzt -k3C 1 -k4C 2 (-k5t2) 6R A=e I x e 1 x e x e x e (2.7-8)
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The reliability for a mission time of 4.5 months can then be ob-
tained by solving Equation (2° 7-8) using the failure rates shown on the
reliability prediction sheets at the end of this section and the following:
I. Assume the reliability of the structure and thermal plate
and cover to be 0. 9999°
. That heater operation is required only during lunar nights,
giving eight cycles of the control relay (one at the beginning
and end of each lunar night) and heater operation time of
1512 hours for four lunar night periods°
. Assume the temperature limit switch operates only a
short period of time during the lunar nights; therefore the
reliability is approximately unity.
From the above assumptions the values for t and C become:
tI = 3294 hours
t2 = 1344 hours
C I = 8 cycles
C2 = 0
Therefore, the reliability for the 4.5-month mission is:
-0.09x 10 -5 -0. 001
R A = 0. 9999 x 0. 9999 x e xlxe
and
RA= 0.9990.
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2. 8 PRIME POWER
Z. 8.1 Parametric Studies Summary
During the first bimonthly period, reliability parametric data were
generated for a prime power subsystem consisting of an RTG and a DC-DC
converter. During the second bimonthly period, the study was continued
and provided parametric data for the reliability comparison of five prime
power subsystem concepts: RTG, RTG-solar cells, RTG-battery, solar
cells-battery, solar cells-battery-isotope heat source and their necessary
associated electronics and electromechanical activators. The concepts
rank from highest to lowest in the order named. An RTG was chosen for
the SLRV (see Volume III, Book 2, Section ii).
2. 8. Z Reliability Model and Prediction
The reliability model for the prime power subsystem is a simple
series chain consisting of the RTG, DC-DC converter and the regulator.
Alambda of 0. 1%/1000 hours was assumed for the RTG. The reliability
model of the DC-DC converter regulator is a simple series chain of all
its piece parts which results in the equation
whe re
k. = failure rate in %/1000 hours for the ith part
I
n = total number of parts.
The resulting prime power subsystem reliability is 0.970 for 4000 hours of
operation. Table 2.8-i provides backup details for this prediction. The
schematic for the converter upon which the prediction is based is shown
in Figure Z. 8-I.
2.8.3 Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis
The methodology is the same as for other subsystems discussed in
previous sections. The five most critical failure modes are listed in
Table 2.8-2. Opening of the center taps on the power transformer and
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Figure Z.8-1 Prime Power Converter Schematic Diagram
Z -364 IV
BSR 903
>
I.-4
<
U_
O
=
w
O
U_
I
O
O N
_ 0
_._ _ _ _ _.
o_ oo oo _o
N _
0 m 0 0
O_J3 _,m _ 0 m
o_ o_ o_ _
O O O O O
O O _ D'- un
O O O O O
O O O O O
O O O O C3
O O O D'- un
O C3 O O O
H H
W 0 _
O O _ m O
N
i
N, "7 _ N
H H H ,
g g r _ -
_J Q;
> >
O O
.,-4
m
IV 2-365
BSR 903
saturable core transformer (T-2 and T-1 respectively in Figure 2.8-1)
in the oscillator circuit both result in complete loss of power from the
converter. T-2 is rated more critical than T-1 since T-2 has thegreater
number of windings and terminals, hence greater susceptibility to the open
failure mode. Shorting of C-l, filter capacitor on the output of the RTG,
also results in complete loss of power output. Although shorting of either
transistor in the oscillator circuit results in 75% compared to 100% loss
for opening of either R-1 orR-2, the probability of occurrence of the
transistors shorting is greater. Detail results of the analysis are in-
cluded in Tables 2.8-3 through 2.8-5. Table 2.8-4 has been truncated
with E- 3 output because E-5 through E- 12 are all similar.
-. o. 4 Conclusions
The reliability of the prime power subsystem could be improved
as follows :
lo Careful design, selection of materials and mounting terminals,
exercising extreme care in electro-mechanical mounting,
assembly, and potting procedures for transformer T:I and
T-2.
2. The C-1 shorting failure mode can be minimized by providing
series redundant capacitors of appropriate value.
3. Parallel redundancy for the transistors in the oscillator would
reduce the criticality of the short mode of those transistors.
Considering the relatively high reliability 0. 970 of the prime power sub-
system, any improvement in this subsystem would provide only a negli-
gible improvement in overall system reliability. Therefore, major
reliability effort will be concentrated on subsystems which will result
in considerable improvement in the overall system reliability.
Z-366 IV
BSR 903
!
aO
m
.,..4
.1.4
,Q
,.a
0
0
_ k
0
°w,I
4_
| .-4
0 _ 0
i •
4,,,*
o 0
¢_,.el
i r./3
_P 'q_ _1_ 0 '_ _P
a0
o
N
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N
_I _ e_
N N N O D'- N(_ N N 0 0 0
"_: 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0n
_-_-_ 0 0 0 0 0 0
q_
0
0
aO
0
0".
o
0
0
0
N ,,,0
N N 0 _ _ r.- o
0 o o o 0 0 o
0 0 o o o 0 o
0 o o o 0 0 0
L)
0",
0
0
0
0
N
00,_ o
v
0 _-
o
!
[-4
N D'- Q0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
• • @
N
!
u
o ._.
o u
o._ u
4-_ ._ ,el
IV Z-367
BSR 903
0
o,m
Nm
TABLE Z. 8-4
FAILURE EFFEC TS NOMENCLATURE
PART FAILURE SUBSYSTEM EFFECTS
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
Zero power from converter
Reduced power
Increased Ripple %
Reduced regulation
Minor decrease in power
Zero regulation
Power reduction greater than 50%
Effect is assumed minor to system
Zero power on associated "E" subsystem
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C-I
R-I
L
L
LL
LL
L-I
L-I
L-Z
L-Z
CT-I
CT-I
L-3
L-3
L-4
L-4
CT-2
CT-2
R-2
BSR 903
TABLE Z. 8-5
CR ITICALIT Y ANAL YSIS
l_rt Failure Effects
Table 7
Short Open
A
B-G
A
A
A
G
G
A
G
G
A
A
Drift
B-C
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
Subsystem Degradation
Short
I00
%
Open
2O
100
100
100
6O
60
100
6O
6O
100
100
Drift
10
fi
_u
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
.0440
.0005
.0002
.0150
.0500
.0088
.0500
.0088
.0300
.0088
.0300
,0088
,0500
.0088
.0300
.0088
00300
,0088
.0500
.0088
.0150
M
I.=1
2
20
21
6
1
11
1
11
3
11
3
11
1
11
3
11
3
11
1
11
6
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TR
TR-2
ZR- 1
ZR-2
L-5
L-5
L-6
L-6
CT-2
CT-2
CR-I
TABLE 2. 8-5 (continuod)
Part Failure Effects
Table 7
Short
G
G
F
F
Open Drift
G-C
E
G-C
E
A
D
A
D
G-C
H
G-C
H
G-C
H
G-C
E
Subsystem
DegradAtion
%
Short
75
75
25
25
8.3
Open
5O
50
I00
I00
4.15
4.15
100
4.98
Drift
2O
2O
• 166
.166
All
All
All
AI]
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
E-I
E-I
E-I
E-I
E-I
E-I
E-I
E-I
E-I
"._?.,
.0270
.0035
.0092
io
4
13
9
.0270
°0035
.0092
.0095
.0012
.0093
.0095
.0012
.0093
.0025
.0088
.0025
.0088
.05OO
.0010
.0091
.0033
.00005
4
13
9
7
17
8
7
17
8
5
11
5
10
1
18
10
14
24
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TABLE Z. 8-5 (continued)
Part Failure Effects
Tabie 7
t4
_, Short Open Drift
CR-Z I
G-C
E
C-Z I
B-C
B-C
ZR-3 I
F
D
L-7 G-C
,I H
L-8 G-C
" H
CT-4 G-C
" H
CR- 3 I
G-C
CR-4 I
G-C
E
E
Subsystem
Degradation
%
Short Open Drift
8.3
4.98
• 166
8.3
4.15
• 830
8.3
1.66
.830
4.15
• 166
4.15
• 166
4.15
• 166
8.3
4.98
• 166
8.3
4.98
• 166
E-I
I!
I!
11
!!
!!
!l
!1
II
E-Z
1!
1!
11
!1
II
!1
!!
!!
I!
!!
t!
0092
0033
00005
0035
0001
000001
0030
0000Z
0007
0025
0088
0025
0088
.0025
0088
0092
0033
00005
0092
0033
00005
t+
9
14
23
13
23
25
15
24
19
16
11
16
11
16
11
9
14
23
9
14
23
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TABLE 2. 8-5 (continued)
Part Failure Effects Subsystem
Degradation ._
Table 7 % _
Short Open Drift Short Open Drift _
ZR-4 F 8. 3 E-2
" A I.66 "
D •830 "
L-9 G-C 4. 15 E-3
" H .166 "
L- I0 G-C 4. 15 "
'J H .166 "
CT-5 G-C 4.98 "
" H . 166 "
CR- 5 I 8.3 "
" G-C 4.98 "
" E I. 66 "
CR-6 I 8.3 "
" G-C 4.98 "
" E I. 66 "
C-4 I 8.3 "
" B-C 4.98 "
" B-C I. 66 "
ZR- 5 I 8.3 "
" F I. 66 "
" D .830 "
4-J
,_ .,-. _"_
• 0030
00002
0007
0025
0088
0025
0088
0025
OO88
0092
0033
00005
0092
0033
00005
0035
0001
000001
OO3O
00002
0007
15
24
i9
16
II
16
II
16
II
9
14
23
9
14
23
13
22
25
15
24
19
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SECTION 3
MAINTAINABILIT Y
The Phase I SLRV design maintainability attributes are described to
show how requirements are met for inspection, checkout, test, parts and
components replacement, disassembly, reassembly, repair, and main-
tenance performance from fabrication through launch countdown. The de-
sign inherently eliminates potential human-induced failures, and gives
assurance that preflight maintenance action and handling can be performed
with minimum wear and stress on flight articles.
3. i PHASE I DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
SLRV design feasibility is partially a function of the ability to survive
prelaunch life and retain peak reliability. Thus a vehicle must be designed
which can survive storage, shipment, handling, test, and required service
with a minimum wear accumulation. The test and inspection program re-
quired for flight acceptance is designed to reveal defects requiring corrective
action prior to flight. Therefore, Phase I development details which es-
tablish the feasibility of fault location and corrective actions are described
in the following sections. However, detailed procedures are not developed
3. 2 MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS DURING LIFE OF SLRV
Inspection, adjustment, and repair procedures must be performed
with minimum effects on remaining parts, and minimum delay in schedules
• or countdown. A design which satisfies these requirements will be amenable
to relatively easy retrofitting; such retrofitting may be required when data
from preceding Surveyor flights become available.
Following fairing installation, (see HAC 239503, Par. 3.6), only
temperatures and selected test points will be monitored through telemetry
channels provided by Surveyor (HAC 239503). Failures detected after this
time require that the standby Surveyor be substituted for the mission. The
effect on possible re-use of the RTG as a function of using the standby
Surveyor will be further studied.
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3.3 SUBSYSTEM REPAIRABILITY
Each of the following maintainability considerations is discussed for
each subsystem where available design detail permits:
I. Repair and replacement disassembly sequence.
2. Subassemblies, throwaway units or modules, throwaway rationale.
3. Disassembly: techniques.
4. Reassembly: RFI shielding, thermal continuity, thermal reflective
coatings, requirements for matched parts.
5. Servicing requirements: tuning, adjustment, lubrication, and
checks.
6. Can performance decrement, wear, or total failure be detected and
located for each assembly, subassembly, or throwaway unit?
7. Is special or automatic checking equipment required?
8. Are special tools, jigs, or fixtures required for any maintenance,
repair, or transport?
9. Service Access: How does it relate to structural or functional re-
quirements of the design and to frequency and criticality of service?
i0. How does the unit withstand extended storage: restrictions in
storage environment, position, condition, time to prevent oxidation,
and other types of deterioration?
II. How does the unit withstand repeated handling, transport, manipu-
lation, and their effects on surface and contents?
12. Hazards to personnel and equipment.
13. Special skills and critical operations.
14. Could any maintainability features adversely effect mission suc-
cess probability?
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3.4 STRUCTURE AND VEHICLE ASSEMBLY
Figure 3-1 shows behicle disassembly for major replaceable compon-
ents or subsystems. The structure is primarily designed to permit service
access, and flexibility in thermal design. No special disassembly or re-
assembly sequence is required, since replaceable subassemblies are readily
accessible. The only exception to this maintainability scheme is the odom-
eter which must be removed to replace the left rear traction drive assembly.
One structural member with threaded attachment hardware must be removed
to replace the RTG.
The temperature of the vehicle assembly will rise when the RTG is
activated. The vehicle half containing the RTG will rise approximately
300°F; i.e., 200°F below the surface temperature of the RTG. At this tem-
perature, special handling devices will facilitate handling and reduce risk
of burns.
Vehicle surface treatment will conform to thermal design requirements.
The full effect of changes to thermal control surface cannot be predicted at
this time. Therefore, all necessary handling must minimize changes in
the surface condition caused by abrasion and soiling.
Gages will be provided to check the structure for excessive elasticity
or permanent deformation to assure proper geometric alignment of all sub-
systems. The shipping container will provide added support during shipping_
handling, and storage to maintain proper alignment.
The deployment assembly is secured by two pins and their respective
explosive pin extractors. The strut tiedown and pivot lock assembly is
removed by two explosive bolts.
3.5 RTG
The supplier will perform any disassembly/reassembly procedures
deemed necessary. However, such actions take the RTG out of service
for several weeks. Servicir_g requirements will consist of voltage monitor-
ing and surface temperature measurement. If fuel is delivered separately,
heat capacity will be checked. Disassembly for repair and replacement of
this unit is not presently foreseen.
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OMNI
ANTENNA
ELECTRONIC
COMPARTMENT
TELEVISION
RF RANGING DIRECTIONAL
ANTENNA ANTENNA
RTG POWER
SUPPLY
AFT
STIFFNER
®
BODY
STRUCTURE
SUSPENSION
/
SOLAR ASPECT
SENSOR TRACTION DRIVE
ASSEMBLY
ODOMETER
Figure 3-1 Vehicle Disassembly for Replacement of
Major Components
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If fuel is removed and reinstalled, RTG performance must be checked
to assure adequate performance. The removal and reinstallation must anti-
cipate replacement of the entire RTG. This is true for all procedures that
permit the RTG to cool after it has been brought to operating temperature.
The permissable number of these heat cycles is limited, and accurate
records of heat cycles must be kept throughout the life of the RTG. Since
knowledge of the full extent of deterioration resulting from alterations in
heat and cold has not been precisely determined, it is anticipated that pre-
launch procedures will prevent the cooling of the RTG.
Life of the system with radio isotope fuel installed is limited. Thus
the fuel will be installed at the latest possible time, within 12 days of launch.
If the heating compartment is opened, oxygen must be removed and an inert
atmosphere substituted.
No special test equipment is required since voltage and _---ur1_---_tempera-
ture checkpoints are expected to be an integral part of the unit. However,
special shipping and storage facilities will be required for temperature
control.
Personnel and equipment hazards will result from the 500°F surface
temperatures; however, radiation hazards are not anticipated. The sup-
plier will furnish the personnel required to perform any operations on the
RTG.
3.6 ELECTRICAL COMPARTMENT
The electrical compartment contains nine electronics and mechanical
packages :
I. Penetrometer. 5. Converter.
2. Inclinometer. 6. Command Decoder.
3. Command Receiver. 7. Telemetry Processor.
4. Transmitter. 8. Odometer Processor.
9. Mobility Control.
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The electronic packages are attached to one thermal plate in a manner
which permits intact removal of the entire electronics package. Replace-
ment with an intact unit permits relatively low down-time in the event of
electronic failure.
Defective subsystems can be removed from this assembly without dis-
turbing the remainder of the assembly. RF conductors and interconnections
between packages by printed-circuit cables will permit individual detachment
of units.
The packages divide into modular throwaway units and components,
with digital circuits composed entirely of modules. The packaging scheme
will be chosen partially on the basis of component reliability, cost, space,
and effect of disassembly on circuit reliability.
The units are quickly disassembled by unfastening screws and unsoldering
taper pin interconnections. The units are just as easily reassembled.
RFI shielding can be quickly restored by simply reapplying the con-
ductive pair_t with a brush. The packaging materials which will be used
ensure that thermal conduction between reassembled parts does not require
precise fits or application of thermal conducting interface materials.
The reflecting surface on the thermal plate may be broken during dis-
assembly and reassembly. The effects of such slight damage, and the pos-
sible correction actions have not yet been determined.
Requirements for selective fits and matched parts in reassembly are
held to a minimum, and servicing requirements consist of programmed
checking of digital circuits and retuning of some RF circuits following
prolonged periods of test or storage. Performance decrement, wear, or
total failure can easily be measured at the test points. Special checkout
equipment and programs will be provided for this assembly and its subsys-
tems to aid in performance analysis and fault isolation. The packaging
concept provides service access without compromise to structural and
functional integrity, and places no restrictions on frequency and criticality
of service. Special jigs, fixtures, or shipping containers are not required.
The unit is not unduly affected by extended storage, can withstand repeated
handling, and creates no hazards to personnel and equipment. Special skills
requirements can be met by Bendix personnel.
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3.6. 1 Penetrorneter
From a functional and maintainability standpoint, the flight model of
the penetrometer will be similar to the existing engineering prototype. Thus,
the detail level of this discussion furnishes a reliable description of flight
model maintainability.
The unit can be disassembled from the electronics package thermal
plate by removing the cover, wiring, and finally the unit proper. Modular
construction of this unit permits further disassembly into four modules.
Replacement of any one of these modules, reassembly, and installation
could thus be accomplished at field locations.
Calibration can be accomplished with a laboratory platform balance
and a multi-range voltage measuring instrument which provides at least
a 100,000-ohm input impedence. Calibration must be performed so that
suspension deflection of the vehicle may be considered.
Special skills for critical operations are only required for disassembly
beyond the module stage.
3.6.2 Inclinometer
The inclinometer is located in the electronics package and is fully
interchangeable. It consists of two accelerometers packaged to permit
appropriate alignment and calibration. It may be repaired by replacing
the mechanical or electronic module on either accelerometer.
lo Inclinometer reassembly requires alignment. Recalibration with
respect to the guide-pin locating holes is accomplished at the
supplier's facility.
Q The inclinometer is replaced in the electronics package and in-
stalled in the SLRV by using the system of locating pins. Thus,
replacement of this unit can be accomplished at AMR with align-
ment accuracies required by the navigational subsystem.
3.6.3 Sun Sensor
Each sun sensor is a replaceable part, and although they are not
attached to the electronics package, they are critically aligned with the
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inclinometer on the electronics package. Each is calibrated to guide pin
holes, and aligned on the SLRV to the required accuracy by guide pins.
3.7 ANTENNAS
The three antennas can be disconnected at their bases without further
disassembly of components other than connecting hardware. Each of the
three antenna types is designed to be fully interchangeable if properly aligned
at some stage prior to installation. This maintenance action is feasible
for all projected alternatives of RF conducter development.
3.8 TRACTION DRIVE ASSEMBLY
Each traction drive assembly is detached from the vehicle by removal
of one lock nut and associated assembly hardware. To ensure reliability
and weight savings, this assembly is constructed for complete replacement,
and further disassembly is not required. Certain components, however,
may be salvaged. Replacement units for the left and right side of the SLRV
will differ. Thus, future adjustment and monitoring is not required; how-
ever, continuity checks may be performed on the motors at any time.
Operational checks may be performed in any environment and will have no
effect on the equipment except for normal wear.
Wear indications may be checked on all visible surfaces including
idler and drive unit rims and both sides of the track. Power input measure-
ment may also be used to determine assembly performance. Special
measuring equipment will be used to set track tension at the factory. No
special containers, tools, jigs, or fixtures will be required for storage,
shipment, and handling. There are no restrictions on storage time or en-
vironment. Exterior surfaces requiring special handling are not currently
considered in the design.
Sharp edges on the track may pose a personnel hazard. Explosives
are planned for two applications on each TDA, but time, method of installa-
tion, and testing requirements are not yet fixed. No special skills are
required to maintain this unit.
3.8.1 Odometer
The odometer is attached by threaded fastening hardware to the left
rear traction drive assembly. (Phase II design can eliminate special
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sparing requirements for left rear traction drive assemblies necessitated
by the odometer attachment.) The wheel-bearing/transducer-dish assembly
can be replaced independent of the pickoff/suspension assembly. These
two assemblies will be replaced as non-repairable modules (cost of repairing
these modules will nearly equal their procurement cost).
3.9 TV SUBSYSTEM
If the SLRV TV subsystem fails, it will be removed, and a new TV
will be installed. The faulty TV subsystem is then repaired in the shop.
Detailed shop-repair time is excluded from the present maintainability
analysis.
The requirements for reliability, weight, volume, and packaging will
normally have precedence over maintainability because of the vehicle and
mission requirements and constraints. The design of the TV subsystem
reflects this order of precedence.,
A preliminary maintainability analysis limited to the replacement of
a complete TV subsystem shows SLRV mean downtime (MDT) of 0.5 hour.
This estimate does not include time for the following repair elements, since
these are either variable, unknown in part or in whole, or not entirely a
function of Raytheon's design responsibility:
1. Detect failure.
3. Gain access to SLRV TV subsystem.
4. Checkout and verify proper operation of the replacement TV
subsystem.
Presumably the tools, facilities, equipment, technicians, and the
spare TV subsystem will be available when needed, thus precluding any
waiting, supply, or administrative downtime.
Since maintenance will not be accomplished during the mission, the
concept of availability (normally related to mean-time-between-failure
and mean downtime) is not significant, particularly in consideration of the
maintenance philosophy, the repair by engineering personnel, and the type
of equipment represented by the TV subsystem.
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The size, weight, volume, packaging requirements, and constraints
of the TV subsystem prevent the inclusion of the usual types and extent of
safety features and provisions which are normally designed into military
equipment.
The TV subsystem requirements and constraints, the maintenance
philosophy (maintenance by skilled engineering-type personnel rather than
by technicians of limited skills}, and the limited number of equipments to
be built, all combine to indicate the adequacy of minimal and reasonable
safety features to safeguard against equipment damage and personnel injury.
Safety provisions to prevent equipment damage during handling and
transportation are :
1. Provide suitable protective outer case for the complete TV subsystem,
2. Provide reasonable protection for the Galilean telescope aperture,
3. Avoid fragile protuberances on the outer case.
, Provide adequate design load margins for gearing, bearings, stops,
and structures between the coupled assembly consisting of camera
case, elevation drive, and azimuth drive, to prevent damage when
torques are inadvertently applied in handling this coupled assembly.
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